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Essays"on"Inequality"and"Market"Failure"
"
ABSTRACT"
"
This"dissertation"comprises"three"chapters.""The"first"chapter"develops"a"research"design"
to"estimate"the"causal"effect"of"parental"layoffs"and"income"during"adolescence"on"children’s"
college"outcomes,"and"implements"this"design"on"administrative"data"for"the"United"States.""The"
design"compares"outcomes"of"children"whose"fathers"lose"jobs"before"college"decisions"with"
outcomes"of"children"whose"fathers"lose"jobs"after"college"decisions."I"find"that"layoffs"and"
unanticipated"income"losses"during"adolescence"have"very"small"adverse"effects"on"future"
college"outcomes."These"effects"are"smaller"than"estimates"in"prior"work"based"on"firm"closures"
rather"than"timing"of"layoffs."I"replicate"these"larger"estimates"and"show"they"are"driven"by"
selection"of"workers"into"closing"firms."The"findings"suggest"that"relaxing"parental"liquidity"
constraints"during"adolescence"will"do"little"to"increase"enrollment"compared"to"improvements"
in"financial"aid,"especially"for"lowOincome"children."
The"second"chapter,"written"with"my"advisor"and"other"colleagues,"shows"that"classroom"
quality"in"early"childhood"has"large"causal"impacts"on"adult"outcomes,"and"that"test"score"gains"
can"help"to"identify"classroom"quality"even"when"these"gains"fade"out"over"time."We"first"link"
administrative"data"to"records"from"Project"STAR,"in"which"11,571"students"in"Tennessee"and"
their"teachers"were"randomly"assigned"to"classrooms"within"their"schools"from"kindergarten"to"
third"grade."We"then"document"four"sets"of"experimental"impacts.""First,"students"in"small"
iv"
classes"are"more"likely"to"attend"college"and"exhibit"improvements"on"other"outcomes."Second,"
students"who"had"a"more"experienced"teacher"in"kindergarten"have"higher"earnings."Third,"
students"who"were"randomly"assigned"to"higher"quality"classrooms"in"grades"KO3"OO"as"
measured"by"classmatesV"endOofOclass"test"scores"OO"have"higher"earnings,"college"attendance"
rates,"and"other"outcomes."Finally,"the"effects"of"class"quality"fade"out"on"test"scores"in"later"
grades"but"gains"in"nonOcognitive"measures"persist."
The"third"chapter"explores"theoretical"properties"of"markets"for"“credence"goods.”"
Credence"goods"such"as"health"care"involve"consumer"reliance"on"expert"diagnosis."When"
consumers"observe"expert"cost"functions,"competitive"markets"tend"strongly"toward"efficiency."I"
argue"that"consumers"do"not"observe"expert"cost"functions"and"extend"an"existing"model"to"
incorporate"this"insight."The"key"result"is"that"prices"and"competition"no"longer"eliminate"
mistreatment.""
v"
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I Do Parental Credit Constraints A§ect Childrenís College
Choices? Evidence From Timing of Parental Layo§s
I.A Introduction
Children with top-quartile family income during adolescence are Öve times more likely to graduate
from college than children with bottom-quartile family income during adolescence in the United
States (Bailey and Dynarski 2011). These educational gaps have large implications for economic
mobility and inequality in future generations. But does family income itself cause higher college
attendance, or do these di§erences stem from correlated factors such as preferences, abilities, beliefs
or income at earlier ages? Economic theory suggests that family income can a§ect childrenís edu-
cational outcomes if non-collateralizability of human capital constrains debt (Schultz 1961, Becker
1994) or if families value education as a consumption good (Lazear 1977, Mulligan 1997). However,
the extent to which these mechanisms a§ect college outcomes remains unclear due to a lack of
suitable research designs and data. Some studies argue that family income has substantial causal
e§ects on childrenís college education (e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke 2001, Belley and Lochner 2007,
Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens 2009, Lovenheim 2011), while others Önd much smaller e§ects (e.g.,
Mayer 1997, Blau 1999, Carneiro and Heckman 2002, and Cameron and Taber 2004).
In this paper, I provide new evidence on this question from variation in the timing of fathersí
layo§s around childrenís ages of college entry.1 I implement this research design using selected
administrative data on the population of parents and children in the United States and Önd that
the causal e§ect of unanticipated income on childrenís college outcomes is positive but small.
Furthermore, I replicate the research designs of prior studies in the literature that Önd much larger
e§ects, and show that these prior results are biased up by selection, reconciling the two sets of
I am very grateful for the advice and support of my primary advisor, Raj Chetty, throughout this project. I also
wish to thank advisors Larry Katz and Andrei Shleifer, as well as John Friedman, Gary Chamberlain, and Danny
Yagan for comments that greatly improved the paper. I also thank Josh Angrist, Sam Asher, Thomas Barrios, David
Cutler, Nora Dillon, Ed Glaeser, Josh Gottlieb, Jacob Leshno, Joana Naritomi, Arash Nekoi, Amanda Pallais, Jesse
Rothstein, Emmanuel Saez, Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Ian Tomb, and Clara Zverina for helpful comments. The
tax data were accessed through contract TIRNO-09-R-00007 with the Statistics of Income (SOI) Division. Research
support from the National Science Foundation and the Project on Justice, Welfare, and Economics is gratefully
acknowledged.
1Time-of-event variation, as opposed to time-of-outcome variation, is widely applied in empirical studies to detect
selection problems with cross-sectional estimators (Mayer 1997, Hurst and Lusardi 2004, Rothstein 2009, Coelli 2010,
Rege and Votruba 2011) and, less frequently, to identify causal e§ects (Grogger 1995, Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and
Almond 2012).
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Öndings.
My research design compares e§ects of layo§s that occur before children reach ages of col-
lege enrollment with e§ects of layo§s that occur after children reach ages of college enrollment.
Layo§s generate large, sudden reductions in family income (Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan 1993,
Wachter, Song and Manchester 2009, Stephens 2001) that lead to corresponding drops in consump-
tion (Gruber 1997, Stephens 2001, 2004, Chetty and Szeidl 2007). In addition, layo§s may also
reduce parental health and happiness (Wachter and Sullivan 2009, Kassenboehmer and Haisken-
DeNew 2009), and therefore may have even larger impacts on children than pure income shocks, an
issue I revisit below. The research design exploits these sharp, unanticipated changes in resources
to identify the causal e§ect of resources during adolescence on child outcomes.
The key identifying variation is straightforward. Suppose the outcome of interest is college
enrollment at age 18. Some children are 17 when their fathers experience layo§. These children
make their age-18 enrollment decision in an environment of low parental income, and perhaps lower
parental health. Other children are 19 when their fathers experience layo§. These children make
their age-18 enrollment decision before layo§s take place, in an environment of high parental income
and high parental health. These two groups of children are much more similar to each other than
to children who never experience a fatherís layo§, but their age-18 college decisions take place in
very di§erent resource environments. I interpret di§erences in college outcomes across these two
groups of children as the treatment e§ect of layo§. The research design generalizes the comparison
in this example into an event study framework incorporating outcomes and shocks at many ages,
and relies on familiar identiÖcation assumptions from di§erence-in-di§erence (DD) estimation such
as parallel trends, no-anticipation and no-manipulation that I conÖrm empirically.
I implement the research design on the full population of United States taxpayer records. The
data set is much larger than typical data sets used to match children and parents in the US, and it
contains less measurement error and virtually no attrition. The analysis sample contains millions
of children who experience a paternal layo§ between 2000 and 2009, and links these children to a
rich set of outcomes and family characteristics.
I Önd that layo§s reduce childrenís college enrollment by 0.43 percentage points (SE .09) or
1.1% of base enrollment during ages 18-22. Layo§s also reduce enrollment at colleges out of a
childís home state (0.529 percentage points or 2.0%), four-year colleges (0.27 percentage points or
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1.4%), and non-public colleges (0.1 percentage points or 1.5%), and reduce college quality deÖned
by alumni earnings ($84 or 0.35%). Fathersí layo§s also slightly increase the fraction of children
who work during adolescence and college.
The results suggest that 10-15% of the cross-sectional e§ect of late childhood family income
on college enrollment is due to late childhood parental inputs, and that a fatherís layo§ during
adolescence likely reduces the net present value of a childís future earnings by about $1,000-3,000.
In order to assess the plausibility of these small e§ects, I examine supplementary data sets on college
Önance gathered by Sallie Mae and the Department of Education. I Önd that the e§ects estimated
here are what one would expect from cross-sectional correlations between parental income and
spending on college (the Engel curve) in conjunction with the best estimated e§ects of college price
subsidies (Deming and Dynarski 2010). The key insight is that layo§s most likely reduce parent
college spending by only $100-500, predicting small e§ects of layo§s on enrollment even if children
respond as strongly to parental contributions as they respond to Önancial aid. Small income e§ects
are therefore easy to reconcile with existing evidence that children respond strongly to college price,
and may even be viewed as weak additional evidence in support of large price e§ects.
I am also able to measure biases from selection that arise in alternative research designs that
do not rely on timing of parental layo§s. Estimates that rely on cross-sectional variation in fatherís
layo§s and control for observable selection into layo§ are biased up by 200% in my data.2 Re-
searchers have tried to address concerns about selection into layo§ by restricting to Örm closures,
since workers displaced by Örm closure are not hand-picked by managers for layo§ (Oreopoulos,
Page and Stevens 2009, Bratberg, Nilson and Vaage 2008, Shea 2000). Surprisingly, I Önd that
Örm closures su§er from an even larger selection problem because they do not leave any within-Örm
ìsurvivorsî for use as a control group.
This Önding bears on a broad range of empirical applications measuring e§ects of Örm-level
shocks on outcomes that are di¢cult to observe for the same individual before and after shocks
take place. The problem can arise for outcomes that are absorbing states such as mortality (Wachter
and Sullivan 2009) and disability (Rege, Telle and Votruba 2009). The problem can also arise when
2Note my data contain a rich set of observables but lack any measure of childrenís pre-college academic achievement.
Past researchers that control for high school test scores have estimated e§ects of parental income that are more
consistent with those I obtain from timing of layo§s, though with relatively wide conÖdence intervals due to smaller
samples (e.g. Carneiro and Heckman 2002).
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shocks and/or outcomes are tied to speciÖc ages, as in the case of estimating childhood shocks on
adult earnings (Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens 2009) or college choices (Lovenheim 2011). Results
here suggest that it is important to analyze these outcomes in such a way that permits assessment
of parallel trends in the outcome itself prior to the shock, rather than relying on other observable
characteristics to control for selection across Örms. Here I assess the parallel trends assumption by
exploiting wide variation in the age at which shocks are experienced, rather than the age at which
outcomes are observed. Another approach is to examine Örm-level aggregate outcomes rather than
individual outcomes (Wachter and Sullivan 2009, Rege, Telle and Votruba 2009). The results here
suggest that caution is warranted when Örm-level analysis cannot reject problems with selection-
on-unobservables across Örms.
I am also able to shed some light on mechanisms underlying the main e§ects by examining
heterogeneous impacts across subgroups. Adverse e§ects of family income shocks on college enroll-
ment are U-shaped in family income levels: smallest at low incomes, larger at middle incomes, and
smaller again at high incomes. This non-monotonic pattern is easiest to explain with an income-
loss channel. Low-income children rely much less heavily on parents to Önance college (Sallie Mae
2011). Counterintuitively, college decisions of the lowest-income children therefore appear least vul-
nerable to parental income shocks during adolescence. In contrast, smaller e§ects for high-income
childrenóthe second half of the U-shapeócould arise if these parents are less liquidity-constrained
(Becker 1994), or if college is a smaller share of their total consumption (Mulligan 1997). I also
provide evidence that income losses in themselves are su¢cient to explain the main results by
showing that children reduce enrollment more in families that depend more heavily on fathersí
earnings, and in families where fathers are predicted to lose more earnings from layo§. Finally, the
evidence suggests that enrollment reductions after layo§ stem from permanent income declines, not
short-term liquidity constraints on parent spending.
The results of this paper contribute to the debate on how transfer programs to low-income
households should be structured. Programs that explicitly target children and parents account for
$300 billion or 10% of annual federal spending in the U.S.3 Income support for parents accounts for
about half of this; the other half subsidizes or provides child inputs such as education and health
3At the federal level, the main income support programs for parents are the Child Tax Credit, the Dependent
Exemption, and the Earned Income Tax Credit. The main child input subsidies are education and Medicaid grants
for states.
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care, bypassing parental preferences. The results here only capture e§ects of unanticipated income
changes during adolescence, holding Öxed parental incomes and child inputs at earlier ages, and
therefore only bear directly on e§ects of unanticipated income transfers to parents of older children.
However, the Öndings suggest that reducing input prices may be a much more e§ective policy to
increase child investments than policies that focus on raising parental incomes. For example, in
the case of college, the results suggest that input subsidies in the form of Önancial aid are likely
2-3 orders of magnitude more e§ective at raising college enrollment than policies that relax credit
constraints for parents of college-age children. The simplest explanation for small income e§ects
and large price e§ects is that parents only spend a small share of marginal income on assisting
children with college costs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data. Section III describes the empirical
strategy. Section IV presents estimated e§ects of fathersí layo§s on family resources and child
outcomes, and performs several robustness checks on the main results. Section V replicates prior
work on Örm closures, and documents selection-on-unobservables into employment at closing Örms.
Section VI estimates heterogeneous treatment e§ects of fathersí layo§s on children by income,
wealth, gender, and predicted earnings losses. Section VII discusses the main results in the context
of college Önancing in the U.S. Section VIII concludes.
I.B Data and Summary Statistics
I.B.1 Variables and Sample Restrictions
This paper draws on selected tables from the population of U.S. tax records. Many of the variables
used in this paper are described in Chetty, et al (2011). The population data sets underlying my
analysis have also been used in recent research by Chetty, Friedman and Rocko§ (2011), Chetty,
Friedman and Saez (2012), and Yagan (2012). The data contain variables on Form 1040 over the
years 1996-2009. These variables include adjusted gross income (AGI), marital status, residential
location, and various taxes paid and rebates received. I only observe these variables when families
Öle taxes. The data also contain variables on forms Öled by institutions on behalf of individuals,
or "information returns," for 1999-2009. These variables are observed independent of individual
Öling. These variables include earnings and deferred compensation (W2), unemployment insurance
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(1099G), disability insurance and social security payments (SSA-1099), college enrollment and
choice of college (1098T), mortgage interest payments (1098), and interest payments from Önancial
institutions (1099-INT). All of my key results rely exclusively on information returns around the
time of layo§. This is important because the probability of Öling a tax return varies sharply
around layo§, making it di¢cult to distinguish "real" behavioral responses from patterns induced
by changes in Öling propensities.
This data set has two large advantages over survey data sets that have typically been used
to study links between parents and children in the U.S. First, the main variables contain little
recall error, because they are reported by institutions relying on data from actual transactions.
Second, the sample size provides a large improvement in statistical power. The two standard
intergenerational survey data sets in the U.S., the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the National
Longitudtinal Survey of Youth, both contain a few thousand families, or approximately 1/10,000th
(0.01%) of the data used here. These two advantages prove critical to the analysis below. The
decrease in measurement error and increase in sample size allow me to employ a non-parametric
estimation strategy, estimate small e§ects with precision, and estimate separate e§ects on narrowly-
deÖned subgroups.
The data raise three issues that should be discussed, though none of them represent a serious
problem for the research design. First, I use unemployment insurance (UI) beneÖt collection to
identify layo§s. UI take-up rates are 72-83% in the U.S. (Currie 2006), and I show below that
layo§s deÖned by sudden UI take-up a§ect parental earnings and consumption similarly to layo§s
studied in prior research (Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan 1993, Wachter, Song and Manchester
2009, Chetty and Szeidl 2007).
Second, the 1098T form reáects enrollment of students at Title IV post-secondary institutions
in the U.S. This class of institutions covers most, but not all, college students in the U.S. In
Appendix 5 I document the extent of imperfect coverage, discuss why it is unlikely to bias my results
substantially, and perform two robustness checks using alternative measures of college enrollment.
One alternative measure relies on parental claiming of children over age 18 on the 1040, and one
measure restricts to colleges that report 1098Tís for an extra subset of students. Both measures
generate treatment e§ects consistent with those reported throughout the paper.
The Önal issue is that I discard 35% of children who I cannot match to fathers through the 1040
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form before the children turn 19. I discard 5% of children who are never claimed by parents (some
of whom likely immigrated to the U.S. after turning 18), 10% who are only claimed by mothers,
and 20% who are claimed by too many adults to identify the father with conÖdence. Children who
I fail to match with fathers tend to have less stable families or families that share claims among
adults to increase tax beneÖts.
These unmatched children have lower college enrollment rates than the children who I match
to fathers with conÖdence. One might worry that I bias my results toward zero by excluding
some lower-income children with complex family structures, because these children may be more
vulnerable to family income shocks. However, this is unlikely. Appendix 1 documents that the
sample of children I link to fathers lines up with the income distributions of comparable male-
headed households in the 2001 American Community Survey. The analysis sample therefore still
contains a large fraction of low-income children. This allows me to show that the e§ects of parental
layo§s on college enrollment for low-income children in my data are actually smaller than e§ects
on high-income children. As I discuss below, this is most likely due to the fact that low-income
children do not rely heavily on parental income to Önance college. It is therefore likely that sample
restrictions excluding low-income children bias my results up, not down. A second reason why the
sample restriction is unlikely to account for the main results is that I successfully replicate large
cross-sectional e§ects of Örm closures on child outcomes, as found in prior research (Oreopoulos,
Page and Stevens 2009).
I now describe the two primary samples used in estimation more precisely: "Layo§" and "Sur-
vivor" fathers. These samples contain events from 2000-2009 and outcomes from 1999-2009, along
with some 1040-based variables from 1996-1999. I rely on Survivors for removing time-trends from
the Layo§ group, not for removing selection into the Layo§ group.
 Layo§s. The layo§ sample contains 100% of fathers who experience an event deÖned as a
"layo§." I deÖne a "layo§" as occurring in year T if a father receives positive unemployment
insurance (UI) in year T , and receives zero UI in the prior year T 1. The no-UI-in-prior-year
restriction serves two purposes: it assures that the layo§ spell begins in the current year, and
it eliminates many repeated short-term layo§s followed by recall, since such layo§s generate
UI in consecutive years after the Örst layo§. I focus on fathers for consistency with prior
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research, and because fathersí earnings are a larger share of family income in most families.
 Survivors. Survivor fathers are a control group for Layo§ fathers. Survivors experience
"survival" in year T if they work at a Örm that lays o§ at least one father at T . They also
must receive zero UI at T  1, to match this restriction on Layo§ fathers. By this deÖnition,
there are no survivors for workers who lose their job in Örm closure, and there are no survivors
at Örms with no workers in the Layo§ sample. Workers are often survivors at some Örm in
every year they are observed. For example, every worker at a very large Örm will be a
"survivor" in every year, because very large Örms will likely have at least one Layo§ father
every year. For computational reasons, I therefore take a 30% random sample of survivors.
The Survivor sample is propensity-score reweighted to match the Layo§ sample on pre-event
characteristics.4 I choose reweighting rather than regression as a method of controlling for
these pre-event di§erences for reasons of convenience.
Note that if a father has N children and su§ers K events (layo§s, survivals), he enters the
data separately NK times. This means that "parent-based" samples are "adult-based" samples
weighted by NK:5 In the Layo§ sample, average N is 2.2 children per father and average K is 1.6
layo§s per father.
I.B.2 Summary Statistics and Cross-Sectional E§ects
Table 1.1 displays summary statistics for children at age 18 over 1999-2009. Each sample is described
by three columns: one column for children who reach age 18 pre-event, one for children who reach
age 18 post-event, and one column containing the percent change from pre-event to post-event.
Fatherís earnings are much lower after layo§s, but are also lower after survival, most likely reáecting
4The propensity score is estimated on the fraction of the displacing Örm that takes up UI, Öxed e§ects for two-digit
NAICS industry of displacing Örm, Öxed e§ects for three-digit zipcode of displacing Örm, gender, whether the worker
has any self-employment income 1996-1999, whether the worker had any deferred compensation in 1999, whether the
worker had any mortgage interest payments in 1999, Öxed e§ects for average number of children claimed by worker
1996-1999, Öxed e§ects for age of wife at childís birth (no mother found all coded with same age), Öxed e§ects for age
of father in year of layo§, marital status of father 1996-1999 interacted with quartic in total family income 1996-1999,
year of layo§ interacted with Örm size in year prior to layo§ interacted with quartic in earnings of father in year prior
to layo§. I restrict Layo§ and Survivor samples to propensity scores within [-.15, .95] and then reweight the Survivor
group to match the Layo§ group within each child cohort by event-year cell.
5Results reported below are robust to clustering on individual children. I ignore clustering issues within families
for computational convenience; this is unlikely to a§ect precision substantially because the number of families in my
sample is very large.
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that Survivors work at struggling Örms. Child college enrollment is actually higher on average after
layo§, but rises by even more after survival. The implied DD for e§ects of layo§ at any time in the
past on college enrollment at age 18 is -0.7 percentage points, which is similar to the e§ects I Önd
using the event study design below. Child earnings fall substantially over time within cohorts due
to a strong secular trend that has been documented elsewhere (Aaronson, Park and Sullivan 2007).
9
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Figure 1.1 plots the cross-sectional e§ects of mean family income from 1996-1999 on long-term
child outcomes in the Survivor sample. Figure 1.1.a plots college enrollment at Age 19 by parental
income. The function is approximately linear, with a slope of 0.5 percentage points per $1,000 of
family income. This slope combines causal e§ects of parental assistance with college costs, parental
spending on earlier child inputs, and many other factors that correlate with family income such
as attitudes toward education, cognitive and noncognitive abilities, and social networks. While
the pattern is dramatic, it is interesting to compare this slope to reported e§ects of Önancial aid.
The literature on Önancial aid estimates that $1,000 of salient, easily-obtained o§ered aid increases
college enrollment by about 3 percentage points (Deming and Dynarski 2010),6 or six times the
slope in Figure 1.1.a. Also note that $1,000 of o§ered aid costs much less than $1,000 if only a
fraction of children enroll in college, and that Önancial aid is a temporary transfer. Therefore even
if the entire slope depicted in Figure 1.1.a is due to liquidity constraints on parents when children
reach college, price e§ects on enrollment are likely to be much larger than parental income e§ects.
6Decreasing the costs of applying for Önancial aid also appear to have very large impacts on college enrollment
relative to cross-sectional e§ects of family income (Bettinger et al 2009).
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Figure 1.1 
Child Outcomes and Parental Income in the Cross-Section: Survivor Sample 
Notes: Family income is pre-tax mean family income for claiming father, 1996-1999. !
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(d) Positive Earnings at Age 27 by Family Income
Figure 1.1.b shows the analogous e§ect of family income on total years enrolled in college over
ages 18-22 is .025 years of college per $1,000 of family income. The slopes in Figure 1.1.a and 1.b
both understate the di§erence in child outcomes because they ignore college quality, which also
rises rapidly in family income. Figure 1.1.c plots child earnings at age 27, and Figure 1.1.d plots
the fraction of children working at age 27, again both by family income. Perhaps in part due to
di§erences in preceding college outcomes, children of richer parents have much higher earnings and
are much more likely to work.
These cross-sectional e§ects of family income serve as benchmarks for interpreting magnitudes
of causal e§ects estimated below. The enrollment e§ect is consistent with prior work using the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.7
I.C Empirical Strategy
I follow Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) in estimating the dynamic e§ects of layo§s on
parental outcomes using an event-study design, which is a more general form of di§erence-in-
di§erence (DD) estimation. Let tO index the year in which an outcome is observed, and tE index
the year in which an event is experienced, or "event-year." DeÖne k  tO  tE as "period" or
"years after event." Let g 2 fT;Cg index whether a family experiences a "treatment event" T or a
"control event" C where the treatment event here is layo§ and the control event is survival. Note
that both tO and tE can provide variation in k. Event studies typically rely on variation in tO, but
for childrenís college outcomes I will rely heavily on variation in tE .
Figure 1.2 displays the estimation strategy on data that I generated for illustrative purposes.
The Ögure plots outcomes for a treatment and control group by period. Variation in period may
come from tO, or tE , or both. These data exhibit a time-invariant selection e§ect  into the
treatment group, a treatment e§ect one year after treatment of DD, and a cross-sectional di§erence
between treatment and control groups one year after layo§ of  =  + DD. This paper improves
on prior literature by estimating DD and  separately, rather than grouping them together as .
7Authorís calculations combining reported statistics in Bailey and Dynarski 2011 and Belley and Lochner 2007.
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Figure 1.2 
Illustration of Event Study for Example Outcome Variable 
Notes: This Figure 1.contains no actual data. It plots data that was generated for illustrative purposes. 
 !
I now formalize this simple approach. I start with a model for parent outcomes, then slightly
modify the approach for estimation of child outcomes. For parents, I estimate an event study model
that allows e§ects of treatment and control events to vary by period:
yg;tO;tE = +
kmaxX
j=kmin
Tj  I fg = T; k = jg+
kmaxX
j=kmin
Cj  I fg = C; k = jg+ Xg;tO;tE + ug;tO;tE , (1)
j kmin < 0 < kmax
where  is a constant, gj terms are coe¢cients on the period dummies, Xt;tW is a vector of
observable covariates,  is a vector of coe¢cients, and ut;tW is an independently-distributed error
term. I run this regression on data collapsed into (tO; tE) cells, which is the level of treatment
variation for parents. Robust standard errors on data grouped at the (tO; tE) level with group
sizes as sampling weights are identical to those obtained by using micro data and clustering at
the (tO; tE) level, as long as covariates do not vary within (tO; tE) groups, which is true in this
application. However, I assign weights of 1 to all cells rather than group size weights because it is
critical that each yC;tO;tE moment have exactly one corresponding yT;tO;tE moment.
For children it is important to allow for an age dimension in the collapsed data, because childís
college outcomes vary systematically by age. I also restrict ages to 18-22 for college outcomes, and
to ages 14-17 for teen outcomes. This means that, compared to parents, more of the variation in
period k comes from variation in event-year tE than outcome-year tO, because the age restriction
eliminates many values of tO for each child but places no restrictions on tE . Let a index age, and
write the estimating equation for children as
ya;g;tO;tE = +
kmaxX
j=kmin
Tj I fg = T; k = jg+
kmaxX
j=kmin
Cj I fg = C; k = jg+Xa;g;tO;tE+ua;g;tO;tE (2)
j kmin < 0 < kmax.
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The only variables I include in Xa;g;tO;tE are dummies for event-year and cohort where cohort
equals tO  a,8 where now these dummies are interacted with age a. As above, DD estimators are
then constructed with linear combinations of the gk coe¢cients on the period dummies.
In addition to plotting all of the period coe¢cients in graphs to display the full period trend of
treatment e§ects for several outcomes, I report DD estimators of treatment e§ects at di§erent time
intervals from linear combinations of the period coe¢cients. I deÖne the "short-run" DD treatment
e§ect as 1;1  T1  C1 

T1  C1

, which I also denote in Figure 1.2 and other Ögures below
as DD, and the "long-run" DD treatment e§ect as 5;1  T5  C5 

T1  C1

. This family
of DD estimators k1;k2 all assume a standard potential outcome function of the form
yg;tO;tE =  +   I (g = T ) +   I (k > 0) + k1;k2  I (g = T; k > 0) + ug;tO;tE (3)
j k 2 fk1; k2g ; k2 < 0 < k1.
When constructing estimates of DD terms k1;k2 , I include full sets of dummies for outcome-
years tO and event-years tE in the covariate vector Xg;tO;tE in equation (1). These covariates
mechanically have no e§ect on the point estimates of the DD terms k1;k2 , but increase precision
dramatically.9
For the DD terms k1;k2 to represent causal e§ects of treatment, it must be true that
I (g = T; k > 0) ? ug;tO;tE .
The economic assumptions required for this orthogonality condition to hold are:
1. Parallel trends in outcomes by k before events: Tj  Cj =  j j < 0.
2. No pre-emptive response at period k2 < 0. Technically, this is implied by the parallel trends
assumption, but it can be tested empirically apart from that assumption.
8 I assume that Layo§ and Survivor families have equal event-year and cohort e§ects. IdentiÖcation of the k1;k2
terms is still possible if we allow separate cohort e§ects across T and C groups, or separate event-year e§ects across
T and C groups, but not both. Including this richer set of controls does not substantially change the results.
When assumed equal across groups, event-year and cohort e§ects do not change the point estimates of the Tk Ck
or k1;k2 terms, though they leave the 
g
k terms themselves unidentiÖed.
9Note that these additional controls leave the period dummy coe¢cients Tk and 
C
k unidentiÖed, but preserve
identiÖcation for the linear combinations of these dummies used to construct DD estimators.
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3. No manipulation of k by parents: k ? ua;g;tO;tE .
4. No time-varying shocks to families that correlate with layo§: k ? ua;g;tO;tE .10
I test and/or relax these assumptions below in the event study graphs and in the "Robustness"
section.
The key improvement on prior cross-sectional estimates is to allow for arbitrarily-large, time-
invariant selection into layo§ on determinants of outcomes, i.e.  6= 0 in Equation (3). Prior
researchers have estimated the equation
ya;g;tO;tE = +   I (g = T ) + Xa;g;tO;tE + ea;g;tO;tE j k > 0, (4)
and interpreted  as a treatment e§ect of layo§. If there is selection on unobservables into layo§,
however, then  = DD +  6= DD.
Note that  = 0 can be achieved mechanically by including pre-event outcomes in the propensity-
score for outcomes that are roughly similar across ages, such as parental earnings. However, this
becomes more di¢cult for outcomes that are only subject to treatment over a small range of
ages, such as 18-22 for college. It is not appealing to include age 18 enrollment in the propensity
score, because this requires restricting to shocks that occur at age 19 or later. This would preclude
estimating full impacts of layo§ on college at ages 18-19, which are the only ages that many children
attend college and a key potential complier margin. This would also yield a value for kmin very
close to zero, making it hard to assess the parallel trends assumption in the event study graph.
The extreme example of this problem occurs when outcomes are only observed at one age. Then
individuals for whom the outcome is observed after the treatment event cannot be matched to
anyone in the control event group on the basis of pre-event outcomes, because no such outcomes
exist. In such cases the only way to control for unobservable selection into treatment is to rely
entirely on variation in tE , since there is no variation in tO.
10Assumptions (3) and (4) have di§erent economic intuitions but are formally identical in this notation.
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I.D Impacts of Layo§ on Parents and Children
I.D.1 Impacts on Parents
Figure 1.3.a plots ^
T
k and ^
C
k separately for fatherís earnings around year of layo§. Mean earnings
are close in levels and trends prior to layo§, as expected due to inclusion of pre-event earnings
in the propensity score. Starting in the year of layo§, earnings of Layo§ fathers fall substantially
relative to earnings of Survivor fathers. Five years after layo§, recovery is only partial and appears
to be slowing down, suggesting permanently lower earnings for Layo§ fathers.
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Figure 1.3 
Event Studies in Parent Outcomes 
Notes: Panel (a) displays simple means of fathers’ earnings in the Layoff and Survival groups, after 
propensity-score reweighting the Survivors. Panel (b) differences these two lines for father’s earnings; the 
lines for father’s UI and family post-tax income are constructed analogously. Panel (c) presents analogous 
differences in means across Layoff and Survivor fathers. Panel (c) loses period -4 because a shift in the 
X-axis is required to reflect the fact that residency can change prior to tax-filing in April and hence can be 
affected by layoffs one tax year in the future. !
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Figure 1.3.b plots the di§erence between the two lines in Figure 1.3.a, and similar di§erences for
UI and post-tax income. Now each point estimates a cross-sectional di§erence ^k, and di§erences
between these points estimate DD parameters ^k1;k2 . DD estimates show that layo§s increase
UI claims by $5; 000 in the year of layo§, but this e§ect drops o§ to almost nothing within two
years. Average paternal earnings fall by $15; 000, after starting at a very comparable level with the
reweighted survivor sample, converging to a long-run decline of $10,000. Post-tax family income
falls by $10,000 at Örst, converging to a long-run decline of $6,000. These earnings and income
losses are similar to those reported in the prior literature (Wachter, Song and Manchester 2009,
Stephens 2001).
Table 1.2 presents short-run and long-run e§ects of layo§s on many other outcomes of interest,
one and Öve years after layo§s, respectively. Permanent income falls by less than the decline in
fatherís earnings due to insurance from progressive taxation, a $300 increase in DI beneÖts, and
a $500 increase in motherís earnings. The small role of motherís earnings in providing insurance
against layo§ is consistent with some prior work in the US (e.g., Cullen and Gruber 2000) though
results in this literature have been mixed (e.g. Stephens 2001).
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In addition to motherís leisure, the data contain two other measures of consumption: mort-
gage interest payments and neighborhood quality. Mortgage interest payments reáect spending on
owner-occupied housing. Five years after layo§s, families have reduced average spending on owner-
occupied housing by $460, or 6.9% of base spending. This number is complicated to interpret
because it includes zeros, and because there are treatment e§ects on switching between owner-
ship and renting. Under the assumption of homogeneous treatment e§ects on home expenditures
across owners and renters, the various opposing biases approximately cancel out and I estimate
total spending on housing to fall by about 6-9%.11 Other research has found that layo§s reduce
food spending about one-for-one proportionally with permanent income declines (Stephens 2001).
Consumption declines of roughly the same magnitude as permanent income declines are consistent
with predictions of a simple lifecycle model (as in Attanasio 1999) at median U.S. wealth/income
ratios at middle-age around 2-3 (Bricker et al 2012).
A second measure of consumption is neighborhood quality. I Önd that average home value in
residential zipcodes declines by over 1% of base levels Öve years after layo§.12 Figure 1.3.c plots
average home value against the fraction of families that change residential zipcodes by period.
The two measures line up well: layo§s induce sudden increases in mobility and sudden declines in
neighborhood quality. Zipcode characteristics capture elements of neighborhood quality for both
owners and renters, but are harder to map into spending.
These results paint a clear picture. Total post-tax family income falls sharply following a
paternal layo§ and only partially recovers over the next Öve years. Following layo§, families are
more likely to move homes, move to less expensive neighborhoods, and reduce home expenditures.
11This number is obtained from a simpliÖed model with four groups based on ownership status before and after
layo§. Let M refer to owners and R refer to renters, and let 0 refer to periods before layo§ and 1 refer to periods
after layo§, and let MM; MR, RM , RR refer to ownership status in periods 0 and 1, respectively, so MR refers to
families that own homes before layo§ and rent homes after layo§. Let YMM0 equal home expenditures by families in
group MM in period 0 and let YMM1 equal home expenditures by families in group MM in period 1, and similarly
deÖne YMR0 , Y
MR
1 , and so forth. Let the fraction of the sample accounted for by each group be MM , MR, RM ,
RR. Let  = $460 be the treatment e§ect on the full sample. I estimate average spending of families who own
homes before layo§ to be $10,000, pooling MM and MR groups. Under the assumption that all four groups spend
the same amount on housing in period 0 and reduce their expenditures by the same amount , I can write  as a
function of  and solve for . The solution is  = MRY
MR
0 +RMY
RM
0
MM+RM
. I estimate MM = :675, MR = :025,
RM = :025, RR = :275, and assume YMR0 = Y
RM
0 = $10; 000. The implied solution is ^

= $657, or 6.6% of total
spending. I obtain a slightly higher estimate of 8.3% from a similar exercise that incorporates the treatment e§ect
on just families who own homes prior to layo§.
12 I observe similar declines for median home value and fraction of population with college degrees in residential
zipcode.
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This behavioral response supports a view that layo§s are permanent, unprepared-for,13 at least
partially-uninsured 10% income shocks that reduce total consumption by approximately 10%. If
liquidity constraints or consumption commitments operate, then more áexible expenditures may
fall by more than 10% in the short-run. The "Örst stage" of the empirical exercise is therefore
powerful: layo§s reduce family income and consumption.
I.D.2 Impacts on Children
I now turn to the main results of the paper: the e§ects of fathersí layo§s on child college outcomes.
Figure 1.4.a plots child college enrollment in Layo§ and Survivor groups by period as estimated in
Equation (2).14 This is very similar to Figure 1.3.a, but with fatherís earnings replaced by child
college enrollment, and with child age restricted to 18-22.15 The selection e§ect  accounts for
a large share of the cross-sectional di§erence . This is because college enrollment before events
cannot be included in the pre-event propensity score reweighting of Survivor families to Layo§
families, and because the treatment e§ect on children is small. The treatment e§ect can be seen
more clearly in Figure 1.4.b, which di§erences the two lines in Figure 1.4.a, and is analogous to
the line for fatherís earnings in Figure 1.3.b. Here we see that 1;1 is estimated precisely at 0.43
percentage points (t-statistic over 4), whereas the estimated cross-sectional e§ect ^ is nearly three
times this large. This causal e§ect of layo§ is 8-14% of the the prediction that would be obtained
from the cross-sectional e§ect of income on enrollment in Figure 1.1.a, depending on whether we
use short-run or long-run income losses from layo§ in the prediction.
13 I say "unprepared-for" instead of "unanticipated" to reáect the results in Stephens (2003), who Önds that workers
can partially predict layo§ but do not appear to use these predictions in their consumption plans.
14Recall that the period e§ects themselves are not identiÖed, but the di§erence between period e§ects in Layo§
and Survivor groups are identiÖed. This means that the slopes of the lines in Figure 3.a are not interpretable, but
di§erences between the two lines are interpretable.
15E§ects are also detectable on individual ages 18, 19, ..., 22, with negative and very signiÖcant e§ects at all ages
except for 21, and the largest e§ect at age 19.
23
! 24!
 
 
Figure 1.4 
Event Study in Child College Enrollment, Pooling Ages 18-22 
Notes: Panel (a) displays the period*layoff and period*survival coefficients for periods -7 to 7 from 
Equation (3) in the text, estimated with cohort*age and event-year*age fixed effects and no constant term. 
Panel (b) displays the difference between these coefficients, by period k. !
Figure 1.4.b exhibits several attractive features. The áat line for k < 0 indicates that the
parallel trends assumption underlying DD estimation is reasonable. Layo§s that occur in the year
of a college decision where k = 0 reduce enrollment less than layo§s that occur one year before
the decision where k = 1, most likely because at k = 0 some children have already paid for college
and started taking classes by the time their fathers are laid o§. This pattern suggests that college
decisions do not anticipate layo§s even a few months in advance. Finally, the upward slope over
k > 0 suggests that layo§s have larger short-run e§ects on enrollment than long-run e§ects.
Table 1.3 calculates treatment e§ects during ages 18-22 on a variety of outcomes, along with
t-statistics and base levels. The treatment e§ect on college enrollment is 1% of base enrollment.
Children experiencing a fatherís layo§ are also less likely to attend college out of state and less likely
to attend a four-year university. These results suggest that children attend lower-priced colleges,
in addition to reducing enrollment.
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These choices translate into lower-quality colleges based on a measure of college quality de-
veloped in Chetty et al (2011). The measure calculates mean earnings at age 29 for individuals
enrolled in each college at age 20 in 1999. Chetty et al (2011) shows that this measure is highly
correlated with U.S. News and World Report college rankings for the top 125 colleges that the
magazine ranks. The alumni-earnings quality index has the advantage of covering all Title IV
post-secondary schools in the U.S. Children who are not in college at age 20 are treated as if they
are in their own college and assigned age-29 earnings like all other colleges, which for them is about
$16,000. For comparison, earnings of individuals in a top college at age 20 are about $65,000 at
age 29.
By this measure, fathersí layo§s reduce the quality of college that their children attend by
$84 or 0.35%. To see e§ects across the distribution of college quality I calculate treatment e§ects
on dummies for enrollment in colleges above various quality cuto§s, e.g., $20,000, $30,000, and
so forth up to $60,000. The fraction of children above the lowest quality cuto§ falls by almost
the same amount as the fall in total enrollment, consistent with most compliers on the enrollment
margin attending low-quality colleges. However, there are also substantial declines in the fraction of
children attending higher-quality colleges. This is consistent with reductions in college enrollment
at out-of-state and four-year colleges, and with children responding along a quality margin as well
as an enrollment margin.
Children also adjust earnings during college-going ages. Once again, to distinguish extensive
and intensive margin responses I calculate treatment e§ects on dummies for earnings above three
cuto§s: $0, $2,000, and $10,000. Results suggest that layo§s push more children to get "real jobs"
that yield substantial earnings during college. These e§ects are all under half of one percent of
base earning and earning-cuto§ levels. These e§ects could be driven mechanically by shifts out of
college enrollment and into work, rather than higher labor supply while in college. To distinguish
these two explanations I also estimate Equation (2) for outcome variables that interact earnings
cuto§s with college enrollment. I Önd no e§ect on these variables, but this is not conclusive because
the children who stop enrolling may have had higher base earnings than other children, masking
an increase in earnings among children who remain enrolled.
The approach can estimate treatment e§ects on outcomes during adolescence by restricting to
outcome-ages a 2 [14; 17] rather than a 2 [18; 22]. The key outcomes I examine are earnings and
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teen pregnancy for girls. There is a signiÖcant response on the extensive earnings margin: parental
layo§s increase the likelihood that children will earn positive formal sector earnings by 1.4%, and
raise the probability that children earn at least $2,000 by 1.7%. There are no signiÖcant e§ects
on average earnings in levels or logs. There are no signiÖcant e§ects on teen birth rates for girls,
although these results are underpowered. While there is substantial evidence that higher family
income reduces child labor supply for low-income families in developing countries (Edmonds 2007),
to my knowledge these results are the Örst quasi-experimental evidence for this relationship in a
developed country (XX cite panel data studies on child labor laws in US, and scale back this claim,
Öxed e§ect models are similar to my approach).
The results suggest that children adjust to family resource shocks along a variety margins. Some
children forego college, some enroll closer to home or at two-year rather than four-year colleges.
Some children enroll at lower-quality colleges that may be cheaper for other reasons. Some children
may increase earnings to remain in college, though this is hard to observe empirically. There are
several other potential adjustment margins that I do not observe. One such margin is informal
earnings. Anecdotally, many college students work as waiters, bussers, bartenders, babysitters,
and tutors.16 In these occupations, consumers often pay workers directly through tips or cash
wages, and W2s may fail to record a higher fraction of compensation. A second potential margin
is consumption. The average college student consumes about $10,000 of goods on top of tuition
and fees for college, including housing, food, transportation, entertainment, clothing, and vacation
(Paulin 2001). A third potential margin I do not observe is changes in parent or student borrowing
and Önancial aid. If college enrollment and college quality are valuable investments, many children
may choose to adjust these many other margins instead, as in Leslie (1984) and Keane and Wolpin
(2001).
I.D.3 Robustness
I now provide evidence in support of the main identifying assumptions, as well as estimators that
rely on weaker versions of these assumptions. I present the results by column in Table 1.4.
16See, for example, <http://www.onlinecertiÖcateprograms.org/blog/2010/20-most-common-jobs-for-
college-students/> and <http://www.kiplinger.com/columns/starting/archive/great-part-time-jobs-for-college-
students.html>, accessed on 10/15/12.
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I employ Survivors throughout my analysis in order to increase precision. However it is possible
to estimate treatment e§ects using only Layo§s. In Appendix 3 I derive an estimator that uses only
the Layo§ sample. Column (1) of Table 1.4 displays treatment e§ects using this approach. The
estimator yields results that are consistent with those reported above, but are much less precise.
The loss of precision occurs because Survivors non-parametrically control for cohort by event-year
shocks in the Layo§ sample. Cohort shocks occur because of nonlinear secular trends in college
outcomes. Event-year shocks occur because selection into layo§ on childrenís college outcomes
(and most likely other measures of family achievement) is counter-cyclical: Örms only lay o§ their
least productive workers during booms, but lay o§ higher-productivity workers during recessions.17
Interactions between cohort and event-year trends are harder to interpret, but turn out to be
important relative to the size of treatment e§ects.
The k1;k2 estimators assume parallel trends in outcomes prior to events. When estimating
k1;1 for some k1, as I do above, I require parallel trends in outcomes with respect to k for k < 0.
There is no evidence to reject this assumption for college enrollment on the full sample in Figure
1.4.b. However, to check this on outcomes other than college enrollment in Table 1.3, I also estimate
treatment e§ects that allow for linear di§erential trends in outcomes with respect to k for k < 0.
This would arise if the line for k < 0 in Figure 1.4.b were not áat, but rather had some non-zero,
linear slope. This is a weaker version of the parallel-trends assumption, and can be viewed as a
triple-di§erence estimator. In Appendix 4 I derive formulas for the point estimates and standard
errors of such an estimator. Results are presented in Column (2) of Table 1.4. These estimates are
nearly identical, and remain precise.
The k1;k2 estimator assumes that families do not reduce spending on college in anticipation of
layo§ k2 years ahead of time. I have used k2 = 1, assuming that families do not pre-emptively
reduce spending one year ahead of time. It is possible that families anticipate and respond to
layo§s one year before they occur. I therefore estimate treatment e§ects 1;3, requiring that
families not reduce spending pre-emptively three years before layo§s take place. The results are
presented in Column (3) of Table 1.4. The results on college are nearly identical, while the e§ect on
fraction of children working is no longer signiÖcant. There are also substantive reasons to believe
that families do not smooth college contributions in anticipation of layo§. First, families adjust
17Mueller (2012) Önds a similar pattern for fatherís pre-layo§ earnings.
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spending on housing only after layo§s occur, and the size of the adjustment is similar to the decline
in permanent income. This is consistent with e§ects of layo§s on food expenditures in the PSID
(Stephens 2001). Moreover, evidence in Stephens (2004) suggests that families do not incorporate
their (limited) idiosyncratic knowledge of future layo§ propensities into their spending plans.
The k1;k2 estimator assumes that children choose outcomes independently at each age 18-22.
This would be violated if, for example, starting college involved a Öxed cost, so that marginal costs
of continuing after oneís Örst year are relatively low. The opposite extreme assumption is that
children make college enrollment decisions for all ages 18-22 at a single point in time, say age 17
or 18. To address this I average outcomes over ages 18-22 and compare this value for children
experiencing events before age 18 with children experiencing events after age 22, continuing to
use the DD approach above. All of the variation in k now comes from event-time tE . Column
(4) of Table 1.4 presents the results. The results are noisier but similar. This also suggests that
intertemporal substitution of outcomes within the age 18-22 age window, such as delaying college
for a year until oneís parents recover from layo§, does not account for the treatment e§ects.
I assume that parents do not carefully postpone being laid-o§ until their children have enrolled
in college, and that layo§s are not driven by time-varying shocks to other parental resources such
as illness or divorce. I test this by examining results of mass layo§s. I deÖne mass layo§s for Örms
that employ over 30 workers in the period k = 1 just before layo§, and in which at least 20% of
workers claim UI in period k = 0. This is not a perfect test, but mass layo§s are driven somewhat
less by idiosyncratic factors than the average layo§. Column (5) of Table 1.4 shows that e§ects of
mass layo§s on children are similar to layo§s in the full sample, though once again considerably
noisier. The same result will be shown to hold below for Örm closures.
I match Survivors to Layo§s using a propensity-score reweighting procedure. I can also estimate
the period e§ects in Equation (2) using regression to control for observables, rather than propensity-
score reweighting. I do this only for college, because each outcome requires a separate regression.
This approach requires me to estimate coe¢cients on cohort by event-year dummy variables, then
use these coe¢cients to estimate Equation (2). The estimated treatment e§ect on annual enrollment
during ages 18-22 using this approach is almost identical to the results above: 0.43 percentage points
(SE .110).
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I.E Impacts of Firm Closures
Recent work on parental layo§s and child outcomes has attempted to address the potential endo-
geneity of parental layo§ by examining job loss due to Örm closure (Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens
2009, Rege, Telle and Votruba 2011, Bratberg, Nilson and Vaage 2008). This approach eliminates
selection into layo§ within Örms, but does not eliminate selection into closing Örms. There are
many reasons why lower-quality workers may wind up at less-proÖtable Örms, and there exists
some evidence that Örms heading for closure wind up employing less productive workers (Brown
and Matsa 2012, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 1999). The event study approach developed above
allows me to test directly for selection into employment at closing Örms.
I Örst deÖne two additional samples that are analogous to the Layo§ and Survivor samples
above.
 Closures. Fathers experience "closure" in year T if they work at a Örm in year T that never
issues another W2 to any worker after year T. Note I observe Örm closures, not plant closures.
I impose the same restrictions described in Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens (2009) in order to
compare my results with theirs on fathers and sons in Canadian administrative tax records.
The sample restrictions are described in more detail in Appendix 2.
 Non-Closures. Non-Closure fathers are a control group for Closure fathers. Non-Closure
fathers are a 30% random sample of the U.S. population of fathers. Non-Closure fathers ex-
perience a placebo event at T generated by a random variable, imposing the same restrictions
as in the Closures sample. As with the Survivors, I propensity-score reweight Non-Closure
fathers to match the Closure sample on pre-event characteristics.18
Summary statistics for these samples are presented in Appendix 2, and are similar to those for
the Layo§ and Survivor samples.
Figure 1.5.a plots earnings of Closure and Non-Closure fathers by period. This Ögure is anal-
ogous to Figure 1.3.a above, but treatment and control events are now Closure and Non-Closure
rather than Layo§ and Survival. Note that the Closure sample is less than 1% of the size of the
18 I include fewer variables in the Non-Closure propensity score than in the Survivor propensity score. The Non-
Closure propensity score includes dummies for event-year, marital status, interacted discretized earnings in the two
years prior to closure in $10,000-width bins, dummy for positive 401(k) compensation in 1999, dummy for Schedule
C proÖt in 1999, dummy for motherís age at childís birth under 22, and sex of child.
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Layo§ sample. Despite the smaller sample, the Ögure displays the same basic pattern as in Figure
1.3.a. Fathersí earnings in the two groups are close and track each other before events take place,
due to the inclusion of fatherís pre-event earnings in the propensity score. Firm closures have
somewhat larger negative short-run impacts ^1;1 than layo§s on fatherís earnings. The associated
short-run post-tax family income loss is about $8,000.
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Figure 1.5 
Event-Time Studies of Firm Closure 
Notes: Panel (a) displays the period*closure and period*non-closure coefficients for periods -3 to 5 from 
Equation (1) in the text, estimated on father’s earnings with outcome-year and event-year fixed effects 
and no constant term. Panel (b) displays the period*closure and period*non-closure coefficients for 
periods -3 to 5 from Equation (3) in the text, estimated on child’s enrollment with cohort*age and event-
year*age fixed effects and no constant term. !
Figure 1.5.b plots childís college enrollment by period, as in Figure 1.4.a. The cross-sectional
estimate ^ is now 6 full percentage points. This is similar to the result obtained by Oreopoulos,
Page and Stevens (2009) on a childís earnings: layo§s appear to have larger e§ects than would
be predicted from income losses, even if the entire cross-sectional e§ect of income in Figure 1.1.a
were causal. However, the event study shown in Figure 1.5.b suggests that virtually all of this
e§ect is due to the selection term . For this reason, the implied short-run DD estimate ^1;1 is
indistinguishable from both zero and from the estimate of ^1;1 obtained using the much larger
Layo§ sample above.19
Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens (2009) also Önd that closures appear to have larger e§ects on
children in lower-income families. I can test whether this pattern could be generated spuriously by
di§erential selection into Örm closure by family income quartiles. Figure 1.6 indeed Önds this pattern
for college enrollment. The cross-sectional estimated treatment e§ect ^ estimated separately at
each family income quartile is twice as large in the bottom quartile as in the top quartile, and this
di§erence is statistically signiÖcant. In contrast, none of the DD estimates ^DD are statistically
di§erent from zero, from each other, or from the main 0.43 percentage-point e§ect estimated above,
at the 5% level. Below I estimate DD treatment e§ects across the income distribution more precisely
using the Layo§ sample.20
19The standard error on the DD estimated impact of Örm closure is approximately ten times larger than the
standard error on the DD estimated impact of layo§, because the sample is approximately 100 times smaller for
closure than for layo§, and standard errors fall with the square of the sample size.
20 It should be noted that there are some important di§erences between this study and Oreopoulos, Page and
Stevens (2009). These authors study child earnings in young adulthood, whereas I study college outcomes. I am able
to show that layo§s at ages 16-17 reduce earnings at age 25 by at most 1%, but due to my short panel I cannot study
e§ects of earlier shocks on later earnings. E§ects on later earnings could be larger than e§ects on college enrollment
would lead us to expect. This appears to be true for teacher e§ects at younger ages in Chetty, Friedman and Rocko§
(2012): if college raises future earnings by 10%, then college only mediates at most 10-20% of the e§ect of teacher
quality on studentsí future earnings. It is not known how these mechanisms compare for shocks to parental resources
during adolescence. Second, these authors study Örm closure in Canada, whereas I study Örm closure in the U.S.
Third, the Closure and Non-Closure samples studied by these authors appear more similar to each other on fathersí
and childrensí outcomes prior to controlling for observable characteristics than the analogous samples in my data. In
my data Closure and Non-Closure fathers have signiÖcantly di§erent earnings, family structures, and other covariates
prior to propensity-score reweighting. This di§erence may stem from larger economic and social heterogeneity in the
U.S. relative to Canada. Therefore it is possible that these explanations, rather than selection into Örm closure, drive
the di§erence between the small estimated e§ects on college in this paper and the large estimated e§ects on childís
future earnings in their paper.
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Figure 1.6 
Estimated Effects of Firm Closure on Enrollment Ages 18-22 by Income Quartile 
Notes: The line labeled β displays estimated treatment effects on annual enrollment during ages 18-22 
from cross-sectional equation (2). The line labeled βDD displays estimated treatment effects on annual 
enrollment  ages 18-22 from the DD equation (3). Both estimates control for observable variables using 
the same propensity-score reweighting of non-closures to match closures. !
These results suggest that allocations of workers across Örms are highly endogenous to some
types of hard-to-observe worker quality, and that childrenís propensity to enroll in college inherits
these worker quality di§erentials. In this case the use of Örm closures rather than layo§s actually
increases the selection component  of the cross-sectional estimate , because Non-Closures are a
worse control group for Closures than Survivors are for Layo§s.
The Öndings here may pose problems for studies that cannot easily control for selection on
the dependent variable into Örms that close, initiate mass layo§s, or exhibit other strong signs
of failure or success. The standard ways to control for selection on a dependent variable are DD,
Öxed e§ect, or event study designs. Selection presents a larger challenge when outcomes cannot
be observed both before and after shocks take place for any particular individual. This problem
aicts Örm-level shocks on outcomes that are absorbing states such as mortality (Wachter and
Sullivan 2009) and disability (Rege, Telle and Votruba 2009). The problem also aicts studies of
Örm-level shocks on workersí children where shocks occur long before outcomes as in Oreopoulos,
Page and Stevens (2009) and Atkin (2009), or where child outcomes only occur at very few ages
such as college outcomes in Lovenheim (2011) and Lovenheim and Reynolds (2012). It is striking
that many of these studies estimate very large impacts compared to the relevant cross-sectional
benchmarks.21
These considerations suggest using alternative methods to establish parallel trends in outcomes
before events. Age-speciÖc outcomes such as college enrollment can often be observed before shocks
for some individuals and after shocks for other individuals. In such cases the researcher can establish
parallel trends in event-time tE around the age of outcome, which is roughly the approach I take
here22. Outcomes that absorb workers out of employment require linking workers to Örms several
periods prior to the shock, i.e. tenure restrictions, which are standard in much of the Örm closure
literature. Parallel trends can then be established in period-level aggregate outcomes over outcome-
21Sullivan and Wachter (2009) Önd that displacementsñsome of which are voluntaryñincrease mortality rates by at
least as much as would be predicted from the entire cross-sectional e§ect of income on mortality, and suggest that
layo§s a§ect health through mechanisms other than income. Atkin (2009) Önds e§ects of maternal employment on
child height that are much too large to be explained by maternal earnings, and suggests many explanations why
stable maternal employment might beneÖt children. Lovenheim (2011) and Lovenheim and Reynolds (2012) Önd
e§ects of home price appreciation on college outcomes that are an order of magnitude larger per dollar of marginal
wealth than those estimated here from layo§s, despite the fact that the negative wealth shocks studied here should
have larger impacts if credit constraints operate.
22 If I restrict Equation 2 to outcomes at a single age, such as college at 18, this is exactly what I do. In practice I
pool ages 18-22 to maximize power, thereby also exploiting a small amount of variation over outcome-time tO within
individuals between ages 18-22. The results are similar either way.
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time tO around the time of the event, for treatment and control groups. In all cases, If a study
exploiting variation in Örm performance lacks su¢cient statistical power to distinguish e§ects due
to selection-on-unobservables () in periods of non-exposure to treatment (k < 0) from total e§ects
(DD + ) in periods of exposure to treatment (k > 0), then results should be interpreted with
caution, especially when they are surprisingly large.
I.F Heterogeneity and Mechanisms
I now explore heterogeneity in treatment e§ects. I Örst compare e§ects for males and females. I
then compare e§ects among various subgroups to understand the mechanisms driving the treat-
ment e§ects. The key mechanisms to distinguish are (1) income e§ects versus non-income e§ects
such as family stress or turmoil, and (2) investment e§ects driven by liquidity constraints versus
consumption e§ects driven by permanent income.
I.F.1 Child Gender
Table 1.5.a examines e§ects on males and females separately. Results are slightly larger for females
across most outcomes, but none of the di§erences in college outcomes are statistically-signiÖcant.
These di§erences are larger when estimating treatment e§ects that allow for linear di§erential
trends in outcomes, rather than imposing a constant selection e§ect , as described in Appendix
4. Larger e§ects for girls echo Öndings in several other studies of monetary incentives for academic
achievement and college enrollment, summarized in Angrist and Lavy (2008, p. 25-27). The reasons
for this disparity are not well-understood.s
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I.F.2 Family Income and Wealth
I now estimate e§ects separately for higher- and lower-income families. Table 1.5.b displays esti-
mated treatment e§ects ^1;1 on other outcomes for families with incomes above and below $40,000.
There are no signiÖcant e§ects on low-income families, whereas all the college and labor supply
outcomes show signiÖcant e§ects in the expected directions for higher-income families.23
Figure 1.7 examines this pattern in more detail. Figure 1.7.a displays treatment e§ects 1;1 of
fathersí layo§s on family income, grouped by income level prior to events. Layo§s reduce income
levels by more in higher-income families.24 Figure 1.7.b displays corresponding treatment e§ects
1;1 on child college enrollment, for the same income groups. Treatment e§ects are close to zero
at the lowest incomes, rise steadily, and may begin to decrease at the highest incomes.
23There is a concern that this pattern could arise spuriously from weaker father-child links at lower incomes, even
within the constraints imposed by my parent-child matching algorithm. To examine this I restricted the sample to
children only ever claimed by one adult, that adult being the father, rather than my normal restriction of only being
claimed by at most one male and one female adult. This did not change the pattern displayed in the Ögure. I also
checked the probability of being claimed by this one adult at ages before 18 across income levels, and found that this
probability is 85% at the very lowest income levels, but quickly rises above 90% for incomes over $10,000. Therefore
even low-income children only claimed by one adultñthe father receiving the layo§ñmost of whom are claimed almost
every possible year by that one adult, do not exhibit an enrollment response to fatherís layo§.
24Note that DD treatment e§ects at base incomes far from the mean exclude mean-reversion due to the use of
Survivors.
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Figure 1.7 
Treatment Effects by Family Income 
Notes: All panels plot estimated treatment effects by mean pre-tax family income over 1996-1999. Panel 
(a) plots short-run DD treatment effects βDD from equation (3) estimated on total post-tax family income. 
Panel (b) plots analogous treatment effects on annual college enrollment ages 18-22. Panel (c) plots the 
treatment effects in Panel (b) divided by the treatment effects in Panel (a), where the income effects in 
Panel (a) have been divided by $1,000 for ease of interpretation as “Effect on enrollment per $1,000 of 
family income lost due to layoff.” !
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(c) College Effects Per $1,000 of Income Lost
Figure 1.7.c displays the college e§ects as percentage points of enrollment per $1,000 of income
lost, and reveals a striking U-shaped pattern of treatment e§ects. This U-pattern is unlikely to
arise if layo§s mainly a§ect children through non-income factors such as fatherís becoming depressed
after layo§s. In contrast, an income-loss channel provides a clear explanation. At low incomes,
children do not rely heavily on parents to Önance college. In the Sallie Mae data, children with
family incomes below $35,000 Önance only 19% of college expenses out of parental resources (loans,
income, and savings), compared to 41% for families with incomes between $35,000 and $100,000,
and 61% for families with incomes above $100,000 (Sallie Mae 2011). Low-income children make up
for the di§erence with greater Önancial aid, student loans, and student earnings. They also attend
lower-cost colleges.
Income losses can also explain the decline in treatment e§ects as incomes continue to rise
past $60,000. There are two leading explanations. The Örst is that families view college as an
investment and face liquidity constraints, as in Becker (1994). The market for private student
loans was active in the U.S. over the sample period, suggesting that subsidized federal Sta§ord
loans did not fully meet demand. The interest rates on private loans for collegeñfor the subset of
students who qualiÖedñwere often much higher than interest rates on collateralized debt such as
home mortgages (Delisle 2012). Under liquidity constraints, low-income parents allocate transfers
to children in the form of human capital investments. As incomes, transfers, and human capital
investments rise, the return on human capital declines to the interest rate on Önancial assets, at
which point parents allocate marginal transfers in forms other than human capital. This means
that as incomes rise, the marginal change in transfers from parents to children is less likely to
reduce spending on college.
The second reason why e§ects on college might decline at higher incomes is that families view
college partly as a consumption good, and spending on this good becomes a smaller fraction of
total spending at higher incomes, e.g., the Engel curve in logs declines with income (Mulligan
1997). For example, a middle-income family that spends 20% of its budget on college will reduce
college spending by $20 out of a $100 income loss, while a family that spends 10% of its budget on
college wil reduce college spending by only $10 out of a $100 income loss. For college, a natural
explanation for declining Engel curves is that each child only needs to enroll in one college, and
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tuition is bounded by institutions.25 Therefore the fact that college becomes less sensitive to income
shocks at higher incomes cannot distinguish between investment and consumption mechanisms.
The ideal test to distinguish consumption and investment mechanisms would be to vary cur-
rent and permanent income losses from layo§. Unfortunately, these two variables are too highly
correlated to identify their separate e§ects. A more feasible test is to examine treatment e§ects
separately for families with high and low Önancial wealth, as in Zeldes (1989). For this exercise,
I restrict the sample to families with pre-layo§ incomes above $40,000. Table 1.5.c shows e§ects
of parental layo§s on various child outcomes for families with pre-layo§ interest income above and
below $500,26 corresponding to an asset cuto§ of about $10,000-$25,000 if interest rates on savings
are 2-5%. The e§ects on child college outcomes in these two groups are not statistically di§erent on
an absolute or per-dollar basis.27 These results provide no evidence of liquidity constraints among
middle-to-high-income families, and suggest that parents at these income levels view marginal col-
lege expenditures as consumption.28
I.F.3 Predicted Earnings Losses
I now explore an additional source of evidence on whether income losses explain the main e§ects.
I Örst explore one measure of economic vulnerability to layo§: fatherís earnings share. Earnings
losses of fathers reduce family income by more, proportionally, when fathers earn a larger share of
family income prior to layo§. This observation suggests that if income losses are driving the e§ects
on children, then e§ects on children should increase in fatherís earnings share. Fatherís earnings
shares, however, are not randomly-assigned. The two most important components of family income
are fatherís earnings and motherís earnings. As fatherís earnings increase, family socioeconomic
status (SES) rises, and fraction of income lost from the fatherís layo§ should also rise. As motherís
earnings inrease, family SES rises, but now fraction of income lost from the fatherís layo§ should
fall. By examining these two sources of variation separately, I estimate e§ects of proportional
25There is some evidence that Engel curves decline with family income in the NPSAS data.
26This is about the 80th percentile of interest income for families with incomes over $40,000 in my sample.
27Di§erent cuto§s for interest income from $0 up to $3,000 do not change the pattern described here, although
conÖdence intervals get wide as the cuto§ gets higher.
28Anecdotally, many middle-income parents in the U.S. o§er to cover childrenís college costs if children attend lower-
amenity, lower-cost state or community colleges, but only a fraction of costs at higher-amenity, higher-cost private
colleges. This suggests that parents may view the beneÖts of more expensive colleges as a form of consumption, and
therefore reduce spending on this good when permanent income falls, consistent with the Öndings.
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income losses from layo§ that should be biased in opposite directions by confounding variation in
family SES.
DeÖne fatherís pre-event earnings share in period k = 1 as !  W
dad
1
W dad1 +W
mom
1
. I Örst divide the
sample into ! bins.29 I then reweight these bins by motherís earnings Wmom1 in order to isolate
variation in ! from fatherís earnings W dad1 , or vice versa in order to isolate variation in ! from
motherís earnings Wmom1 . For this exercise I restrict the share groups to a range with enough
observations to reweight them on W dad1 or Wmom1 , and to relatively high incomes due to the Önding
above that childrenís college decisions appear unresponsive to layo§ in low-income families.
Figure 1.8 implements this exercise using variation in motherís earnings. Panel (a) shows this
variation. As fatherís earnings share rises from 70% to 100% on the x-axis, motherís earnings fall
by $30,000, while average fatherís earnings remain constant. Panel (b) plots the e§ect of layo§s on
family income by earnings share. The 30 points of earnings share variation yields an additional 6
percentage points of income loss. Panel (c) plots the e§ect of layo§s on child college enrollment by
earnings share. Enrollment declines more in higher-share groups that experience larger proportional
income losses from layo§.
29 I do not scatter the points in this graph because it is not possible to obtain equally-sized bins, largely because
there is a large mass of mothers at zero earnings.
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Figure 1.8 
Treatment Effects by Father’s Earnings Share: Variation from Mother’s Earnings 
Notes: All of these figures restrict father’s earnings in period -1 to lie in [$60,000, $160,000] and plot 
variables by father’s period -1 earnings share, where earnings share groups have been reweighted to 
match the share=70% share group in father’s earnings in -1. Panel (a) plots mother’s and father’s period -
1 earnings levels in this reweighted data. Panels (b) and (c) plot estimated short-run DD treatment effects 
from Equation (3) on the log of family income and the level of college enrollment, respectively. 
Regression lines depict slope of estimated coefficient from OLS regression of these treatment effects on 
father’s pre-event earnings share. !
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(c) College Enrollment
Figure 1.9 repeats this exercise using variation in fatherís earnings. Now as the shares increase
from 40% to 60%, fatherís earnings rise from $30,000 to $65,000, while average motherís earnings
remain constant. Whereas family SES declined in fatherís earnings share in Figure 1.8, it now rises
in fatherís earnings share. Despite the di§erent source of earnings share variation that moves family
unobservable characteristics in the opposite direction, once again college enrollment declines more
in higher-share groups that experience larger proportional income losses from layo§.
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Figure 1.9 
Treatment Effects by Father’s Earnings Share: Variation from Father’s Earnings 
Notes: All of these figures restrict mother’s earnings in period -1 to lie in [$30,000, $50,000] and plot 
variables by father’s period -1 earnings share, where earnings share groups have been reweighted to 
match the share=50% share group in mother’s earnings in -1. Panel (a) plots mother’s and father’s period 
-1 earnings levels in this reweighted data. Panels (b) and (c) plot estimated short-run DD treatment effects 
from Equation (3) on the log of family income and the level of college enrollment, respectively. 
Regression lines depict slope of estimated coefficient from OLS regression of these treatment effects on 
father’s pre-event earnings share. 
 !
30
00
0
40
00
0
50
00
0
60
00
0
70
00
0
Ea
rn
ing
s, 
Do
lla
rs
40 45 50 55 60
Father's Pre-Event Share of Earnings
Mother's Earnings Father's Earnings
(a) Base Earnings
-.434 [.0189]
-2
0
-1
8
-1
6
-1
4
-1
2
-1
0
10
0*
Lo
g 
Po
int
s
40 45 50 55 60
Father's Pre-Event Share of Earnings
(b) Log of Post-Tax Family Income
-.061 [.014]
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oin
ts
40 45 50 55 60
Father's Pre-Event Share of Earnings
(c) College Enrollment
These Ögures can be interpreted as instrumenting for proportional income losses with fatherís
earnings share. The implied Wald estimator that instruments for proportional income losses with
motherís earnings variation in Figure 1.8 is .12, while the analogous Wald estimator for fatherís
earnings variation in Figure 1.9 is .14. The Wald estimator obtained on the full sample of layo§s by
instrumenting for proportional income losses with a dummy for layo§ is 0.1. These estimates there-
fore provide no evidence to reject the hypothesis that income losses account for the full treatment
e§ects of layo§s on childrenís college enrollment.
I have focused on fatherís earnings shares as one factor that predicts income losses from layo§, in
order to show how separate variation in motherís and fatherís earnings can address concerns about
endogeneity of predicted income losses. However, this approach only exploits a small fraction of
the information available to predict income losses from layo§, and motherís earnings only provide
variation in proportional income losses, not absolute income losses. It is possible to obtain much
more precise predictions of fatherís earnings losses, and variation in absolute income losses, by
exploiting all pre-event information about fathers. DeÖne a fatherís proportional earnings loss
around an event as Li;g =
Wi;g;k1Wi;g;k2
Wi;g;k2
where k1 > 0 > k2 as before, and deÖne a vector of pre-
event variables Xi;k2 . These pre-event variables include information about the fatherís industry,
Örm, location, wife, and other demographics.30 I generate comparable earnings loss predictions for
all fathers as follows. I Örst regress Li;T on Xi restricting to the Layo§ sample, then separately
regress Li;C on Xi restricting to the Survivor sample. This yields estimated coe¢cient vectors ^T
and ^C , respectively. I then calculate predicted earnings losses under realized and counterfactual
events, yielding ^TXi;T and ^CXi;T for Layo§ fathers and ^TXi;C and ^CXi;C for Survivor fathers. I
then group fathers by the di§erence between these two predictions D^i, where D^i = (^C  ^T )Xi for
all fathers. These di§erences capture fathersí vulnerability to earnings losses from layo§, excluding
mean-reversion and other movements in earnings that would happen within Xi groups, even if layo§
were not experienced.
Figure 1.10 presents the results from this exercise, where Wi;g;k2  Wi;g;1 and Wi;g;k1 
1
5
P5
j=1Wi;g;j , or average earnings one year to Öve years after events.
31 Figure 1.10.a graphs total
post-tax family income losses ^1;1 by this measure of fatherís predicted earnings loss D^i. An
30Note that Li;g is large across the entire income distribution, and therefore relies on di§erent variation from that
explored in the income cuts displayed in Figure 7.
31Results are similar for other deÖnitions of post-event earnings Wi;g;k1 .
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additional percentage point of fatherís earnings loss increases the loss in family income by $618.
Figure 1.10.b graphs the college enrollment decline ^1;1 against the fatherís predicted earnings
loss D^i. An additional percentage point of fatherís earnings loss increases the decline in college
enrollment by .04 percentage points. Using predicted earnings losses to instrument for income losses
yields a Wald estimator for the e§ect of family income on college enrollment of 0.07 (standard error
.012) percentage points of enrollment per $1,000 of income. This is exactly the slope required for
income losses to "explain" the entire treatment e§ect of layo§s on children, and is consistent with
the results obtained using fatherís earnings share variation.
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Figure 1.10 
Treatment Effects by Predicted Percent Earnings Loss 
Notes: Figure 1.plots treatment effects by father’s predicted percent earnings loss, here defined as the 
percent change in income from period -1 earnings to the mean of earnings from period 1 to period 5. 
Predicted percent earnings loss is constructed from separate regressions of actual earnings losses on pre-
event covariates in the Layoff and Survivor samples, where the final prediction is the difference between 
the predicted values for each observation using the estimates from the Layoff and Survivor regressions. 
Observations are grouped into 12 predicted earnings loss bins that have approximately equal numbers of 
Layoff fathers. Panels (a) and (b) plot estimated short-run DD treatment effects using Equation (3) on the 
level of post-tax family income and the level of college enrollment, respectively. Regression lines depict 
slope of estimated coefficient from OLS regression of these treatment effects on father’s predicted 
earnings loss. 
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I.G Discussion of Results
The results above provide strong evidence that parental layo§s occurring just before college decisions
have small impacts on college outcomes, despite their large impacts on parental resources. One
reason for this might be that children adjust other margins instead of altering investments. While
this may be true, adjustments are also small for every alternative margin I observe including college
quality, type, distance from home, and child earnings. To understand why adjustments are small
at a more basic level it is useful to examine how children actually pay for college. Data on college
Önance are available in Sallie Maeís (2011) "How America Pays for College" survey and in the
Department of Educationís National Post-Secondary Student Aid Study.
The average annual cost of college in the U.S. over this studyís sample period is about $20,000,
including tuition, fees, room and board. Average parent borrowing and transfers Önance about
$10,000 of these costs. Layo§s reduce permanent family income by about $6,000 and transitory
income by about $10,000. A key parameter for predicting e§ects of this income loss is the fraction
of marginal family income that parents would allocate to college spending if their child attended
college. This parameter is the conditional-on-college parental Engel curve in college spending.
While there are no existing causal estimates of this parameter, a benchmark can be obtained easily
from cross-sectional data. Surprisingly, in both Sallie Mae and DOE data, the slope of this line is
very áat: about .02 to .05. This suggests that a loss of family income between $6,000 and $10,000
will reduce average parental contributions for college by $120-$500. Deming and Dynarski (2010)
review the Önancial aid literature and conclude that $1,000 of salient, easily-obtained Önancial aid
raises enrollment by about 3 percentage points. This is likely an upper bound on the e§ect of
$1,000 in parental contributions, because children may not view parental contributions as "free
money," and parents do not necessarily require children to spend transfers on college. Based on
these numbers, a plausible upper bound on the e§ects of a fatherís layo§ on college enrollment is
0.36-1.5 percentage points. The e§ect of layo§s I actually Önd is 0.43 percentage points. In this
context, small causal e§ects of layo§ on enrollment appear much less surprising. This reasoning
also suggests, again, that income losses are su¢cient to explain the full e§ect of layo§s.
These calculations strengthen the lessons discussed above regarding Figure 1.1.a: Önancial aid
most likely is a much more e§ective way to increase college enrollment than transfers to parents
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with teenage or college-age children. To clarify this I convert the e§ect of Önancial aid into a metric
that is comparable with the e§ect of family income: percentage points of enrollment gained per
$1,000 of government spending. Average enrollment at age 18 in the U.S. is about 40%. An o§er
of $1,000 of additional, non-crowded-out Önancial aid would be predicted to increase this number
to 43%. This would cost, on average, $430. The enrollment gain per $1,000 dollars actually spent
would therefore be closer to 6 percentage points. In contrast, if layo§s a§ect parental college
spending through transitory income, $1,000 of government spending will raise enrollment by 0.04
percentage points, and if layo§s a§ect parental college spending through permanent income, $1,000
of additional government spending will raise enrollment by only .007 percentage points. This means
that on the margin in the U.S. today, spending on Önancial aid is 150-850 times more e§ective
at raising enrollment than unanticipated cash transfers to parents with college-age children. It
is possible that anticipated cash transfers in late childhood, which parents may smooth into child
inputs at earlier ages, have large impacts on college enrollment and other important child outcomes.
But both this smoothing behavior and the e§ects of the earlier child inputs must be larger than
any existing evidence suggests in order to reach a di§erent conclusion.
A simple, reduced-form policy calculation serves to make this point more vivid. The Dependent
Exemption and the non-refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit transferred $60 billion to middle-
and high-income parents in 2008. Consider a policy that re-allocates this revenue to Önancial aid
for children aged 18-22 with below-median parental income. I estimate that these income losses
after age 12 have virtually no impact on enrollment, and estimates in Dahl and Lochner (2012)
and Chetty, Friedman and Rocko§ (2011) suggest income e§ects before age 12 for middle- and
high-income families will reduce enrollment by at most one percentage point.32 The revenue saved
would Önance $12,000 in annual o§ered scholarships for every child between ages 18-22 below
median parental income, raise enrollment during these ages by 36 percentage points, and close 90%
of the entire 2-year gap in total college attainment between children in families with above- and
32Dahl and Lochner (2012) estimate that $1,000 of permanent income raises child test scores by 6% of a standard
deviation, where most of this is driven by children in lower-SES families and therefore represents an upper bound
on the e§ect of foregone non-refundable tax credits that mostly beneÖt middle- and upper-income families. Chetty,
Friedman and Rocko§ (2012) Önd that a one standard deviation gain in student test scores generates a 5 percentage
point gain in college enrollment and a 10% gain in future earnings. Suppose each family losing income has on average
2 children. Then families on average lose $2,000 of income from the policy change. Under the strong assumption that
test score changes produced from teacher quality and family income map into long-term outcomes identically, the
income loss produces a 0.6 percentage point reduction in future enrollment, and a 1.2% decline in future earnings.
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below-median incomes.33 This exercise is based on very strong assumptions, but it illustrates that
large gains from revenue-neutral shifts in the composition of government spending on children are
plausible.
If parental college spending, like Önancial aid, does have large per-dollar impacts on child college
outcomes, why donít parents devote more income to helping children pay for collegeñwhy is the
Engel curve so áat? Even at high incomes, parents leave children to Önance much of college with
student loans, earnings from work and low consumption, when apparently a few thousand extra
dollars of help for a few years could compel many of these children to attend college. It is possible
that parents believe children who are unwilling to endure these costs have little to gain from college.
But with an average lifetime earnings premium for college graduates approaching 60% (Goldin and
Katz 2008) over the sample period, it seems worthwhile for altruistic parents to bribe children into
obtaining a degree (as in Weinberg 2001). Another explanation is that many child inputs at earlier
ages, such as a motherís health while pregnant, high-quality neighborhoods and comfortable home
environments, are within-family public goods that beneÖt parents and children simultaneously. In
contrast, college is more of a private good that primarily beneÖts children. College spending may
therefore place larger demands on parental altruism. This theory predicts that parental income at
earlier ages will have larger impacts on long-term child outcomes even if the per-dollar productivity
of early childhood inputs are identical to the per-dollar productivity of college investments.
Do e§ects of parental layo§s on college outcomes, in themselves, justify substantial tax and
social insurance advantages for parents over non-parents? Under strong assumptions, I estimate
the NPV of the earnings loss imposed on children by parental layo§s to be $1,000-2,000.34 This is
small compared to the transfers that would be required to replace lost family income from layo§
while children are in college.
33There are approximately 3 million children per cohort, and therefore 15 million children between ages 18-22
each year. $60 billion permits $8,000 of annual realized spending per child below median parental income. DeÖne
a§ordable o§ered aid G, a§ordable realized aid E, the causal e§ect  of $1,000 of o§ered Önancial aid on enrollment,
and base enrollment R among the aid-eligible population. Under the strong assumption that  holds true at levels
of G substantially larger than most variation used to estimate  in existing studies, and that  is true for all ages
18-22, these variables are related by the identity E = (R+ G)G. For R = 0:3,  = 0:03 (Deming and Dynarski
2010, and consistent with results in this paper), and E = $8; 000, this yields G  $12; 000, an annual enrollment gain
of G  :36, and a gain in total college attainment of 5G  1:8 years. Future research on the causal e§ects of such
a large, means-tested Önancial aid program would be very useful.
34 I Önd that layo§s reduce total college attainment during ages 18-22 by 0.016 years. If each year of college raises
earnings by 10% and lifetime earnings are $500,000-$1,000,000, then parental layo§s reduce childrenís future earnings
by $800-$1,600. An alternative way to reach a similar conclusion is to impute the future earnings loss directly from
the 0.35% decline in alumni-earnings-based college quality.
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I.H Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that large, unanticipated family income shocks during late childhood
have small, adverse e§ects on childrenís college enrollment and choice of college. The research design
uses fathers who are laid o§ in the near future as a control group for fathers who are laid o§ in the
near past, and a reweighted sample of fathers who experience "control events" to remove time trends
among laid-o§ fathers. The design identiÖes selection-on-unobservables into layo§ () separately
from treatment e§ects (DD) and reveals that selection of parents into layo§ both within and across
Örms is important, even when conditioning on a rich set of family background characteristics. This
Önding bears on a broad range of empirical applications in which it is di¢cult for the researcher to
observe a dependent variable for the same individual both before and after a Örm-level treatment
takes place.
I precisely estimate that an unanticipated $1,000 decrease in permanent income due to a fatherís
layo§ reduces childrenís enrollment by 0.18%. I Önd similarly small, adverse e§ects on several
measures of college quality and distance of college from home. I also Önd that all of these e§ects
are smaller for low-income children. Using supplementary data, I show that the smaller e§ects
I obtain after controlling for selection-on-unobservables into layo§ are more consistent with how
children Önance college in the U.S. Layo§s most likely reduce parent college spending by only $100-
500. The fact that layo§s have any e§ect at all on childrenís enrollment therefore reinforces Öndings
in the Önancial aid literature that children respond strongly to perceived college costs.
I provide a variety of arguments consistent with the interpretation of layo§s as family income
shocks. An income loss channel o§ers a simple explanation for the U pattern of treatment e§ects
on enrollment by family income. An income loss channel also accords with treatment e§ects being
larger in families that rely more heavily on fatherís earnings, and larger in families with fathers
predicted to lose more earnings from layo§. Finally, I show that reductions in college enrollment and
quality following layo§ most likely reáect lower family consumption rather than liquidity constraints
on investment.
This paper contributes to the debate over how to improve long-term outcomes of disadvantaged
children. Programs that explicitly target children and parents account for about $300 billion or 10%
of annual federal spending in the U.S. (Isaacs et al 2011). Income transfers to parents account for
54
half of this spending; subsidies for speciÖc child inputs such as education and health care account
for the other half. The Öndings here show that policies designed to alleviate credit constraints
for parents of teenage and college-age children are unlikely to have a signiÖcant impact on college
outcomes, especially for low-income children. The Öndings are also consistent with existing evidence
that salient, easily-obtained Önancial aid has much larger impacts (Deming and Dynarski 2010,
Bettinger et al 2009). These considerations suggest that revenue-neutral shifts in the composition
of government spending on childrenóout of some parental income transfers and into speciÖc child
input subsidiesómay have much larger impacts on future generations than previously thought.
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Appendix 1: Matching Algorithm and E§ects on Sample
I Örst discuss the general logic of the match of fathers and mothers to children and then doc-
ument the exact routine employed. Linking parents and children in IRS data for my event study
and event-age study designs requires care for several reasons. Marital status and children are only
reported by Ölers, and Öling is reduced by layo§. Therefore it is important to use information
prior to layo§s to match parents and children, a rule I follow with one exception, discussed below.
All matches of fathers with children rely on claims from 1996-1998, giving a bu§er of two years
before the Örst layo§ can occur, in 2000. I also restrict to claims in years before a child turns 18,
because after that age claims depend endogenously on child college outcomes for eligibility reasons.
Over 90% of matches occur in the Örst available year, 1996, while virtually all the rest are made
in 199735. About 10% of children are only claimed by mothers and therefore excluded from my
sample. An additional 25% of children are either never claimed, or claimed by too many di§erent
people for my matching algorithm to assign them a single father in all years 1996-2009 with conÖ-
dence, and therefore removed from the sample. Multiple claimers are a much bigger problem than
no claimers, because most low-income parents Öle taxes and claim children in order to collect large
EITC beneÖts (Athreya et al 2010).
Removing children claimed by multiple fathers before age 18, even when a second father claims
the child after a Örst father is laid-o§, violates the rule that only pre-layo§ information be used in
matching children to parents. My match algorithm errs on the side of strong linkages to assure that
children are linked with their primary, contempary source of parental support. Measurement error
in family linkages can be a minor problem when using parents as background controls in the context
of some external treatment, because even a non-contemporaneous parent likely contains a lot of
information about Öxed characteristics of a childís family background. However, erroneous linkages
are a major problem when measuring the e§ects of changes in parental circumstances over time on
child outcomes. Even if all of a childís claiming fathers have highly-correlated Öxed characteristics,
changes in their time-varying characteristics are likely far less correlated. Therefore I err on the side
of excluding children claimed by more than one father to assure I have strong parent-child linkages.
35The claims data are mostly missing in 1998-2000. It is therefore reassuring that many more kids are claimed
for the Örst time in 1996 than 1997, because this suggests that the missing data only cause a tiny fraction of missed
linkages.
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This restriction eliminates nearly 20% of children ever claimed in IRS records. Unsurprisingly,
children claimed by multiple fathers or no father have much lower college enrollment than children
claimed by one father (note that college enrollment is observed for all children, both matched and
unmatched). To the extent we think income matters more for children in lower-SES families, my
estimates may be smaller than estimates for the full population of children. My estimates may also
be smaller if layo§s a§ect children through mechanisms that correlate with divorce and remarriage
(the most likely path to multiple claimers) before a child turns 18.
Figure 1.A1.1 shows two simple validations of my algorithm for matching parents and children.
It plots the pre-tax income distribution for a random sample of children in my IRS data who are
age 14-16 in 2001, compared with two samples of age 14-16 children drawn from the 2001 American
Community Survey (ACS). My sample selection criteria cannot be validated exactly in ACS data
because it relies on the time dimension of my panel data. I therefore use two ACS samples with
income distributions that I expect to "bracket" that of the IRS sample. The main issue is that
children in my data are in households that were headed by men at some point during 1996-1998,
several years before the year of observation, 2001. These households are higher-SES than average
Census households due to their male-headed status, but lower-SES than Census households headed
by men in 2001. Figure 1.A1.1.a conÖrms this intuition when these three income distributions are
normalized into PDFís. The income distribution resulting from my linked sample looks very close
to what would be expected from ACS data. Figure 1.A1.1.b makes another point: the Average
sample of children is smaller (using appropriate sampling weights) than the Census male-headed
sample. This is because I exclude children who are claimed by more than one father before age 18,
and children who are never claimed on tax returns.
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Figure 1.A1.1 
IRS Linked Sample vs Census 
Family Income Distributions of Children Age 14-16 in 2001 
Notes: IRS linked sample is a random sample of the children age 14-16 in 2001 who I match to fathers in 
1996-1998. Census_All is a random sample of children from the ACS age 14-16 in 2001. 
Census_Malehead is a random sample of children from the ACS age 14-16 and residing in male-headed 
households in 2001. Income is year 2001 pre-tax family nominal income. Panel (a) presents the 
probability density functions for the income distributions of these three samples. Panel (b) presents the 
corresponding histograms for these three samples. !
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The algorithm is as follows.
1. Make a list all unique pairs of children and claimers in every year in the sample, 1996-2009.
Each individual is indexed by a unique identiÖer. About 95% of individuals currently in the
US who were children during this sample period are linked to at least one claimer. Some of
the remaining 5% may have arrived as immigrants after age 18.
2. Restrict this list to rows in which the child is under 18, because claims beginning in 18 are
typically only valid conditional on college enrollment.
3. Get the sex of all claimers and the unique identiÖer of each claimerís spouse, if any, in every
year. In each year call the claimers "PEís" for "primary earnings," and their spouses "SEís"
for "secondary earners."
4. Case 1: Child has only one PE claimer (63.7% of children)
-Restrict to SEís who claim child largest number of times.
-If multiple SEís, break tie by selecting SE who claims child Örst
5. Case 2: Child has exactly one male PE claimer and one female PE claimer (11.4% of children)
-Assign child this man and this woman as mother and father
6. Discard remaining children (20% of children)
Appendix 2: Firm Closure Sample: Details
I here brieáy discuss the sample restrictions of the closure sample I construct in IRS data, which
are based on those in OPS.
Firms can only enter the sample if they employ at least 30 workers at time of closure.
One restriction requires that fewer than 35% of workers experiencing closure at T at a particular
Örm be working at the same Örm in a future year, and is intended to remove re-organizations
mistakenly identiÖed as closures. This restriction eliminates 45% of candidate Örm closures.
Other restrictions require at least two years of zero UI and two years of tenure at the closing
Örm. The tenure restriction eliminates 35% of workers and the zero-UI restriction eliminates 15%
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of the remaining workers. To identify closure at T under these restrictions, we need to conÖrm
zero employment at that Örm in T+1, no excess bunching of displaced workers at the same Örms
in T+2, and the tenure and no-UI restrictions in T-1 and T-2. It is also important to note that
many spurious closures arise if less than two years are allowed for late updates of the W2 earnings
data in IRS records. Imposing all these restrictions require me to limit my sample to closures to
2001-2007. I also impose a restriction that fathers earn less than $150,000 (2009 dollars) in both
of the two years prior to layo§, because there is not enough overlap in this region to adequately
reweight Non-Closures to Closures.
The resulting closures sample is a 100% sample of workers displaced by closure who take up UI,
combined with a 30% random sample of workers displaced by closure who do not take up UI, with
appropriate sampling weights.
Table 1.A2.1 shows number of Örms that close and their average size, by year of closure, in my
sample. While some fairly large Örms do close every year, the vast majority of closing Örms are
small. This leads to the small average size of closing Örms.
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Table 1.A2.2 displays summary statistics for the Closure and Non-Closure samples, and is
analogous to Table 1.1. The Closure and Non-Closure samples display similar overall patterns,
though smaller declines in child earnings because many fewer cohorts are included in this sample
due to the computational demands of identifying closures according to the above restrictions.
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Appendix 3: IdentiÖcation Using Only Layo§s
In this appendix I develop an estimator that relies entirely on the Layo§ sample.
The challenge is to estimate period e§ects when event-year and cohort both have e§ects on
outcomes that are large relative to period e§ects, given that these three variables are linearly
dependent36. This linear dependence makes it infeasible to estimate period e§ects while controlling
for cohort and event-year Öxed e§ects. I Örst discuss the approach I take intuitively, and then
formalize it using the notation developed above.
Estimating treatment e§ects requires estimation of potential outcomes under non-layo§ for the
Layo§ children after layo§ takes place. Above, I use Survivors for this. Here, I use Layo§ children
prior to realization of layo§s. This is another form of DD estimator. The Örst di§erence is the same:
the di§erence between two moments in the Layo§ sample on either side of period k = 0. Above,
the second di§erence is between the two corresponding moments in the Survivor sample. Here, the
second di§erence is between two moments in the layo§ sample, both of which involve k < 0. There
are typically a number of candidate pre-layo§ di§erences that can be used to estimate the desired
potential outcomes. The approach I develop here pinpoints a particular weighted combination of
these di§erences that addresses the problem of confounding event-year and cohort shocks.
Figure 1.A3.1.a displays average enrollment for the Layo§ group at age 19 for three cohorts,
each plotted by event-age aE  a  (tO  tE). One option would be to pool all of these cohorts
into event-age means, but this throws away a lot of useful information. The key information to
exploit is that event-age is collinear with event-year for a Öxed cohort. Consider the di§erence
AB for the 1984 cohort. This is a particular "treatment di§erence," which can be deÖned as the
outcome at an event-year that takes place after the age of the outcome, minus the outcome at an
event-year that takes place before the age of the outcome. For cohort 1984, the points AB reáect
outcomes for children with event-year 2002 minus outcomes for children with event-year 2004. The
di§erence A  B therefore contains both the desired di§erence in outcomes across children with
di§erent event-ages, and a confounding di§erence across children with event-years 2002 and 2004.
We would like to estimate the confounding di§erence across children with these event-years.
36The problem occurs when linearly dependent covariates enter a conditional expectation function, and the re-
searcher is primarily interested in e§ects of a subset of these linearly dependent variabless. Leading examples of this
are age, year, and cohort e§ects in labor economics (Hall, Mairesse and Turner 2005) and age, year, and vintage
e§ects in studies of capital goods (Hall 1971, Berndt, Griliches and Rappaport 1995).
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Figure 1.A3.1 
Outcomes at Age 19 by Event-Age, Layoff Sample 
Notes: Figures plot mean college enrollment for children grouped into cohort by event-age bins in the 
Layoff sample. Panel (a) displays these group means for three cohorts. Panel (b) displays these group 
means for three event-years. 
 !
There are many ways to estimate this confounding di§erence. Any cohort for which both of
these event-years occur too late to a§ect the outcome at age 19 provides an estimate of this event-
year e§ect di§erence. DeÖne a "control di§erence" as a di§erence across outcomes for event-years
that occur too late to a§ect these outcomes. Figure 1.A3.1.a presents two such control di§erences.
The control di§erence C  D uses the 1986 cohort to estimate the di§erence across event-years
2002 and 2004. The control di§erence EF uses the 1988 cohort to estimate the di§erence across
event-years 2002 and 2004. There are many such control di§erences. Each control di§erence yields
a di§erent double-di§erence estimator of the treatment e§ect. One estimator is AB  (C D).
Another estimator is AB  (E  F ). The unweighted mean of these double-di§erences provides
one estimate of the di§erence in event-age e§ects across event-ages 18 and 20, which is the short-run
treatment e§ect of interest.
This estimate relies on the treatment di§erence in cohort 1984. There are many other cohorts,
each of which o§ers one treatment di§erence across event-ages 18 and 20. Each cohort uses a
di§erent pair of event-years in its treatment di§erence, and therefore requires a di§erent set of
control di§erences to remove the confounding event-year variation. Each cohort then yields a
di§erent "treatment e§ect," deÖned as a treatment di§erence minus the mean of all available control
di§erences that share the event-years used in the treatment di§erence. I then take the mean of all
these treatment e§ects.
A similar argument holds for treatment di§erences that occur within event-years, rather than
within cohorts. The analogous graph is presented in Figure 1.A3.1.b. I omit the discussion of these
estimators to save space; it is conceptually analogous to that just presented. The surprising fact,
however, is that the treatment e§ects that emerge from these two approaches contain independent
information. The amount of independent information decreases in the smaller dimension of the
outcome-year by event-year matrix. I therefore calculate the complete set of treatment e§ects and
pool them into a single estimate. This approach does count some information multiple times, and
therefore overestimates the precision of the Önal estimate. I ignore this problem.
Write birth cohort as tB  tO  a. I now rewrite the model in terms of cohort instead of
outcome-year. Write the potential child outcome function in terms of a treatment e§ect, and age
interacted with cohort e§ects and event-year e§ects, dropping the g subscript because now all
observations set g = T :
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ya;tB ;tE = +
kmaxX
j=kmin
j  I fk = jg+
tmaxBX
j=tminB
a;j  I ftB = jg+
tmaxEX
j=tminE
 a;j  I ftE = jg+ ua;tB ;tE ,
where j is the e§ect of layo§ on the outcome, a;j is the e§ect of cohort j on the outcome
at age a,  a;j is the e§ect of selection into layo§ in year j on outcome at age a, and ua;tB ;tE is
an error term. A key restriction here is that cohort e§ects are constant across event-years, and
event-year e§ects are constant across cohorts, within age groups. Without Survivors we have no
way to distinguish these interaction terms from event-age e§ects. This is why the estimates using
only Layo§s are much noisier: event-ages are capturing both treatment e§ects and random cohort
by event-year by age interaction shocks.
It is not possible to identify all of the parameters in this model without further assumptions,
due to the collinearity k = tO  tE = a + tB  tE . I therefore make an additional selection that
period e§ects not driven by treatment e§ects are linear:
A1 : j = a;0 + a;1k +
kmaxX
j=0
j  I fk = jg ,
where a;0 and a;1 capture the linear trend in period, and k captures treatment e§ects,
assumed to equal zero for outcomes prior to events. This is not a strong additional assumption; it
is weaker than the parallel trends assumption a;1 = 0 used for the main results.
Under these assumptions we identify many di§erent treatment e§ects using DDs, as previously
described. I here characterize the set of these treatment e§ects. All such DDís consist of one
treatment di§erence that crosses the cuto§ where k = 0 (e.g.,aW = a, depicted as di§erence
A  B), and one control di§erence that is contained entirely in the untreated region where k < 0
(e.g., aW > a, depicted as di§erences C D and E  F ).
Writing event-age in terms of event-year and cohort and Öxing age a for simplicity, this set of
DDís identifying treatment e§ects k = a+ ti2B  ti2E years after layo§ can be characterized as:
a

ti1E ; t
i2
E ; t
i3
E ; t
i4
E ; t
j1
B ; t
j2
B ; t
j3
B ; t
j4
B

 E
h
ya

ti2E ; t
i2
B

 ya

ti1E ; t
i1
B
i
(5)
 E
h
ya

ti4E ; t
i4
B

 ya

ti3E ; t
i3
B
i
(DDís in event-age)
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such that
1. ti1E  ti1B + 1 < a+ 1  ti2E  ti2B  ti3E  ti3B < ti4E  ti4B (6)
(one treatment di§erence minus one control di§erence)
and either of the following hold:
2A. ti1B = t
i2
B , t
i3
B = t
i4
B , t
i1
E = t
i3
E , and t
i2
E = t
i4
E (7)
(treatment di§erences removes cohort, control di§erence removes event-year)
2B. ti1E = t
i2
E , t
i3
E = t
i4
E , t
i1
B = t
i3
B , and t
i2
B = t
i4
B (8)
(treatment di§erences removes event-year, control di§erence removes cohort).
To avoid clutter we can re-write a

ti1E ; t
i2
E ; t
i3
E ; t
i4
E ; t
j1
B ; t
j2
B ; t
j3
B ; t
j4
B

as a

ai1E ; a
i2
E ; a
i3
E ; a
i4
E

, where
the assumptions embodied in a (:) are implicit. As stated above for the example, under assumption
A1 selection terms cancel out in DDís of this nature, and we have:
a

ai1E ; a
i2
E ; a
i3
E ; a
i4
E

= k. (9)
Table 1.A3.1 calculates treatment e§ects as the unweighted average all these DDís, and is
analogous to Table 1.3. Column 1 shows the mean treatment e§ect for a (a 1; a+ 1) by age a
for ages 18 22, as well as a total e§ect that combines all ages in this range. The estimated e§ects
are very similar to those estimated with Survivors as a control group, but much noisier due to the
lack of any way to eliminate event-year by cohort interaction terms.
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Appendix 4: Linear Di§erential Trends and Other Robustness Check Results
In this appendix I derive formulas for point estimates and standard errors on a treatment e§ect
estimator that allows for linear di§erential selection in outcomes with respect to period k for k < 0.
This is a weaker version of the parallel-trends assumption.
The key parameters are the Tk and 
C
k terms; their di§erence captures the di§erence in child
outcomes around period of fatherís layo§. These terms are estimated using OLS on Equation (2).
I here employ a small amount of new notation for convenience. Write a conditional expectation
function for a scalar child outcome Y as
E [Y jX] = X,
where Y is the childís outcome,  is a K by 1 vector of parameters, and X contains the
covariates, including the period terms interacted with type of event (layo§ or survival) and controls
for event-year and cohort. Let V = V ar

^

.
First deÖne a 7 by K matrix LT such that LT =

T7; :::; 
T
1

, and similarly deÖne LC such
that LC =

C7; :::; 
C
1

, where I have here imposed a cuto§ of seven years prior to layo§. Now
let L = L1L0, such that L =

T7  C7; :::; T1  C1

. This vector contains the points in the
pre-treatment region of the graph. We want to estimate a line through these points, i.e., we want
to regress these points on a constant and on a linear period trend, where period goes from 7 to
1. Therefore deÖne a covariate matrix
Z =
0BBBBBBB@
1 7
1 6
::: :::
1 1
1CCCCCCCA
,
and deÖne the parameter vector  as the least-squares approximation
  argmin
a
(L  Za)0 (L  Za) = Z 0Z1 Z 0L.
We can write the estimator of  as (Z 0Z)1 Z 0L^  ^, and the covariance matrix for ^ as
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V
0.
The target parameter is the estimated di§erence between the imputed counterfactual outcome
under survival and the realized outcome under layo§ in period k > 0. DeÖne this scalar parameter
as   (0 + k  1) 

Tk  Ck

, where we here focus on the case of k = 1, the year after layo§.
This can be rewritten by deÖning two matrices H0 = (1; k) and H1 such that  = H0 H1, or
 = (H0H1):
This neatly writes the target parameter as a linear combination of the original regression of
outcomes on period dummies for each group and other controls. We can therefore write the variance
of ^ as
V = (H0H1)V (H0H1)0 ,
yielding a standard error on ^ as V 1=2 .
Appendix 5: Institutional Non-Filing of the 1098T Form
My results rely on data contained in 1098T forms Öled by all Title IV post-secondary institu-
tions. Title IV institutions contain most four-year, two-year, and professional schools in the U.S..
However, recent work by Cellini and Goldin (2012) suggests that 27% of college students are not
enrolled in Title IV institutions, and will therefore not receive 1098Ts. In addition, schools are
only required to Öle 1098T forms for individual students who pay any positive dollar amount for
tuition, room, board, or other fees, net of Önancial aid received from the school or other sources.
My analysis data set deÖnes college enrollment as a non-missing 1098T form, and non-enrollment
as a missing 1098T form. I have interpreted reductions in 1098T Öling for children with recent
paternal layo§s as reductions in college enrollment. However, a decline in non-missing 1098T
forms could be generated by increased enrollment in non-Title-IV institutions, or by an increase
in Önancial aid for students that pushes their net payments to zero at a school that does not
report 1098Ts when not legally required to do so. Therefore, it is possible in theory that my
key enrollment decline results represent a switch from Title IV to non-Title-IV institutions, or
an increase in 1098T non-Öling. The switch into non-Title-IV institutions seems unlikely because
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Cellini and Goldin (2012) estimate that these schools are approximately equal in price to Title IV
schools, after accounting for subsidies (mainly Pell Grants) at Title IV schools. Therefore the main
worry is that layo§s increase 1098T non-Öling rather than decrease real college enrollment. While
the evidence I present in this appendix suggests 1098T-nonÖling is not driving my results, such
a problem would anyway work in favor of my conclusion that layo§s and their associated income
declines have at most very small e§ects on child college outcomes.
To address this concern I Örst construct an alternative measure of college enrollment in IRS
data. I then provide two tests suggesting that the problem is unlikely to drive my main results.
The alternative measure of college enrollment is based on the claiming of children age 19-24.
Parents are allowed to claim children ages 19-24 if and only if the child is "permanently and totally
disabled" or enrolled full-time at a school37. The key features of this rule, for our purposes, are
that children can qualify as students if the family pays zero net tuition, and if the school is not a
Title IV school. Therefore, conditional on parents Öling a tax return, the fraction of parents that
claim a child age 19-24 represents a potential alternative measure of college enrollment that can
validate Öndings with 1098T-based enrollment.
Figure 1.A5.1 plots the two measures of college enrollment for children at age 19 in 2002 by mean
three-year family income. I restrict to children in 2002 to facilitate comaparison with statistics in
the NLSY 97 for cohorts 1979-1982 in Bailey and Dynarski (2011, Figure 1.2). I restrict to age
19 because after age 19 children gradually start to claim themselves as dependents. While parent
claims continue to track 1098T-based enrollment for higher-income families, the mechanical decrease
in levels makes them less useful as a gauge of total enrollment.
37See instructions for the 1040 online at <http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1040a/ar01.html>.
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Figure 1.A5.1 
College Enrollment at Age 19 in 2002 by Family Income 
Two Alternative Measures 
Notes: Figure 1.plots two measures of college enrollment in the Survivor sample. “College (1098T)” uses 
an indicator variable for receipt of a 1098T form by a student. “College (Claimed by Filer)” uses an 
indicator for whether a child is claimed by an adult (not necessarily the linked father). !
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The Örst pattern is that, for richer children, college enrollment based on claims roughly tracks
college enrollment based on 1098Ts. About 20% more high-income children are enrolled in college
using the claims measure. This is slightly less than the fraction of students estimated to be enrolled
in non-Title-IV colleges in Cellini and Goldin (2012). The smaller Ögure here could be due to the
small fraction of 19-year-olds who claim themselves and hence cannot be claimed by their parents.
The second pattern is that, for poorer children, college enrollment based on claims is much too
high to represent actual college enrollment. While 1098T-based enrollment matches enrollment in
the NLSY for children in the bottom quartile of family income, the claims-based measure of college
enrollment is about twice this level. The most likely explanation for these implausibly-high claiming
rates is that low-income families claim children after age 18 in order to claim the EITC38. This
seems especially likely since the only reason most low-income families Öle a 1040 at all is to claim
EITC beneÖts39. Therefore the claims-based measure of college enrollment cannot help us validate
the 1098T-based measure of college enrollment for low-income children: false claims overwhelm
genuine non-1098T college enrollment with zero tuition payments or at non-Title IV schools.
I would like to see if the main results in the paper hold up when using this alternative enrollment
measure. For this to make sense, I restrict to richer families for two reasons. The Örst reason, as
just discussed, is that this measure appears to approximate enrollment only for richer families. The
second reason is that layo§s reduce Öling rates, because Öling correlates positively with income.
This introduces a potential spurious e§ect by reducing claims by reducing Ölings. However, note
that families who do not Öle are unlikely to have children in college, because such families can
claim EITC beneÖts. Nonetheless, restricting to higher-income families alleviates most of the Öling
problem. I use the same deÖnition of "high-income" used in the main results in the text, three-year
mean incomes 1996-1999 above $40,000.
Figure 1.A5.2.a plots treatment e§ects from Equation (2) where the outcome is a dummy for
whether the child is claimed by her parents, instead of whether the child receives a 1098T as
in Figure 1.13. The claim-based enrollment measure shows almost exactly the same pattern of
treatment e§ects as the 1098T-based measure for high-income families: about one percentage point
38Note that by using three-year mean family income on the x-axis, families with incomes in the EITC beneÖt range
for at least one of these three years are likely to have much higher three-year mean income, due to mean-reversion,
explaining why the excess claims extend "too high" relative to the EITC beneÖt range, which reaches zero around
$30,000.
39Only 60% of the poorest parents in this graph Öle, where as almost 100% of parents Öle starting at around $50,000
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lower enrollment for children experiencing a fatherís job loss one year before college decisions versus
one year after college decisions. I conclude that this test supports the main results of the paper:
layo§s reduce college enrollment by a small amount.
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Figure 1.A5.2 
Event-Age Studies for Alternative College Enrollment Measures 
Notes: Panel (a) is analogous to Figure 1.4.b but replacing the 1098T indicator for college with a claimed-
by-adult-filer indicator for college, and adding a restriction to age 19-22 and family incomes in 1996-
1999 above $40,000. Panel (b) is also analogous to Figure 1.4.b but adding a restriction that the 1098T 
come from a college that appears to report 1098Ts even for children who make no payments for college. !
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I also develop a second robustness check on the main 1098T enrollment results. I create a dummy
variable that equals one when a child receives a 1098T from a college that often Öles 1098Ts for
students with zero net-tuition payments40. I then estimate Equation (2) again for this outcome
variable, now for all children, not just high-income children. The resulting event-age e§ects are
much noisier due to the much lower rate of enrollment at this restricted set of institutions, but
the overall pattern is reassuring: children experiencing paternal layo§s one year before making
enrollment decisions enroll in these colleges about 1% less than children experiencing paternal
layo§s one year after making enrollment decisions. The only way this pattern could be generated
spuriously is if these schools (1) raise Önancial aid for students who experience paternal layo§ and
then (2) selectively decide not to Öle 1098Ts for students whose greater aid package reduced their
net payments to zero, despite Öling 1098Ts for many other students with zero net payments. As
this seems much less likely than the alternative explanation that paternal layo§s cause a small
fraction of students to forego college, I conclude that this test also supports the main results of the
paper.
40 I deÖne "often" by ranking colleges by the fraction of their 1098Ts recording zero net tuition payments, and
restricting to those in the 75th percentile of this distribution.
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II How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom A§ect Your
Earnings? Evidence from Project STAR41
II.A Introduction
What are the long-term impacts of early childhood education? Evidence on this important policy
question remains scarce because of a lack of data linking childhood education and outcomes in
adulthood. This paper analyzes the long-term impacts of Project STAR, one of the most widely
studied education experiments in the United States. The Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio
(STAR) experiment randomly assigned one cohort of 11,571 students and their teachers to di§erent
classrooms within their schools in grades K-3. Some students were assigned to small classes (15
students on average) in grades K-3, while others were assigned to large classes (22 students on
average). The experiment was implemented across 79 schools in Tennessee from 1985 to 1989.
Numerous studies have used the STAR experiment to show that class size, teacher quality, and
peers have signiÖcant causal impacts on test scores (see Schanzenbach 2006 for a review). Whether
these gains in achievement on standardized tests translate into improvements in adult outcomes
such as earnings remains an open question.
We link the original STAR data to administrative data from tax returns, allowing us to follow
95% of the STAR participants into adulthood.42 We use these data to analyze the impacts of STAR
on outcomes ranging from college attendance and earnings to retirement savings, home ownership,
and marriage. We begin by documenting the strong correlation between kindergarten test scores
and adult outcomes. A one percentile increase in end-of-kindergarten (KG) test scores is associated
with a $132 increase in wage earnings at age 27 in the raw data, and a $94 increase after controlling
for parental characteristics. Several other adult outcomes ñ such as college attendance rates,
41This chapter is coauthored with Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Emmanuel Saez, Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach,
and Danny Yagan. We thank Lisa Barrow, David Card, Gary Chamberlain, Elizabeth Cascio, Janet Currie, Jeremy
Finn, Edward Glaeser, Bryan Graham, James Heckman, Caroline Hoxby, Guido Imbens, Thomas Kane, Lawrence
Katz, Alan Krueger, Derek Neal, Jonah Rocko§, Douglas Staiger, numerous seminar participants, and anonymous
referees for helpful discussions and comments. We thank Helen Bain and Jayne Zaharias at HEROS for access to the
Project STAR data. The tax data were accessed through contract TIRNO-09-R-00007 with the Statistics of Income
(SOI) Division at the US Internal Revenue Service. Gregory Bruich, Jane Choi, Jessica Laird, Keli Liu, Laszlo
Sandor, and Patrick Turley provided outstanding research assistance. Financial support from the Lab for Economic
Applications and Policy at Harvard, the Center for Equitable Growth at UC Berkeley, and the National Science
Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
42The data for this project were analyzed through a program developed by the Statistics of Income (SOI) Division
at the U.S. Internal Revenue Service to support research into the e§ects of tax policy on economic and social outcomes
and improve the administration of the tax system.
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quality of college attended, home ownership, and 401(k) savings ñ are also all highly correlated
with kindergarten test scores. These strong correlations motivate the main question of the paper:
do classroom environments that raise test scores ñ such as smaller classes and better teachers ñ
cause analogous improvements in adult outcomes?
Our analysis of the experimental impacts combines two empirical strategies. First, we study the
impacts of observable classroom characteristics. We analyze the impacts of class size using the same
intent-to-treat speciÖcations as Krueger (1999), who showed that students in small classes scored
higher on standardized tests. We Önd that students assigned to small classes are 1.8 percentage
points more likely to be enrolled in college at age 20, a signiÖcant improvement relative to the mean
college attendance rate of 26.4% at age 20 in the sample. We do not Önd signiÖcant di§erences in
earnings at age 27 between students who were in small and large classes, although these earnings
impacts are imprecisely estimated. Students in small classes also exhibit statistically signiÖcant
improvements on a summary index of the other outcomes we examine (home ownership, 401(k)
savings, mobility rates, percent college graduate in ZIP code, and marital status).
We study variation across classrooms along other observable dimensions, such as teacher and
peer characteristics, using a similar approach. Prior studies (e.g. Krueger 1999) have shown that
STAR students with more experienced teachers score higher on tests. We Önd similar impacts on
earnings. Students randomly assigned to a KG teacher with more than 10 years of experience earn
an extra $1; 093 (6.9% of mean income) on average at age 27 relative to students with less expe-
rienced teachers.43 We also test whether observable peer characteristics have long-term impacts
by regressing earnings on the fraction of low-income, female, and black peers in KG. These peer
impacts are not signiÖcant, but are very imprecisely estimated because of the limited variation in
peer characteristics across classrooms.
Because we have few measures of observable classroom characteristics, we turn to a second
empirical strategy that captures both observed and unobserved aspects of classrooms. We use an
analysis of variance approach analogous to that in the teacher e§ects literature to test whether
earnings are clustered by kindergarten classroom. Because we observe each teacher only once
in our data, we can only estimate ìclass e§ectsî ñ the combined e§ect of teachers, peers, and
43Because teacher experience is correlated with many other unobserved attributes ñ such as attachment to the
teaching profession ñ we cannot conclude that increasing teacher experience would improve student outcomes. This
evidence simply establishes that a studentís KG teacher has e§ects on his or her earnings as an adult.
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any class-level shock ñ by exploiting random assignment to KG classrooms of both students and
teachers. Intuitively, we test whether earnings vary across KG classes by more than what would
be predicted by random variation in student abilities. An F test rejects the null hypothesis that
KG classroom assignment has no e§ect on earnings. The standard deviation of class e§ects on
annual earnings is approximately 10% of mean earnings, highlighting the large stakes at play in
early childhood education.
The analysis of variance shows that kindergarten classroom assignment has signiÖcant impacts
on earnings, but it does not tell us whether classrooms that improve scores also generate earnings
gains. That is, are class e§ects on earnings correlated with class e§ects on scores? To analyze
this question, we proxy for each studentís KG ìclass qualityî by the average test scores of his
classmates at the end of kindergarten. We show that end-of-class peer test scores are an omnibus
measure of class quality because they capture peer e§ects, teacher e§ects, and all other classroom
characteristics that a§ect test scores. Using this measure, we Önd that kindergarten class quality
has signiÖcant impacts on both test scores and earnings. Students randomly assigned to a classroom
that is one standard deviation higher in quality earn 3% more at age 27. Students assigned to
higher quality classes are also signiÖcantly more likely to attend college, enroll in higher quality
colleges, and exhibit improvements in the summary index of other outcomes. The class quality
impacts are similar for students who entered the experiment in grades 1-3 and were randomized
into classes at that point. Hence, the Öndings of this paper should be viewed as evidence on the
long-term impacts of early childhood education rather than kindergarten in particular.
Our analysis of ìclass qualityî must be interpreted very carefully. The purpose of this analysis
is to detect clustering in outcomes at the classroom level: are a childís outcomes correlated with
his peersí outcomes? Although we test for such clustering by regressing own scores and earnings
on peer test scores, we emphasize that such regressions are not intended to detect peer e§ects.
Because we use post-intervention peer scores as the regressor, these scores incorporate the impacts
of peer quality, teacher quality, and any random class-level shock (such as noise from construction
outside the classroom). The correlation between own outcomes and peer scores could be due to
any of these factors. Our analysis shows that the classroom a student was assigned to in early
childhood matters for outcomes 20 years later, but does not shed light on which speciÖc factors
should be manipulated to improve adult outcomes. Further research on which factors contribute
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to high ìclass qualityî would be extremely valuable in light of the results reported here.
The impacts of early childhood class assignment on adult outcomes may be particularly surpris-
ing because the impacts on test scores ìfade outî rapidly. The impacts of class size on test scores
become statistically insigniÖcant by grade 8 (Krueger and Whitmore 2001), as do the impacts of
class quality on test scores. Why do the impacts of early childhood education fade out on test
scores but re-emerge in adulthood? We Önd some suggestive evidence that part of the explanation
may be non-cognitive skills. We Önd that KG class quality has signiÖcant impacts on non-cognitive
measures in 4th and 8th grade such as e§ort, initiative, and lack of disruptive behavior. These
non-cognitive measures are highly correlated with earnings even conditional on test scores but are
not signiÖcant predictors of future standardized test scores. These results suggest that high quality
KG classrooms may build non-cognitive skills that have returns in the labor market but do not
improve performance on standardized tests. While this evidence is far from conclusive, it highlights
the value of further empirical research on non-cognitive skills.
In addition to the extensive literature on the impacts of STAR on test scores, our study builds
on and contributes to a recent literature investigating selected long-term impacts of class size in
the STAR experiment. These studies have shown that students assigned to small classes are more
likely to complete high school (Finn, Gerber, and Boyd-Zaharias 2005) and take the SAT or ACT
college entrance exams (Krueger and Whitmore 2001) and are less likely to be arrested for crime
(Krueger and Whitmore 2001). Most recently, Muennig et al. (2010) report that students in small
classes have higher mortality rates, a Önding that we do not obtain in our data as we discuss below.
We contribute to this literature by providing a uniÖed evaluation of several outcomes, including
the Örst analysis of earnings, and by examining the impacts of teachers, peers, and other attributes
of the classroom in addition to class size.
Our results also complement the Öndings of studies on the long-term impacts of other early
childhood interventions, such as the Perry and Abecederian preschool demonstrations and the
Head Start program, which also Önd lasting impacts on adult outcomes despite fade-out on test
scores (see Almond and Currie 2010 for a review). We show that a better classroom environment
from ages 5-8 can have substantial long-term beneÖts even without intervention at earlier ages.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the STAR experimental design
and address potential threats to the validity of the experiment. Section III documents the cross-
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sectional correlation between test scores and adult outcomes. Section IV analyzes the impacts of
observable characteristics of classrooms ñ size, teacher characteristics, and peer characteristics ñ
on adult outcomes. In Section V, we study class e§ects more broadly, incorporating unobservable
aspects of class quality. Section VI documents the fade-out and re-emergence e§ects and the
potential role of non-cognitive skills in explaining this pattern. Section VI concludes.
II.B Experimental Design and Data
II.B.1 Background on Project STAR
Word et al. (1990), Krueger (1999), and Finn et al. (2007) provide a comprehensive summary of
Project STAR; here, we brieáy review the features of the STAR experiment most relevant for our
analysis. The STAR experiment was conducted at 79 schools across the state of Tennessee over
four years. The program oversampled lower-income schools, and thus the STAR sample exhibits
lower socioeconomic characteristics than the state of Tennessee and the U.S. population as a whole.
In the 1985-86 school year, 6,323 kindergarten students in participating schools were randomly
assigned to a small (target size 13-17 students) or regular-sized (20-25 students) class within their
schools.44 Students were intended to remain in the same class type (small vs. large) through 3rd
grade, at which point all students would return to regular classes for 4th grade and subsequent years.
As the initial cohort of kindergarten students advanced across grade levels, there was substantial
attrition because students who moved away from a participating school or were retained in grade
no longer received treatment. In addition, because kindergarten was not mandatory and due to
normal residential mobility, many children joined the initial cohort at the participating schools after
kindergarten. A total of 5,248 students entered the participating schools in grades 1-3. These new
entrants were randomly assigned to classrooms within school upon entry. Thus all students were
randomized to classrooms within school upon entry, regardless of the entry grade. As a result, the
randomization pool is school-by-entry-grade, and we include school-by-entry-grade Öxed e§ects in
all experimental analyzes below.
Upon entry into one of the 79 schools, the study design randomly assigned students not only
44There was also a third treatment group: regular sized class with a full-time teacherís aide. This was a relatively
minor intervention, since all regular classes were already assigned a 1/3 time teacherís aide. Prior studies of STAR
Önd no impact of a full-time teacherís aide on test scores. We follow the convention in the literature and group the
regular and regular plus aide class treatments together.
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to class type (small vs. large) but also to a classroom within each type (if there were multiple
classrooms per type, as was the case in 50 of the 79 schools). Teachers were also randomly assigned
to classrooms. Unfortunately, the exact protocol of randomization into speciÖc classrooms was
not clearly documented in any of the o¢cial STAR reports, where the emphasis was instead the
random assignment into class type rather than classroom (Word et al. 1990). We present statistical
evidence conÖrming that both students and teachers indeed appear to be randomly assigned directly
to classrooms upon entry into the STAR project, as the original designers attest.
As in any Öeld experiment, there were some deviations from the experimental protocol. In
particular, some students moved from large to small classes and vice versa. To account for such
potentially non-random sorting, we adopt the standard approach taken in the literature and assign
treatment status based on initial random assignment (intent-to-treat).
In each year, students were administered the grade-appropriate Stanford Achievement Test, a
multiple choice test that measures performance in math and reading. These tests were given only
to students participating in STAR, as the regular statewide testing program did not extend to the
early grades.45 Following Krueger (1999), we standardize the math and reading scale scores in each
grade by computing the scale scoreís corresponding percentile rank in the distribution for students
in large classes. We then assign the appropriate percentile rank to students in small classes and
take the average across math and reading percentile ranks. Note that this percentile measure is a
ranking of students within the STAR sample.
II.B.2 Variable DeÖnitions and Summary Statistics
We measure adult outcomes of Project STAR participants using administrative data from United
States tax records. 95.0% of STAR records were linked to the tax data using an algorithm based on
standard identiÖers (SSN, date of birth, gender, and names) that is described in Online Appendix
A.46
We obtain data on students and their parents from federal tax forms such as 1040 individual
45These K-3 test scores contain considerable predictive content. As reported in Krueger Whitmore (2001), the
correlation between test scores in grades g and g+1 is 0.65 for KG and 0.80 for each grade 1-3. The values for grades
4-7 lie between 0.83 and 0.88, suggesting that the K-3 test scores contain similar predictive content.
46All appendix material is available as an on-line appendix posted as supplementary material to the article. Note
that the matching algorithm was su¢ciently precise that it uncovered 28 cases in the original STAR dataset that were
a single split observation or duplicate records. After consolidating these records, we are left with 11,571 students.
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income tax returns. Information from 1040ís is available from 1996-2008. Approximately 10%
of adults do not Öle individual income tax returns in a given year. We use third-party reports
to obtain information such as wage earnings (form W-2) and college attendance (form 1098-T) for
all individuals, including those who do not Öle 1040s. Data from these third-party reports are
available since 1999. The year always refers to the tax year (i.e., the calendar year in which the
income is earned or the college expense incurred). In most cases, tax returns for tax year t are Öled
during the calendar year t+1. The analysis dataset combines selected variables from individual tax
returns, third party reports, and information from the STAR database, with individual identiÖers
removed to protect conÖdentiality.
We now describe how each of the adult outcome measures and control variables used in the
empirical analysis is constructed. Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for these variables for the
STAR sample as well as a random 0.25% sample of the US population born in the same years
(1979-1980).
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Earnings. The individual earnings data come from W-2 forms, yielding information on earnings
for both Ölers and non-Ölers.47 We deÖne earnings in each year as the sum of earnings on all W-2
forms Öled on an individualís behalf. We express all monetary variables in 2009 dollars, adjusting
for ináation using the Consumer Price Index. We cap earnings in each year at $100,000 to reduce
the ináuence of outliers; fewer than 1% of individuals in the STAR sample report earnings above
$100,000 in a given year. To increase precision, we typically use average (ináation indexed) earnings
from year 2005 to 2007 as an outcome measure. The mean individual earnings for the STAR sample
in 2005-2007 (when the STAR students are 25-27 years old) is $15,912. This earnings measure
includes zeros for the 13.9% of STAR students who report no income 2005-2007. The mean level of
earnings in the STAR sample is lower than in the same cohort in the U.S. population, as expected
given that Project STAR targeted more disadvantaged schools.
College Attendance. Higher education institutions eligible for federal Önancial aid ñ Title IV
institutions ñ are required to Öle 1098-T forms that report tuition payments or scholarships received
for every student.48 Title IV institutions include all colleges and universities as well as vocational
schools and other postsecondary institutions. Comparisons to other data sources indicate that
1098-T forms accurately capture US college enrollment.49 We have data on college attendance
from 1098-T forms for all students in our sample since 1999, when the STAR students were 19
years old. We deÖne college attendance as an indicator for having one or more 1098-T forms Öled
on oneís behalf in a given year. In the STAR sample, 26.4% of students are enrolled in college
at age 20 (year 2000). 45.5% of students are enrolled in college at some point between 1999 and
2007, compared with 57.1% in the same cohort of the U.S. population. Because the data are based
purely on tuition payments, we have no information about college completion or degree attainment.
College Quality. Using the institutional identiÖers on the 1098-T forms, we construct an
47We obtain similar results using household adjusted gross income reported on individual tax returns. We focus on
the W-2 measure because it provides a consistent deÖnition of individual wage earnings for both Ölers and non-Ölers.
One limitation of the W-2 easure is that it does not include self-employment income.
48These forms are used to administer the Hope and Lifetime Learning education tax credits created by the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997. Colleges are not required to Öle 1098-T forms for students whose qualiÖed tuition and related
expenses are waived or paid entirely with scholarships or grants; however, in many instances the forms are available
even for such cases, perhaps because of automation at the university level.
49 In 2009, 27.4 million 1098-T forms were issued (Internal Revenue Service, 2010). According to the Current
Population Survey (US Census Bureau, 2010, Tables V and VI), in October 2008, there were 22.6 million students in
the U.S. (13.2 million full time, 5.4 million part-time, and 4 million vocational). As an individual can be a student
at some point during the year but not in October and can receive a 1098-T form from more than one institution, the
number of 1098-T forms for the calendar year should indeed be higher than the number of students as of October.
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earnings-based index of college quality as follows. First, using the full population of all individuals
in the United States aged 20 on 12/31/1999 and all 1098-T forms for year 1999, we group individuals
by the higher education institution they attended in 1999. This sample contains over 1.4 million
individuals.50 We take a 1% sample of those not attending a higher education institution in 1999,
comprising another 27,733 individuals, and pool them together in a separate ìno collegeî category.
Next, we compute average earnings of the students in 2007 when they are aged 28 by grouping
students according to the educational institution they attended in 1999. This earnings-based
index of college quality is highly correlated with the US News ranking of the best 125 colleges and
universities: the correlation coe¢cient of our measure and the log US news rank is 0.75. The
advantages of our index are that while the US News ranking only covers the top 125 institutions,
ours covers all higher education institutions in the U.S. and provides a simple cardinal metric for
college quality. Among colleges attended by STAR students, the average value of our earnings
index is $35,080 for four-year colleges and $26,920 for two-year colleges.51 For students who did
not attend college, the imputed mean wage is $16,475.
Other Outcomes. We identify spouses using information from 1040 forms. For individuals
who Öle tax returns, we deÖne an indicator for marriage based on whether the tax return is Öled
jointly. We code non-Ölers as single because most non-Ölers in the U.S. who are not receiving
Social Security beneÖts are single (Cilke 1998, Table I). We deÖne a measure of ever being married
by age 27 as an indicator for ever Öling a joint tax return in any year between 1999 and 2007. By
this measure, 43.2% of individuals are married at some point before age 27.
We measure retirement savings using contributions to 401(k) accounts reported on W-2 forms
from 1999-2007. 28.2% of individuals in the sample make a 401(k) contribution at some point
during this period. We measure home ownership using data from the 1098 form, a third party
report Öled by lenders to report mortgage interest payments. We include the few individuals who
report a mortgage deduction on their 1040 forms but do not have 1098ís as homeowners. We deÖne
any individual who has a mortgage interest deduction at any point between 1999 and 2007 as a
homeowner. Note that this measure of home ownership does not cover individuals who own homes
50 Individuals who attended more than one institution in 1999 are counted as students at all institutions they
attended.
51For the small fraction of STAR students who attend more than one college in a single year, we deÖne college
quality based on the college that received the largest tuition payments on behalf of the student.
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without a mortgage, which is rare among individuals younger than 27. By our measure, 30.8% of
individuals own a home by age 27. We use data from 1040 forms to identify each householdís ZIP
code of residence in each year. For non-Ölers, we use the ZIP code of the address to which the W-2
form was mailed. If an individual did not Öle and has no W-2 in a given year, we impute current
ZIP code as the last observed ZIP code. We deÖne a measure of cross-state mobility by an indicator
for whether the individual ever lived outside Tennessee between 1999 and 2007. 27.5% of STAR
students lived outside Tennessee at some point between age 19 and 27. We construct a measure
of neighborhood quality using data on the percentage of college graduates in the individualís 2007
ZIP code from the 2000 Census. On average, STAR students lived in 2007 in neighborhoods with
17.6% college graduates.
We observe dates of birth and death until the end of 2009 as recorded by the Social Security
Administration. We deÖne each STAR participantís age at kindergarten entry as the studentís age
(in days divided by 365.25) as of September 1, 1985. Virtually all students in STAR were born in
the years 1979-1980. To simplify the exposition, we say that the cohort of STAR children is aged
a in year 1980+ a (e.g., STAR children are 27 in 2007). Approximately 1.7% of the STAR sample
is deceased by 2009.
Parent Characteristics. We link STAR children to their parents by Önding the earliest 1040
form from 1996-2008 on which the STAR student was claimed as dependents. Most matches were
found on 1040 forms for the tax year 1996, when the STAR children were 16. We identify parents
for 86% of the STAR students in our linked dataset. The remaining students are likely to have
parents who did not Öle tax returns in the early years of the sample when they could have claimed
their child as a dependent, making it impossible to link the children to their parents. Note that
this deÖnition of parents is based on who claims the child as a dependent, and thus may not reáect
the biological parent of the child.
We deÖne parental household income as average Adjusted Gross Income (capped at $252,000,
the 99th percentile in our sample) from 1996-1998, when the children were 16-18 years old. For
years in which parents did not Öle, we deÖne parental household income as zero. For divorced
parents, this income measure captures the total resources available to the household claiming the
51Alternative deÖnitions of income for non-Ölers ñ such as income reported on W-2ís starting in 1999 ñ yield very
similar results to those reported below.
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child as a dependent (including any alimony payments), rather than the sum of the individual
incomes of the two parents. By this measure, mean parent income is $48,010 (in 2009 dollars) for
STAR students whom we are able to link to parents. We deÖne marital status, home ownership,
and 401(k) saving as indicators for whether the parent who claims the STAR child ever Öles a joint
tax return, has a mortgage interest payment, or makes a 401(k) contribution over the period for
which relevant data are available. We deÖne motherís age at childís birth using data from Social
Security Administration records on birth dates for parents and children. For single parents, we
deÖne the motherís age at childís birth using the age of the Öler who claimed the child, who is
typically the mother but is sometimes the father or another relative.52 By this measure, mothers
are on average 25.0 years old when they give birth to a child in the STAR sample. When a child
cannot be matched to a parent, we deÖne all parental characteristics as zero, and we always include
a dummy for missing parents in regressions that include parent characteristics.
Background Variables from STAR. In addition to classroom assignment and test score variables,
we use some demographic information from the STAR database in our analysis. This includes
gender, race (an indicator for being black), and whether the student ever received free or reduced
price lunch during the experiment. 36% of the STAR sample are black and 60% are eligible for
free or reduced-price lunches. Finally, we use data on teacher characteristics ñ experience, race,
and highest degree ñ from the STAR database. The average student has a teacher with 10.8 years
of experience. 19.5% of kindergarten students have a black teacher, and 35.9% have a teacher with
a masterís degree or higher.
Our analysis dataset contains one observation for each of the 10,992 STAR students we link
to the tax data. Each observation contains information on the studentís adult outcomes, parent
characteristics, and classroom characteristics in the grade the student entered the STAR project
and was randomly assigned to a classroom. Hence, when we pool students across grades, we include
test score and classroom data only from the entry grade.
52We deÖne the motherís age at childís birth as missing for 471 observations in which the implied motherís age
at birth based on the claiming parentís date of birth is below 13 or above 65. These are typically cases where the
parent does not have an accurate birth date recorded in the SSA Öle.
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II.B.3 Validity of the Experimental Design
The validity of the causal inferences that follow rests on two assumptions: successful randomization
of students into classrooms and no di§erences in attrition (match rates) across classrooms. We
now evaluate each of these issues.
Randomization into Classrooms. To evaluate whether the randomization protocol was imple-
mented as designed, we test for balance in pre-determined variables across classrooms. The original
STAR dataset contains only a few pre-determined variables: age, gender, race, and free-lunch status.
Although the data are balanced on these characteristics, some skepticism naturally has remained
because of the coarseness of the variables (Hanushek 2003).
The tax data allow us to improve upon the prior evidence on the validity of randomization
by investigating a wider variety of family background characteristics. In particular, we check
for balance in the following Öve parental characteristics: household income, 401(k) savings, home
ownership, marital status, and motherís age at childís birth. Although most of these characteristics
are not measured prior to random assignment in 1985, they are measured prior to the STAR cohortís
expected graduation from high school and are unlikely to be impacted by the childís classroom
assignment in grades K-3. We Örst establish that these parental characteristics are in fact strong
predictors of student outcomes. In column 1 of Table 2.2, we regress the childís earnings on the
Öve parent characteristics, the studentís age, gender, race, and free-lunch status, and school-by-
entry-grade Öxed e§ects. We also include indicators for missing data on certain variables (parentsí
characteristics, motherís age, studentís free lunch status, and studentís race). The student and
parent demographic characteristics are highly signiÖcant predictors of earnings.
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Having identiÖed a set of pre-determined characteristics that predict childrenís future earnings,
we test for balance in these covariates across classrooms. We Örst evaluate randomization into the
small class treatment by regressing an indicator for being assigned to a small class upon entry on
the same variables as in column 1. As shown in column 2 of Table 2.2, none of the demographic
characteristics predict the likelihood that a child is assigned to a small class. An F test for the joint
signiÖcance of all the pre-determined demographic variables is insigniÖcant (p = 0:26), showing that
students in small and large classes have similar demographic characteristics.
Columns 3-5 of Table 2.2 evaluate the random assignment of teachers to classes by regressing
teacher characteristics ñ experience, bachelorís degree, and race ñ on the same student and parent
characteristics. Again, none of the pre-determined variables predict the type of teacher a student
is assigned, consistent with random assignment of teachers to classrooms.
Finally, we evaluate whether students were randomly assigned into classrooms within small or
large class types. If students were randomly assigned to classrooms, then conditional on school
Öxed e§ects, classroom indicator variables should not predict any pre-determined characteristics
of the students. Column 6 of Table 2.2 reports p values from F tests for the signiÖcance of
kindergarten classroom indicators in regressions of each pre-determined characteristic on class and
school Öxed e§ects. None of the F tests is signiÖcant, showing that each of the parental and
child characteristics is balanced across classrooms. To test whether the pre-determined variables
jointly predict classroom assignment, we predict earnings using the speciÖcation in column 1 of
Table II. We then regress predicted earnings on KG classroom indicators and school Öxed e§ects
and run an F test for the signiÖcance of the classroom indicators. The p value of this F test
is 0:92, conÖrming that one would not predict clustering of earnings by KG classroom based on
pre-determined variables. We use only kindergarten entrants for the F tests in column 6 because F
tests for class e§ects are not powerful in grades 1-3 as only a few students enter each class in those
grades. In Online Appendix Table II, we extend these randomization tests to include students who
entered in grades 1-3 using the technique developed in Section V below and show that covariates
are balanced across classrooms in later entry grades as well.
Selective Attrition. Another threat to the experimental design is di§erential attrition across
classrooms (Hanushek 2003). Attrition is a much less serious concern in the present study than
in past evaluations of STAR because we are able to locate 95% of the students in the tax data.
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Nevertheless, we investigate whether the likelihood of being matched to the tax data varies by
classroom assignment within schools. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.3, we test whether the match
rate varies signiÖcantly with class size by regressing an indicator for being matched on the small
class dummy. Column 1 includes no controls other than school-by-entry-grade Öxed e§ects. It
shows that, eliminating the between-school variation, the match rate in small and large classes
di§ers by less than 0:02 percentage points. Column 2 shows that controlling for the full set of
demographic characteristics used in Table 2.2 does not uncover any signiÖcant di§erence in the
match rate across class types. The p values reported at the bottom of columns 1 and 2 are for F
tests of the signiÖcance of classroom indicators in predicting match rates in regression speciÖcations
analogous to those in column 6 of Table 2.2. The p values are approximately 0:9, showing that
there are no signiÖcant di§erences in match rates across classrooms within schools.
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Another potential source of attrition from the sample is through death. Columns 3 and 4
replicate the Örst two columns, replacing the dependent variable in the regressions with an indicator
for death before January 1, 2010. We Önd no evidence that mortality rates vary with class size or
across classrooms. The di§erence in death rates between small and large classes is approximately
0:01 percentage points. This Önding is inconsistent with recent results reported by Muennig et
al. (2010), who Önd that students in small classes and regular classes with a certiÖed teaching
assistant are slightly more likely to die using data from the National Death Index. We Önd that
154 STAR students have died by 2007 while Muennig et al. (2010) Önd 141 deaths in their data.
The discrepancy between the Öndings might be due to di§erences in match quality.53
II.C Test Scores and Adult Outcomes in the Cross-Section
We begin by documenting the correlations between test scores and adult outcomes in the cross-
section to provide a benchmark for assessing the impacts of the randomized interventions. Figure
2.1a documents the association between end-of-kindergarten test scores and mean earnings from
age 25-27.54 To construct this Ögure, we bin individuals into twenty equal-width bins (vingtiles)
and plot mean earnings in each bin. A one percentile point increase in KG test score is associated
with a $132 (0.83%) increase in earnings twenty years later. If one codes the x-axis using national
percentiles on the standardized KG tests instead of within-sample percentiles, the earnings increase
is $154 per percentile. The correlation between KG test score percentiles and earnings is linear
and remains signiÖcant even in the tails of the distribution of test scores. However, KG test scores
explain only a small share of the variation in adult earnings: the adjusted R2 of the regression of
earnings on scores is 5%.55
53As 95% of STAR students are matched to the our data and have a valid Social Security Number, we believe
that deaths are recorded accurately in our sample. It is unclear why a lower match rate would lead to a systematic
di§erence in death rates by class size. However, given the small number of deaths, slight imbalances might generate
marginally signiÖcant di§erences in death rates across class types.
54Although individualsí earnings trajectories remain quite steep at age 27, earnings levels from ages 25-27 are highly
correlated with earnings at later ages (Haider and Solon 2006), a Önding we have conÖrmed with our population wide
longitudinal data (see Online Appendix Table I).
55These cross-sectional estimates are consistent with those obtained by Currie and Thomas (2001) using the British
National Child Development Survey and Currie (2010) using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.
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Figures 2.1b and 2.1c show that KG test scores are highly predictive of college attendance rates
and the quality of the college the student attends, as measured by our earnings-based index of college
quality. To analyze the other adult outcomes in a compact manner, we construct a summary index
of Öve outcomes: ever owning a home by 2007, 401(k) savings by 2007, ever married by 2007, ever
living outside Tennessee by 2007, and living in a higher SES neighborhood in 2007 as measured
by the percent of college graduates living in the ZIP code. Following Kling, Liebman, and Katz
(2007), we Örst standardize each outcome by subtracting its mean and dividing it by its standard
deviation. We then sum the Öve standardized outcomes and divide by the standard deviation
of the sum to obtain an index that has a standard deviation of 1. A higher value of the index
represents more desirable outcomes. Students with higher entry-year test scores have stronger
adult outcomes as measured by the summary index, as shown in Figure 2.1d.
The summary index should be interpreted as a broader measure of success in young adulthood.
Some of its elements proxy for future earnings conditional on current income. For example, having
401(k) savings reáects holding a good job that o§ers such beneÖts. Living outside Tennessee is
a proxy for cross-state mobility, which is typically associated with higher socio-economic status.
While none of these outcomes are unambiguously positive ñ for instance, marriage or homeownership
by age 27 could in principle reáect imprudence ñ existing evidence suggests that, on net, these
measures are associated with better outcomes. In our sample, each of the Öve outcomes is highly
positively correlated with test scores on its own, as shown in Online Appendix Table III.
Table 2.4 quantiÖes the correlations between test scores and adult outcomes. We report stan-
dard errors clustered by school in this and all subsequent tables. Column 1 replicates Figure
2.1a by regressing earnings on KG test scores without any additional controls. Column 2 controls
for classroom Öxed e§ects and a vector of parent and student demographic characteristics. The
parent characteristics are a quartic in parentís household income interacted with an indicator for
whether the Öling parent is ever married between 1996 and 2008, motherís age at childís birth,
and indicators for parentís 401(k) savings and home ownership. The student characteristics are
gender, race, age at entry-year entry, and free lunch status.56 We use this vector of demographic
characteristics in most speciÖcations below. When the class Öxed e§ects and demographic controls
56We code all parental characteristics as 0 for students whose parents are missing, and include an indicator for
missing parents as a control. We also include indicators for missing data on certain variables (motherís age, studentís
free lunch status, and studentís race) and code these variables as zero when missing.
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are included, the coe¢cient on kindergarten percentile scores falls to $94, showing that part of
the raw correlation in Figure 2.1a is driven by these characteristics. Equivalently, a one standard
deviation (SD) increase in test scores is associated with an 18% increase in earnings conditional on
demographic characteristics.
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Columns 1 and 2 use only kindergarten entrants. 55% of students entered STAR in Kinder-
garten, with 20%, 14% and 11% entering in grades 1 through 3, respectively. In column 3, we also
include students who entered in grades 1-3 in order to obtain estimates consistent with the exper-
imental analysis below, which pools all entrants. To do so, we deÖne a studentís ìentry-gradeî
test score as her score at the end of the grade in which she entered the experiment. Column 3
shows that a 1 percentile increase in entry-grade scores is associated with a $90 increase in earnings
conditional on demographic controls. This $90 coe¢cient is a weighted average of the correlations
between grade K-3 test scores and earnings, with the weights given by the entry rates in each grade.
In column 4, we include both 8th grade scores (the last point at which data from standardized
tests are available for most students in the STAR sample) and entry-grade scores in the regression.
The entire e§ect of entry-grade test score is absorbed by the 8th grade score, but the adjusted R2 is
essentially unchanged. In column 5, we compare the relative importance of parent characteristics
and cognitive ability as measured by test scores. We calculate the parentís income percentile rank
using the tax data for the U.S. population. We regress earnings on test scores, parentsí income
percentile, and controls for the studentís race, gender, age, and class Öxed e§ects. A one percentile
point increase in parental income is associated with approximately a $148 increase in earnings,
suggesting that parental background a§ects earnings as much as or more than cognitive ability in
the cross section.57
Columns 6-9 of Table 2.4 show the correlations between entry-grade test scores and the other
outcomes we study. Conditional on demographic characteristics, a one percentile point increase in
entry-grade score is associated with a 0.36 percentage point increase in the probability of attending
college at age 20 and a 0.51 percentage point increase in the probability of attending college at
some point before age 27. A one percentile point increase in score is associated with $32 higher
predicted earnings based on the college the student attends and a 0.5% of a standard deviation
improvement in the summary index of other outcomes.
We report additional cross-sectional correlations in the online appendix. Online Appendix Table
IV replicates Table 2.4 for each entry grade separately. Online Appendix Table V documents
the correlation between test scores and earnings from grades K-8 for a Öxed sample of students,
while Online Appendix Table VI reports the heterogeneity of the correlations by race, gender, and
57Moreover, this $148 coe¢cient is an underestimate if parental income directly a§ects entry-grade test scores.
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free lunch status. Throughout, we Önd very strong correlations between test scores and adult
outcomes, which motivates the central question of the paper: do classroom environments that raise
early childhood test scores also yield improvements in adult outcomes?
II.D Impacts of Observable Classroom Characteristics
In this section, we analyze the impacts of three features of classrooms that we can observe in our
data ñ class size, teacher characteristics, and peer characteristics.
II.D.1 Class Size
We estimate the e§ects of class size on adult outcomes using an intent-to-treat regression speciÖ-
cation analogous to Krueger (1999):
yicnw = nw + SMALLcnw +Xicnw + "icnw (10)
where yicnw is an outcome such as earnings for student i randomly assigned to classroom c at
school n in entry grade (wave) w. The variable SMALLcnw is an indicator for whether the
student was assigned to a small class upon entry. Because children were randomly assigned to
classrooms within schools in the Örst year they joined the STAR cohort, we include school-by-
entry-grade Öxed e§ects (nw) in all speciÖcations. The vector Xicnw includes the student and
parent demographic characteristics described above: a quartic in household income interacted with
an indicator for whether the parents are ever married, 401(k) savings, home ownership, motherís
age at childís birth, and the studentís gender, race, age (in days), and free lunch status (along with
indicators for missing data). To examine the robustness of our results, we report the coe¢cient
both with and without this vector of controls. The inclusion of these controls does not signiÖcantly
a§ect the estimates, as expected given that the covariates are balanced across classrooms. In all
speciÖcations, we cluster standard errors by school. Although treatment occurred at the classroom
level, clustering by school provides a conservative estimate of standard errors that accounts for any
cross-classroom correlations in errors within schools, including across students in di§erent entry
grades. These standard errors are in nearly all cases larger than those from clustering on only
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classroom.58
We report estimates of equation (10) for various outcomes in Table V using the full sample of
STAR students; we show in Online Appendix Table VIII that similar results are obtained for the
subsample of students who entered in kindergarten. As a reference, in column 1 of Table 2.5, we
estimate equation (10) with the entry grade test score as the outcome. Consistent with Krueger
(1999), we Önd that students assigned to small classes score 4.8 percentile points higher on tests in
the year they enter a participating school. Note that the average student assigned to a small class
spent 2.27 years in a small class, while those assigned to a large class spent 0.13 years in a small
class. On average, large classes had 22.6 students while small classes had 15.1 students. Hence,
the impacts on adult outcomes below should be interpreted as e§ects of attending a class that is
33% smaller for 2.14 years.
58Online Appendix Table VII compares standard errors when clustering at di§erent levels for key speciÖcations.
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College Attendance. We begin by analyzing the impacts of class size on college attendance.
Figure IIa plots the fraction of students who attend college in each year from 1999 to 2007 by class
size. In this and all subsequent Ögures, we adjust for school-by-entry-grade e§ects to isolate the
random variation of interest. To do so, we regress the outcome variable on school-by-entry-grade
dummies and the small class indicator in each tax year. We then construct the two series shown
in the Ögure by setting the di§erence between the two lines equal to the regression coe¢cient on
the small class indicator in the corresponding year and the weighted average of the lines equal to
the sample average in that year.
Figure 2.2a shows that students assigned to a small class are more likely to attend college,
particularly before age 25. As the cohort ages from 19 (in 1999) to 27 (in 2007), the attendance
rate of both treatment and control students declines, consistent with patterns in the broader U.S.
population. Because our measure of college attendance is based on tuition payments, it includes
students who attend higher education institutions both part-time and full-time. Measures of college
attendance around age 20 (two years after the expected date of high school graduation) are most
likely to pick up full-time attendance to two-year and four-year colleges, while college attendance
in later years may be more likely to reáect part-time enrollment. This could explain why the e§ect
of class size becomes much smaller after age 25. We therefore analyze two measures of college
attendance below: college attendance at age 20 and attendance at any point before age 27.
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The regression estimates reported in Column 2 of Table 2.5 are consistent with the results in
Figure 2.2a. Controlling for demographic characteristics, students assigned to a small class are 1.8
percentage points (6:7%) more likely to attend college in 2000. This e§ect is marginally signiÖcant
with p = 0:06. Column 3 shows that students in small classes are 1.6 percentage points more likely
to attend college at some point before age 27.
Next, we investigate how class size a§ects the quality of colleges that students attend. Using the
earnings-based college quality measure described above, we plot the distribution of college quality
attended in 2000 by small and large class assignment in Figure 2.2b. We compute residual college
mean earnings from a regression on school-by-entry-grade e§ects and plot the distribution of the
residuals within small and large classes, adding back the sample mean to facilitate interpretation
of units. To show where the excess density in the small class group lies, the densities are scaled to
integrate to the total college attendance rates for small and large classes. The excess density in
the small class group lies primarily among the lower quality colleges, suggesting that the marginal
students who were induced to attend college because of reduced class size enrolled in relatively low
quality colleges.
Column 4 of Table 2.5 shows that students assigned to a small class attend colleges whose
students have mean earnings that are $109 higher. That is, based on the cross-sectional relationship
between earnings and attendance at each college, we predict that students in small classes will be
earning approximately $109 more per year at age 28. This earnings increase incorporates the
extensive-margin of higher college attendance rates, because students who do not attend college
are assigned the mean earnings of individuals who do not attend college in our index.59 Conditional
on attending college, students in small classes attend lower quality colleges on average because of
the selection e§ect shown in Figure 2.2b.60
Earnings. Figure 2.2c shows the analog of Figure IIa for wage earnings. Earnings rise rapidly
over time because many students are in college in the early years of the sample. Individuals in
small classes have slightly higher earnings than those in large classes in most years. Column 5 of
59Alternative earnings imputation procedures for those who do not attend college yield similar results. For example,
assigning these students the mean earnings of Tennessee residents or STAR participants who do not attend college
generates larger estimates.
60Because of the selection e§ect, we are unable to determine whether there was an intensive-margin improvement
in quality of college attended. Quantifying the e§ect of reduced class size on college quality for those who were
already planning to attend college would require additional assumptions such as rank preservation.
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Table 2.5 shows that without controls, students who were assigned to small classes are estimated
to earn $4 more per year on average between 2005 and 2007. With controls for demographic
characteristics, the point estimate of the earnings impact becomes -$124 (with a standard error of
$336). Though the point estimate is negative, the upper bound of the 95% conÖdence interval is
an earnings gain of $535 (3.4%) gain per year. If we were to predict the expected earnings gain
from being assigned to a small class from the cross-sectional correlation between test scores and
earnings reported in column 4 of Table 2.4, we obtain an expected earnings e§ect of 4:8 percentiles
 $90 = $432. This prediction lies within the 95% conÖdence interval for the impact of class size
on earnings. In Online Appendix Table IX, we consider several alternative measures of earnings,
such as total household income and an indicator for positive wage earnings. We Önd qualitatively
similar impacts ñ point estimates close to zero with conÖdence intervals that include the predicted
value from cross-sectional estimates ñ for all of these measures. We conclude that the class size
intervention, which raises test scores by 4.8 percentiles, is unfortunately not powerful enough to
detect earnings increases of a plausible magnitude as of age 27. Because class size has impacts
on college attendance, earnings e§ects might emerge in subsequent years, especially since college
graduates have much steeper earnings proÖles than non college graduates.
Other Outcomes. Column 6 of Table 2.5 shows that students assigned to small classes score 4.6
percent of a standard deviation higher in the summary outcome index deÖned in Section III, an
e§ect that is statistically signiÖcant with p < 0:05. This index combines information on savings
behavior, home ownership, marriage rates, mobility rates, and residential neighborhood quality.
In Online Appendix Table X, we analyze the impacts of class size on each of the Öve outcomes
separately. We Önd particularly large and signiÖcant impacts on the probability of having a
401(k), which can be thought of as a proxy for having a good job. This result is consistent with
the view that students in small classes may have higher permanent income that could emerge in
wage earnings measures later in their lifecycles. We also Önd positive e§ects on all the other
components of the summary index, though these e§ects are not individually signiÖcant.61
In Online Appendix Table XI, we document the heterogeneity of class size impacts across
61 In Online Appendix Table X, we also analyze an alternative summary index that weights each of the Öve compo-
nents by their impacts on wage earnings. We construct this index by regressing wage earnings on the Öve components
in the cross-section and predicting wage earnings for each individual. We Önd signiÖcant impacts of class size on
this predicted-earnings summary index, conÖrming that our results are robust to the way in which the components
of the summary index are weighted.
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subgroups. We replicate the analysis of class size impacts in Table 2.5 for six groups: black and
white students, males and females, and lower- and higher-income students (based on free lunch
status). The point estimates of the impacts of class size are positive for most of the groups and
outcomes. The impacts on adult outcomes are somewhat larger for groups that exhibit larger
test scores increases. For instance, black students assigned to small classes score 6.9 percentile
points higher on their entry-grade test, are 5.3 percentage points more likely to ever attend college,
and have an earnings increase of $250 (with a standard error of $540). There is some evidence
that reductions in class size may have more positive e§ects for men than women and for higher
income than lower income (free-lunch eligible) students. Overall, however, the STAR experiment
is not powerful enough to detect heterogeneity in the impacts of class size on adult outcomes with
precision.
II.D.2 Observable Teacher and Peer E§ects
We estimate the impacts of observable characteristics of teachers and peers using speciÖcations
analogous to equation (10):
yicnw = nw + 1SMALLcnw + 2zcnw +Xicnw + "icnw (11)
where zcnw denotes a vector of teacher or peer characteristics for student i assigned to classroom c
at school n in entry grade w. Because students and teachers were randomly assigned to classrooms,
2 can be interpreted as the e§ect of the relevant teacher or peer characteristics on the outcome
y. Note that we control for class size in these regressions, so the variation identifying teacher and
peer e§ects is orthogonal to that used above.
Teachers. We begin by examining the impacts of teacher experience on scores and earnings.
Figure 2.3a plots KG scores vs. the numbers of years of experience that the studentís KG teacher
had at the time she taught his class. We exclude students who entered the experiment in grades
1 to 3 in these graphs for reasons we discuss below. We adjust for school e§ects by regressing the
outcome and dependent variables on these Öxed e§ects and computing residuals. The Ögure is a
scatter plot of the residuals, with the sample means added back in to facilitate interpretation of
the axes. Figure 2.3a shows that students randomly assigned to more experienced KG teachers
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have higher test scores. The e§ect of experience on KG scores is roughly linear in the STAR
experimental data, in contrast with other studies which Önd that the returns to experience drop
sharply after the Örst few years.
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Figure 2.3b replicates 2.3a for the earnings outcome. It shows that students who were randomly
assigned to more experienced KG teachers have higher earnings at age 27. As with scores, the
impact of experience on earnings in these data appear roughly linear. Figure 2.3c characterizes the
time path of the earnings impact. We divide teachers in two groups ñ those with experience above
and below 10 years (since mean years of experience is 9.3 years). We then plot mean earnings
for the students in the low- and high-experience groups by year, adjusting for school Öxed e§ects
as in Figure 2.3b. From 2000 to 2004 (when students are aged 20 to 24), there is little di§erence
in earnings between the two curves. A gap opens starting in 2005; by 2007, students who had
high-experience teachers in kindergarten are earning $1,104 more on average.
Columns 1-2 of Table 2.6 quantify the impacts of teacher experience on scores and earnings,
conditioning on the standard vector of student and parent demographic characteristics as well as
whether the teacher has a masterís degree or higher and the small class indicator. Column 1 shows
that students assigned to a teacher with more than 10 years of experience score 3.2 percentile
points higher on KG tests. Column 2 shows that these same students earn $1,093 more on average
between ages 25 and 27 (p < 0:05).62
62 In Online Appendix Table XII, we replicate columns 1 and 2 for small and large classes separately to evaluate
whether teacher experience is more important in managing classrooms with many students. We Önd some evidence
that teacher experience has a larger impact on earnings in large classes, but the di§erence in impacts is not statistically
signiÖcant.
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Columns 3-4 show that teacher experience has a much reduced e§ect for children entering the
experiment in grades 1 to 3 on both test scores and earnings. The e§ect of teacher experience
on test scores is no longer statistically signiÖcant in grades 1-3. Consistent with this result,
teacher experience in grades 1-3 also does not have a statistically signiÖcant e§ect on wage earnings.
Unfortunately, the STAR dataset includes very few teacher characteristics, so we are unable to
provide deÖnitive evidence on why the e§ect of teacher experience varies across grades.
The impact of kindergarten teacher experience on earnings must be interpreted very carefully.
Our results show that placing a child in a kindergarten class taught by a more experienced teacher
yields improved outcomes. This Önding does not imply that increasing a given teacherís experi-
ence will improve student outcomes. The reason is that while teachers were randomly assigned to
classrooms, experience was not randomly assigned to teachers. The di§erence in earnings of stu-
dents with experienced teachers could be due to the intrinsic characteristics of experienced teachers
rather than experience of teachers per se. For instance, teachers with more experience have selected
to stay in the profession and may be more passionate or more skilled at teaching. Alternatively,
teachers from older cohorts may have been more skilled (Corcoran, Evans, and Schwab 2004, Hoxby
and Leigh 2004, Bacolod 2007). These factors may explain the di§erence between the e§ect of
teacher experience in Kindergarten and later grades. For instance, the selection of teachers may
vary across grades or cohort e§ects may di§er for Kindergarten teachers.
The linear relationship between kindergarten teacher experience and scores in the STAR data
stands in contrast to earlier studies that track teachers over time in a panel and Önd that teacher
performance improves with the Örst few years of experience and then plateaus. This further
suggests that other factors correlated with experience may drive the observed impacts on scores
and earnings. We therefore conclude that early childhood teaching has a causal impact on long
term outcomes but we cannot isolate the characteristics of teachers responsible for this e§ect.
The few other observable teacher characteristics in the STAR data (degrees, race, and progress
on a career ladder) have no signiÖcant impact on scores or earnings. For instance, columns 1-4 of
Table 2.6 show that the e§ect of teachersí degrees on scores and earnings is statistically insigniÖcant.
The Önding that experience is the only observable measure that predicts teacher quality matches
earlier studies of teacher e§ects (Hanushek 2010, Rocko§ and Staiger 2010).63
63Dee (2004) shows that being assigned to a teacher of the same race raises test scores. We Önd a positive but
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Peers. Better classmates could create an environment more conducive to learning, leading to
improvements in adult outcomes. To test for such peer e§ects, we follow the standard approach in
the recent literature by using linear-in-means regressions speciÖcations. We include students who
enter in all grades and measure peer characteristics in their Örst, randomly assigned classroom, and
condition on school-by-entry-grade e§ects. We proxy for peer abilities (z) in equation (11) with the
following exogenous peer characteristics: fraction black, fraction female, fraction eligible for free or
reduced-price lunch (a proxy for low income), and mean age. Replicating previous studies, we show
in column 5 of Table 2.6 that the fraction of female and low-income peers signiÖcantly predict test
scores. Column 6 replicates column 5 with earnings as the dependent variable. The estimates on
all four peer characteristics are very imprecise. For instance, the estimated e§ect of increasing the
fraction of low-income peers by 10 percentage points is an earnings loss of $28, but with a standard
error of $173. In an attempt to obtain more power, we construct a single index of peer abilities by
Örst regressing scores on the full set of parent and student demographic characteristics described
above and then predicting peersí scores using this regression. However, as column 7 shows, even
the predicted peer score measure does not yield a precise estimate of peer e§ects on earnings; the
95% conÖdence interval for a 1 percentile point improvement in peersí predicted test scores ranges
from -$207 to $160.64
The STAR experiment lacks the power to measure the e§ects of observable peer characteristics
on earnings precisely because the experimental design randomized students across classrooms. As a
result, it does not generate signiÖcant variation in mean peer abilities across classes. The standard
deviation of mean predicted peer test scores (removing variation across schools and waves) is less
than two percentile points. This small degree of variation in peer abilities is adequate to identify
some contemporaneous e§ects on test scores but proves to be insu¢cient to identify e§ects on
outcomes twenty years later, which are subject to much higher levels of idiosyncratic noise.
II.E Impacts of Unobservable Classroom Characteristics
Many unobserved aspects of teachers and peers could impact student achievement and adult out-
comes. For instance, some teachers may generate greater enthusiasm among students or some
statistically insigniÖcant impact of having a teacher of the same race on earnings.
64We Önd positive but insigniÖcant impacts of teacher and peer characteristics on the other outcomes above,
consistent with a general lack of power in observable characteristics (not reported).
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peers might be particularly disruptive. To test whether such unobservable aspects of class quality
have long-term impacts, we estimate the parameters of a correlated random e§ects model. In
particular, we test for ìclass e§ectsî on scores and earnings by exploiting random assignment to
classrooms. These class e§ects include the e§ects of teachers, peers, and any class-level shocks.
We formalize our estimation strategy using a simple empirical model.
II.E.1 A Model of Class E§ects
For simplicity, we analyze a model in which all students enter in the same grade and suppress the
entry grade index (w); we discuss below how our estimator can be applied to the case with multiple
entry grades. We Örst consider a case without peer e§ects and then show how peer e§ects a§ect
our analysis below.
Consider the following model of test scores (sicn) at the end of the class and earnings or other
adult outcomes (yicn) for student i in class c at school n:
sicn = dn +
X
k
SkZ
k
cn + aicn (12)
yicn = n +
X
k
Yk Z
k
cn + aicn + icn, (13)
where the error term aicn can be interpreted as intrinsic academic ability. The error term icn
represents the component of intrinsic earnings ability that is uncorrelated with academic ability.
The parameter  controls the correlation between intrinsic academic and earnings ability. The
school Öxed e§ects dn and n capture school-level di§erences in achievement on tests and earnings
outcomes, e.g. due to variation in socioeconomic characteristics across school areas. Zcn =
(Z1cn; ::; Z
K
cn) denotes a vector of classroom characteristics such as class size, teacher experience, or
other teacher attributes. The coe¢cients Sk and 
Y
k are the e§ects of class characteristic k on test
scores and earnings respectively. Note that the ratios of Yk =
S
k may vary across characteristics.
For example, teaching to the test could improve test scores but not earnings, while an inspiring
teacher who does not teach to the test might raise earnings without improving test scores.
Denote by zcn =
P
k 
S
kZ
k
cn the total impact of the bundle of class characteristics o§ered
in classroom c on scores. The total impact of classrooms on earnings can be decomposed asP
k 
Y
k Z
k
cn = zcn + z
Y
cn, where z
Y
cn is by construction orthogonal to zcn. Hence, we can rewrite
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equations (12) and (13) as
sicn = dn + zcn + aicn (14)
yicn = n + zcn + z
Y
cn + aicn + icn. (15)
In this correlated random e§ects model, zcn represents the component of classrooms that a§ects
test scores (and earnings if  > 0), while zYcn represents the component of classrooms that a§ects
only earnings without a§ecting test scores. Class e§ects on earnings are determined by both  and
var(zYcn). The parameter  measures the correlation of class e§ects on scores and class e§ects on
earnings. Importantly,  only measures the impact of the bundle of classroom-level characteristics
that varied in the STAR experiment rather than the impact of any single characteristic. Because
 is not a structural parameter, not all educational interventions that improve test scores will have
the same e§ect on earnings.65 Moreover, we could Önd  > 0 even if no single characteristic a§ects
both test scores and earnings.66
Because of random assignment to classrooms, studentsí intrinsic abilities aicn and icn are
orthogonal to zcn and zYcn. Exploiting this orthogonality condition, one can estimate equations (12)
and (13) directly using OLS for characteristics that are directly observable, as we did using equations
(10) and (11) to analyze the impacts of class size and observable teacher and peer attributes. To
analyze unobservable attributes of classrooms, we use two techniques: an analysis of variance to
test for class e§ects on earnings (var(zcn) + var(zYcn) > 0) and a regression-based method to test
for covariance of class e§ects on scores and earnings ( > 0).
Analysis of Variance: class e§ects on scores and earnings. We decompose the variation in yicn
into individual and class-level components and test for the signiÖcance of class-level variation using
an ANOVA. Intuitively, the ANOVA tests whether the outcome y varies across classes by more
than what would be predicted by random variation in students across classrooms. We measure the
magnitude of the class e§ects on earnings using a random class e§ects speciÖcation for equation
(15) to estimate the standard deviation of class e§ects under the assumption that they are normally
65As an extreme example, teachers who help students raise test scores by cheating may have zero impact on
earnings. The  estimated below applies to the set of classroom characteristics that a§ected test scores in the STAR
experiment.
66Suppose teaching to the test a§ects only test scores while teaching discipline a§ects only earnings. If the decisions
of teachers to teach to the test and teach discipline are correlated, then we would still obtain  > 0 in (15).
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distributed.
Although the ANOVA is useful for estimating the magnitude of class e§ects on earnings, it has
two limitations. First, it does not tell us whether class e§ects on scores are correlated with class
e§ects on earnings (i.e., whether  > 0). Hence, it does not answer a key question: do classroom
environments that raise test scores also improve adult outcomes? This is an important question
because the impacts of most educational policies can be measured only by test scores in the short
run. Second, in the STAR data, roughly half the students enter in grades 1-3 and are randomly
assigned to classrooms at that point. Because only a small number of students enter each school
in each of these later grades, we do not have the power to detect class e§ects in later grades and
therefore do not include these students in the ANOVA.
Covariance between class e§ects on scores and earnings. Motivated by these limitations, our
second strategy measures the covariance between class e§ects on scores and class e§ects on earnings
(). As the class e§ect on scores zcn is unobserved, we proxy for it using end-of-class peer test
scores. Let scn denote the mean test score in class c (in school n) and sn denote the mean test
score in school n. Let I denote the number of students per class, C the number of classes per
school, and N the number of schools.67 The mean test score in class c is
scn =
1
I
IX
i=1
sicn = dn + zcn +
1
I
IX
i=1
aicn
To simplify notation, assume that the mean value of zcn across classes within a school is 0 (zn = 0).
Then the di§erence between mean test scores in class c and mean scores in the school is
scn = scn  sn = zcn +
241
I
IX
j=1
ajcn  1
IC
CX
c=1
IX
j=1
ajcn
35 . (16)
Equation (16) shows that scn is a (noisy) observable measure of class quality zcn. The noise arises
from variation in student abilities across classes. As the number of students grows large (I !1),
scn converges to the true underlying class quality zcn if all students are randomly assigned to
classrooms.
67We assume that I and C do not vary across classes and schools for presentational simplicity. Our empirical
analysis accounts for variation in I and C across classrooms and schools, and the analytical results below are una§ected
by such variation.
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Equation (16) motivates substituting scn for zcn in equation (15) and estimating a regression
of the form:
yicn = n + b
Mscn + "icn: (17)
The OLS estimate bbM is a consistent estimate of  as the number of students I ! 1, but it is
upward-biased with Önite class size because a high ability student raises the average class score
and also has high earnings himself. Because of this own-observation problem, plim N!1 b^M > 0
even when  = 0 (see Online Appendix B). An intuitive solution to eliminate the upward bias due
to the own-observation problem is to omit the own score sicn from the measure of class quality for
individual i. Hence, we proxy for class quality using a leave-out mean (or jackknife) peer score
measure
sicn = s
i
cn  sin , (18)
where
sicn =
1
I  1
IX
j=1;j 6=i
sjcn
is classmatesí mean test scores and
sin =
1
IC  1
CX
k=1
IX
j=1;j 6=i
sjkn
is schoolmatesí mean scores. Intuitively, the measure sicn answers the question: ìHow good are
your classmatesí scores compared with those of classmates you could have had in your school?î
Replacing scn by sicn , we estimate regressions of the following form:
yicn = n + b
LMsicn + "icn: (19)
We show in Online Appendix B that the coe¢cient on class quality converges to a positive value as
the number of schools N grows large if and only if class quality has an impact on adult outcomes:
plim N!1 b^LM > 0 i§  > 0.68 However, bLM is biased toward zero relative to  because sicn is
a noisy measure of class quality. In Online Appendix B, we use the sample variance of test scores
68We use the di§erence between peer scores in the class and the school (rather than simply using classmatesí scores)
to address the Önite-sample bias in small peer groups identiÖed by Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo (2009).
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to estimate the degree of this attenuation bias at 23%.
Our preceding analysis ignores variation in class quality due to peer e§ects. With peer e§ects, a
high ability student may raise his peersí scores, violating the assumption made above that zcn ? aicn.
Such peer e§ects bias bLM upward (generating plim N!1 b^LM > ) because of the reáection
problem (Manski 1993). Even if there is no e§ect of class quality on earnings, that studentís
higher earnings (due solely to her own ability) will generate a positive correlation between peer
scores and own earnings. While we cannot purge our leave-out-mean estimator of this bias, we
show below that we can tightly bound the degree of reáection bias in a linear-in-means model. The
reáection bias turns out to be relatively small in our application because it is of order 1I and classes
have 20 students on average.
We refer to peer-score measure sicn as ìclass qualityî and the coe¢cient bLM as the e§ect of
class quality on earnings (or other outcomes). Although we regress outcomes on peer scores in
equation (19), the coe¢cient bLM should not be interpreted as an estimate of peer e§ects. Because
class quality sicn is deÖned based on end-of-class peer scores, it captures teacher quality, peer
quality, and any other class-level shocks that may have a§ected students systematically. End-
of-class peer scores are a single index that captures all classroom characteristics that a§ect test
scores. Equation (19) simply provides a regression-based method of estimating the correlation
between random classroom e§ects on scores and earnings.
We include students who enter STAR in later grades when estimating equation (19) by deÖning
sicn as the di§erence between mean end-of-year test scores for classmates and schoolmates in the
studentís grade in the year she entered a STAR school. To maximize precision, we include all
peers (including those who had entered in earlier grades) when deÖning sicn for new entrants.
Importantly, sicn varies randomly within schools for new entrants ñ who are randomly assigned
to their Örst classroom ñ as it does for kindergarten entrants.69 With this deÖnition of sicn , bLM
measures the extent to which class quality in the initial class of entry (weighted by the entry rates
across the four grades) a§ects outcomes.
An alternative approach to measuring the covariance between class e§ects on scores and earnings
is to use an instrumental variables strategy, regressing earnings on test scores and instrumenting
69For entrants in grades 1-3, there can be additional noise in the class quality measure because students who had
entered in earlier grades were not in general re-randomized across classrooms. Because such noise is orthogonal to
entering student ability, it generates only additional attenuation bias.
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for scores with classroom Öxed e§ects. Because the Ötted values from the Örst stage regression are
just mean test scores by classroom, the coe¢cient obtained from this TSLS regression coincides
with bM when we run equation (17). The TSLS estimate of  is upward biased because the own
observation is included in both mean scores and mean earnings, which is the well known weak
instruments problem. The weak instruments literature has developed various techniques to deal
with this bias, including (a) jackknife IV (Angrist, Imbens, and Krueger 1999), which solves the
problem by omitting the own observation when forming the instrument; (b) split-sample IV (Angrist
and Krueger 1995), which randomly splits classes into two and only uses mean scores in the other
half of the class as an instrument; and (c) limited information maximum likelihood (LIML), which
collapses the parameter space and uses maximum likelihood to obtain a consistent estimate of .
The estimator for bLM in equation (19) is essentially the reduced-form of the Örst technique, the
jackknife IV regression. We present estimates using the instrumental variable strategies in Online
Appendix Table XIII to evaluate the robustness of our results.
II.E.2 Analysis of Variance
We implement the analysis of variance using regression speciÖcations of the following form for
students who enter the experiment in kindergarten:
yicn = n + cn +Xicn + "icn (20)
where yicn is an outcome for student i who enters class c in school n in kindergarten and cn
is the class e§ect on the outcome, and Xicn a vector of pre-determined individual background
characteristics.70
We Örst estimate equation (20) using a Öxed-e§ects speciÖcation for the class e§ects cn. Under
the null hypothesis of no class e§ects, the class dummies should not be signiÖcant because of random
assignment of students to classrooms. We test this null hypothesis using an F test for whether
cn = 0 for all c; n. To quantify the magnitude of the class e§ects, we compute the variance of cn
by estimating equation (20) using a random-e§ects speciÖcation. In particular, we assume that
cn  N(0; 2c) and estimate the standard deviation of class e§ects c.
70We omit cn for one class in each school to avoid collinearity with the school e§ects n.
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Table 2.7 reports p values from F tests and estimates of c for test scores and earnings. Consis-
tent with Nye, Konstantopoulos, and Hedges (2004) ñ who use an ANOVA to test for class e§ects
on scores in the STAR data ñ we Önd highly signiÖcant class e§ects on KG test scores. Column
1 rejects the null hypothesis of no class e§ects on KG scores with p < 0:001. The estimated
standard deviation of class e§ects on test scores is c = 8:77, implying that a one standard de-
viation improvement in class quality raises student test scores by 8.77 percentiles (0.32 standard
deviations). Note that this measure represents the impact of improving class quality by one SD of
the within-school distribution because the regression speciÖcation includes school Öxed e§ects.
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Column 2 of Table 2.7 replicates the analysis in column 1 with 8th grade test scores as the
outcome. We Önd no evidence that kindergarten classroom assignment has any lasting impact
on achievement in 8th grade as measured by standardized test scores (p = 0:42). As a result,
the estimated standard deviation of class e§ects on 8th grade scores is c = 0:00. This evidence
suggests that KG class e§ects fade out by grade 8, a Önding that we revisit and explore in detail
in Section 2.6.
Columns 3-6 of Table 2.7 implement the ANOVA for earnings (averaged over ages 25-27).
Column 3 implements the analysis without any controls besides school Öxed e§ects. Column 4
introduces the full vector of parental and student demographic characteristics. Both speciÖcations
show statistically signiÖcant class e§ects on earnings (p < 0:05). Recall that the same speciÖcation
revealed no signiÖcant di§erences in predicted earnings (based on pre-determined variables) across
classrooms (p = 0:92, as shown in column 6 of Table 2.2). Hence, the clustering in actual earnings
by classroom is the consequence of treatments or common shocks experienced by students after
random assignment to a KG classroom. The standard deviation of KG class e§ects on earnings in
column 4 (with controls) is c = $1; 520. Assigning students to a classroom that is one standard
deviation better than average in kindergarten generates an increase in earnings at ages 25-27 of
$1,520 (9:6%) per year for each student. While the mean impact of assignment to a better classroom
is large, kindergarten class assignment explains a small share of the variance in earnings. The intra-
class correlation coe¢cient in earnings implied by the estimate in Column 4 of Table 2.7 is only
(1; 520=15; 558)2 = 0:01.71
Column 5 of Table 2.7 restricts the sample to students assigned to large classes, to test for class
e§ects purely within large classrooms. This speciÖcation is of interest for two reasons. First, it
isolates variation in class quality orthogonal to class size. Second, students in large classes were
randomly reassigned to classrooms in Örst grade. Hence, column 5 speciÖcally identiÖes clustering
by kindergarten classrooms rather than a string of teachers and peers experienced over several years
71The clustering of earnings detected by the ANOVA may appear to contradict that fact that clustering standard
errors by classroom or school has little impact on the standard errors in the regression speciÖcation in, for example,
equation (10) (see Online Appendix Table VII). The intra-class correlation in earnings of 0.01 implies a Moulton
correction factor of 1.09 for clustering at the classroom level with a mean class size of 20.3 students (Angrist and
Pischke 2009, equation 8.2.5). The Moulton adjustment of 9% assumes that errors are equi-correlated across students
within a class. Following standard practice, we report clustered standard errors that do not impose this equi-
correlation assumption. Clustered standard errors can be smaller than un-clustered estimates when the intra-class
correlation coe¢cient is small. We thank Gary Chamberlain for helpful comments on these issues.
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by a group of children who all started in the same KG class. Class quality continues to have a
signiÖcant impact on earnings within large classes, showing that components of kindergarten class
quality beyond size matter for earnings.
Column 6 expands upon this approach by controlling for all observable classroom characteristics:
indicators for small class, teacher experience above 10 years, teacher race, teacher with degree higher
than a BA, and classmatesí mean predicted score, constructed as in column 6 of Table 2.6. The
estimated c falls by only $66 relative to the speciÖcation in column 4, implying that most of the
class e§ects are driven by features of the classroom that we cannot observe in our data.
The F tests in Table 2.7 rely on parametric assumptions to test the null of no class e§ects.
As a robustness check, we run permutation tests in which we randomly permute students between
classes within each school. For each random permutation, we calculate the F statistic on the class
dummies. Using the empirical distribution of F statistics from 1,000 within-school permutations
of students, we calculate a non-parametric p value based on where the true F statistic (from row
1) falls in the empirical distribution. Reassuringly, these non-parametric p values are quite similar
to those produced from the parametric F test, as shown in the second row of Table 2.7.
II.E.3 Covariance between Class E§ects on Scores and Earnings
Having established class e§ects on both scores and earnings, we estimate the covariance of these
class e§ects using regression speciÖcations of the form
yicnw = nw + s
i
cnw +Xicnw + "icnw, (21)
where yicnw represents an outcome for student i who enters class c in school n in entry grade (wave)
w. The regressor of interest sicnw is our leave-out mean measure of peer test scores for student i at
the end of entry grade w, as deÖned in equation (18).72 In the baseline speciÖcations, we include
students in all entry grades to analyze how the quality of the studentís randomly assigned Örst
class a§ects long-term outcomes. We then test for di§erences in the impacts of class quality across
grades K-3 by estimating equation (21) for separate entry grades. As above, we cluster standard
errors at the school level to adjust for the fact that outcomes are correlated across students within
72Sacerdote (2001) employs analagous regression speciÖcations to detect clustering in randomly assigned roommatesí
ex-post test scores.
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classrooms and possibly within schools.
We begin by characterizing the impact of class quality on test scores. Figure 2.4a plots each
studentís end-of-grade test scores vs. his entry-grade class quality, as measured by his classmatesí
test scores minus his schoolmatesí test scores. The graph adjusts for school-by-entry-grade e§ects
to isolate the random variation in class quality using the technique in Figure IIIa; it does not
adjust for parent and student controls. Figure 2.4a shows that children randomly assigned to
higher quality classes upon entry ñ i.e., classes where their peers score higher on the end of year
test ñ have higher test scores at the end of the year. A one percentile increase in entry-year class
quality is estimated to raise own test scores by 0.68 percentiles, conÖrming that test scores are
highly correlated across students within a classroom. Figure 2.4b replicates Figure 2.4a, changing
the dependent variable to 8th grade test score. Consistent with the earlier ANOVA results, the
impact fades out by grade 8. A one percentile increase in the quality of the studentís entry-year
classroom raises 8th grade test scores by only 0.08 percentiles. Figure 2.4c uses the same design to
evaluate the e§ects of class quality on adult wage earnings. Students assigned to a one percentile
higher quality class have $56.6 (0.4%) higher earnings on average over ages 25-27.
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We verify that our method of measuring class quality does not generate a mechanical correlation
between peers scores and own outcomes using permutation tests. We randomly permute students
across classrooms within schools and replicate equation (21). We use the t statistics on  from
the random permutations to form an empirical cdf of t statistics under the null hypothesis of no
class e§ects. We Önd that fewer than 0.001% of the t statistics from the random permutations
are larger than the actual t statistic on kindergarten test score in Figure 2.4a of 22.7. For the
earnings outcome, fewer than 0.1% of the t statistics from the random permutations are larger than
the actual t statistic of 3.55. These non-parametric permutation tests conÖrm that the p values
obtained using parametric t-tests are accurate in our application.
As noted above, part of the relationship between earnings and peersí test scores may be driven
by reáection bias: high ability students raise their peersí scores and themselves have high earnings.
This could generate a correlation between peer scores and own earnings even if class quality has no
causal impact on earnings. However, the fact that end-of-kindergarten peer scores are not highly
correlated with 8th grade test scores (Figure 2.4b) places a tight upper bound on the degree of this
bias. In the presence of reáection bias, a high ability student (who raises her classroom peersí scores
in the year she enters) should also score highly on 8th grade tests, creating a spurious correlation
between Örst-classroom peer scores and own 8th grade scores. Therefore, if Örst-classroom peer
scores have zero correlation with 8th grade scores, there cannot be any reáection bias. In Online
Appendix B, we formalize this argument by deriving a bound on the degree of reáection bias in a
linear-in-means model as a function of the empirical estimates in Table 2.8 and the cross-sectional
correlations between test scores and earnings. If class quality has no causal impact on earnings
( = 0), the upper bound on the regression coe¢cient of earnings on class quality is $9, less than
20% of our empirical estimate of $56.6. Although this quantitative bound relies on the parametric
assumptions of a linear-in-means model, it captures a more general intuition: the rapid fade out
of class quality e§ects on test scores rules out signiÖcant reáection bias in impacts of peer scores
on later adult outcomes. Recall that the class quality estimates also su§er from a downward
attenuation bias of 23%, the same magnitude as the upper bound on the reáection bias. We
therefore proceed by using end-of-year peer scores as a simple proxy for class quality.
Figure 2.5a characterizes the time path of the impact of class quality on earnings, dividing
classrooms in two groups ñ those with class quality above and below the median. The time
137
pattern of the total class quality impact is similar to the impact of teacher experience shown in
Figure 2.3c. Prior to 2004, there is little di§erence in earnings between the two curves, but the
gap noticeably widens beginning in 2003. By 2007, students who were assigned to classes of above-
median quality are earning $875 (5.5%) more on average. Figure 2.5b shows the time path of the
impacts on college attendance. Students in higher quality classes are more likely to be attending
college in their early 20ís, consistent with their higher earnings and steeper earnings trajectories in
later years.
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Table 2.8 quantiÖes the impacts of class quality on wage earnings using regressions with the
standard vector of parent and student controls used above. Column 1 shows that conditional
on the demographic characteristics, a one percentile point increase in class quality increases a
studentís own test score by 0.66 percentile points. This e§ect is very precisely estimated, with a
t statistic of 27.6, because the intra-class correlation of test scores among students in very large.
Column 2 of Table 2.8 shows the e§ect of class quality on earnings.73 Conditional on demographic
characteristics, a one percentile point increase in class quality increases earnings (averaged from
2005 to 2007) by $50.6 per year, with a t statistic of 2.9 (p < 0:01). To interpret the magnitude of
this e§ect, note that a one standard deviation increase in class quality as measured by peer scores
leads to a $455 (2.9%) increase in earnings at age 27.74
73Panel C of Online Appendix Table IX replicates the speciÖcation in Column 2 to show that class quality has
positive impacts on all Öve alternative measures of wage earnings described above.
74Part of the impact of being randomly assigned to a higher quality class in grade w may come from being placed
in higher quality classes in subsequent grades. A 1 percentile increase in KG class quality (peer scores) is associated
with a 0.15 percentile increase in class quality (peer scores) in grade 1. The analogous e§ect of grade 1 class quality
on grade 2 class quality is 0.37 percentiles.
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The impact of class quality on earnings is estimated much more precisely than the impacts of
observable characteristics on earnings because class quality varies substantially across classrooms.
Recall from Table 2.5 that students assigned to small classes scored 4.8 percentile points higher on
end-of-year tests. If class quality varied only from -2.4 to 2.4, we would be unable to determine
whether the relationship between class quality and earnings is signiÖcant, as can be seen in Figure
2.4c. By pooling all observable and unobservable sources of variation across classrooms, we obtain
more precise (though less policy relevant) estimates of the impact of classroom environments on
adult outcomes.
Column 3 of Table 2.8 isolates the variation in class quality that is orthogonal to observable
classroom characteristics by controlling for class size, teacher characteristics, and peer characteris-
tics as in column 6 of Table 2.7. Class quality continues to have a signiÖcant impact on earnings
conditional on these observables, conÖrming that components of class quality orthogonal to observ-
ables matter for earnings.
The preceding speciÖcations pool grades K-3. Column 4 restricts the sample to kindergarten
entrants and shows that a one percentile increase in KG class quality raises earnings by $53.4.
Column 5 includes only those who entered STAR after kindergarten. This point estimate is similar
to that in column 4, showing that class quality in grades 1-3 matters as much for earnings as class
quality in kindergarten.
Columns 6-9 show the impacts of class quality on other adult outcomes. These columns
replicate the baseline speciÖcation for the full sample in column 2. Columns 6 and 7 show that a
1 percentile improvement in class quality raises college attendance rates by 0.1 percentage points,
both at age 20 and before age 27 (p < 0:05). Column 8 shows that a one percentile increase in
class quality generates an $9.3 increase in the college quality index (p < 0:05). Finally, column 9
shows that a one percentile point improvement in class quality leads to an improvement of 0:25%
of a standard deviation in our outcome summary index (p < 0:05). Online Appendix Table X
reports the impacts of class quality on each of the Öve outcomes separately and shows that the
point estimates of the impacts are positive for all of the outcomes. Online Appendix Table XI
documents the heterogeneity of class quality impacts across subgroups. The point estimates of the
impacts of class quality are positive for all the groups and outcomes.
Finally, we check the robustness of our results by implementing instrumental-variable methods
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of detecting covariance between class e§ects on scores and earnings. The e§ects of class quality on
test scores and earnings in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.8 can be combined to produce a jackknife
IV estimate of the earnings gain associated with an increase in test scores: $50:61=0:662 = $76:48.
That is, class-level factors that raise test scores by one percentile point raise earnings by $76.48
on average. In Online Appendix Table XIII, we show that other IV estimators yield very similar
estimates.
While class e§ects on scores and earnings are highly correlated, a substantial portion of class
e§ects on earnings is orthogonal to our measure of class quality. Using a random e§ects estimator
as in Column 4 of Table 2.7, we Önd that the standard deviation of class e§ects on earnings falls
from $1520 to $1372 after we control for our peer-score class quality measure sicnw. Hence,
roughly 1 (13721520)2  1=5 of the variance of the class e§ect on earnings comes through class e§ects
on test scores.
II.F Fade-Out, Re-Emergence, and Non-Cognitive Skills
In this section, we explore why the impacts of class size and class quality in early childhood fade
out on tests administered in later grades but re-emerge in adulthood. In order to have a Öxed
benchmark to document fade-out, we use only kindergarten entrants throughout this section and
analyze the impacts of KG class quality on test scores and other outcomes in later grades.
We Örst document the fade-out e§ect using the class quality measure by estimating equation
(21) with test scores in each grade as the dependent variable and with the standard vector of parent
and student controls as well as school Öxed e§ects. Figure 2.6a plots the estimated impacts on
test scores in grades K-8 of increasing KG class quality by one (within-school) standard deviation.
A one (within school) SD increase in KG class quality increases end-of-kindergarten test scores by
6.27 percentiles, consistent with our Öndings above. In grade 1, students who were in a 1 SD better
KG class score approximately 1.50 percentile points higher on end-of-year tests, an e§ect that is
signiÖcant with p < 0:001. The e§ect gradually fades over time, and by grade 4 students who were
in a better KG class no longer score signiÖcantly higher on tests.75
75This fade-out e§ect is consistent with the rapid fade-out of teacher e§ects documented by Jacob, Lefgren, and
Sims (2008), Kane and Staiger (2008), and others.
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If a one percentile increase in 8th grade test scores is more valuable than a one percentile
increase in KG test scores, then the evidence in Figure 2.6a would not necessarily imply that the
e§ects of early childhood education fade out. To evaluate this possibility, we convert the test score
impacts to predicted earnings gains. We run separate OLS regressions of earnings on the test
scores for each grade from K-8 to estimate the cross-sectional relationship between each gradeís
test score and earnings (see Online Appendix Table V, Column 1 for these coe¢cients). We then
multiply the class quality e§ect on scores shown in Figure 2.6a by the corresponding coe¢cient on
scores from the OLS earnings regression. Figure 2.6b plots the earnings impacts predicted by the
test score gains in each grade that arise from attending a better KG class. The pattern in Figure
2.6b looks very similar to that in Figure 2.6a, showing that there is indeed substantial fade-out of
the KG class quality e§ect on predicted earnings. By 4th grade, one would predict less than a $50
per year gain in earnings from a better KG class based on observed test score impacts.
The Önal point in Figure 2.6b shows the actual observed earnings impact of a one SD improve-
ment in KG class quality. The actual impact of $483 is similar to what one would have predicted
based on the improvement in KG test scores ($588). The impacts of early childhood education
re-emerge in adulthood despite fading out on test scores in later grades.
Non-Cognitive Skills. One potential explanation for fade-out and re-emergence is the acquisition
of non-cognitive skills (e.g. Heckman 2000, Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006, Lindqvist and
Vestman 2011). We evaluate whether non-cognitive skills could explain our Öndings using data on
non-cognitive measures collected for a subset of STAR students in grades 4 and 8.76
Finn et al. (2007) and Dee and West (2008) describe the non-cognitive measures in the STAR
data in detail; we provide a brief summary here. In grade 4, teachers in the STAR schools were asked
to evaluate a random subset of their students on a scale of 1-5 on several behavioral measures, such
as whether the student ìannoys others.î These responses were consolidated into four standardized
scales measuring each studentís e§ort, initiative, nonparticipatory behavior, and how the student
is seen to ìvalueî the class. In grade 8, math and English teachers were asked to rate a subset
of their students on a similar set of questions, which were again consolidated into the same four
76Previous studies have used the STAR data to investigate whether class size a§ects non-cognitive skills (Finn et al.
1989, Dee and West 2008). They Önd mixed evidence on the impact of class size on non-cognitive skills: statistically
signiÖcant impacts are detected in grade 4, but not in grade 8. Here, we analyze the impacts of our broader class
quality measure.
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standardized scales. To obtain a measure analogous to our percentile measure of test scores, we
construct percentile measures for these four scales and compute the average percentile score for
each student. For 8th grade, we then take the average of the math and English teacher ratings.
Among the 6,025 students who entered Project STAR in KG and whom we match in the IRS
data, we have data on non-cognitive skills for 1,671 (28%) in grade 4 and 1,780 (30%) in grade
8. The availability of non-cognitive measures for only a subset of the students who could be
tracked until grade 8 naturally raises concerns about selective attrition. Dee and West (2008)
investigate this issue in detail, and we replicate their Öndings with our expanded set of parental
characteristics. In grade 8, we Önd no signiÖcant di§erences in the probability of having non-
cognitive data by KG classrooms or class types (small vs. large), and conÖrm that in this sample
the observable background characteristics are balanced across classrooms and class types. In
grade 4, non-cognitive data are signiÖcantly more likely to be available for students assigned to
small classes, but among the sample with non-cognitive data there are no signiÖcant di§erences in
background characteristics across classrooms or class types. Hence, the sample for whom we have
non-cognitive data appear to be balanced across classrooms at least on observable characteristics.
We begin by estimating the cross-sectional correlation between non-cognitive outcomes and
earnings. Column 1 of Table 2.9 shows that a 1 percentile improvement in non-cognitive measures in
grade 4 is associated with a $106 gain in earnings conditional on the standard vector of demographic
characteristics used above and school-by-entry-grade Öxed e§ects. Column 2 shows that controlling
for math and reading test scores in grade 4 reduces the predictive power of non-cognitive scores
only slightly, to $88 per percentile. In contrast, column 3 shows that non-cognitive skills in grade
4 are relatively weak predictors of 8th grade test scores when compared with math and reading
scores in 4th grade. Because non-cognitive skills appear to be correlated with earnings through
channels that are not picked up by subsequent standardized tests, they could explain fade-out and
re-emergence.
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To further evaluate this mechanism, we investigate the e§ects of KG class quality on non-
cognitive skills in grade 4 and 8. As a reference, column 4 shows that a 1 percentile improvement
in KG class quality increases a studentís test scores in grade 4 by a statistically insigniÖcant 0.05
percentiles. In contrast, column 5 shows that the same improvement in KG class quality generates
a statistically signiÖcant increase of 0.15 percentiles in the index of non-cognitive measures in grade
4. Columns 6 and 7 replicate columns 4 and 5 for grade 8.77 Again, KG class quality does not have
a signiÖcant impact on 8th grade test scores but has a signiÖcant impact on non-cognitive measures.
Finally, columns 8 and 9 show that the experience of the studentís teacher in kindergarten ñ which
we showed above also impacts earnings ñ has a small and statistically insigniÖcant impact on test
scores but a substantially larger impact on non-cognitive measures in 8th grade (p = 0:07).78
We can translate the impacts on non-cognitive skills into predicted impacts on earnings fol-
lowing the method in Figure 2.6b. We regress earnings on the non-cognitive measure in grade 4,
conditioning on demographic characteristics, and obtain an OLS coe¢cient of $101 per percentile.
Multiplying this OLS coe¢cient by the estimated impact of class quality on non-cognitive skills
in grade 4, we predict that a 1 SD improvement in KG class quality will increase earnings by
$139. The same exercise for 4th grade math+reading test scores yields a predicted earnings gain
of $40. These results suggest that improvements in non-cognitive skills explain a larger share
of actual earnings gains than improvements in cognitive performance, consistent with Heckman
et al.ís (2010) Öndings for the Perry Preschool program. In contrast, a one standard deviation
increase in class quality is predicted to raise 8th grade test scores by only 0:47 percentiles based on
its observed impacts on non-cognitive skills in grade 4 and the cross-sectional correlation between
grade 4 non-cognitive skills and grade 8 test scores. This predicted impact is quite close to the
actual impact of class quality on 8th grade scores of 0:57 percentiles. Hence, the impacts of class
quality on non-cognitive skills is consistent with both fade-out on scores and re-emergence on adult
outcomes.
Intuitively, a better kindergarten classroom might simultaneously increase performance on end-
of-year tests and improve untested non-cognitive skills. For instance, a KG teacher who is able to
77We use all KG entrants for whom test scores are available in columns 4 and 6 to increase precision. The point
estimates on test score impacts are similar for the subsample of students for whom non-cognitive data are available.
78Online Appendix Table XIV decomposes the relationships described in Table IX into the four constituent com-
ponents of non-cognitive skill.
150
make her students memorize vocabulary words may instill social skills in the process of managing
her classroom successfully. These non-cognitive skills may not be well measured by standardized
tests, leading to very rapid fade-out immediately after KG. However, these skills could still have
returns in the labor market.
Although non-cognitive skills provide one plausible explanation of the data, our analysis is far
from deÖnitive proof of the importance of non-cognitive skills. The estimates of non-cognitive
impacts could su§er from attrition bias and are somewhat imprecisely estimated. Moreover, our
analysis does not show that manipulating non-cognitive skills directly has causal impacts on adult
outcomes. We have shown that high quality KG classes improve both non-cognitive skills and
adult outcomes, but the mechanism through which adult outcomes are improved could run through
another channel that is correlated with the acquisition of non-cognitive skills. It would be valuable
to analyze interventions that target non-cognitive skills directly in future work.
II.G Conclusion
The impacts of education have traditionally been measured by achievement on standardized tests.
This paper has shown that the classroom environments that raise test scores also improve long-term
outcomes. Students who were randomly assigned to higher quality classrooms in grades K-3 earn
more, are more likely to attend college, save more for retirement, and live in better neighborhoods.
Yet the same students do not do much better on standardized tests in later grades. These results
suggest that policy makers may wish to rethink the objective of raising test scores and evaluating
interventions via long-term test score gains. Researchers who had examined only the impacts of
STAR on test scores would have incorrectly concluded that early childhood education does not
have long-lasting impacts. While the quality of education is best judged by directly measuring its
impacts on adult outcomes, our analysis suggests that contemporaneous (end-of-year) test scores
are a reasonably good short-run measure of the quality of a classroom.
We conclude by using our empirical estimates to provide rough calculations of the beneÖts of
various policy interventions (see Online Appendix C for details). These cost-beneÖt calculations
rely on several strong assumptions. We assume that the percentage gain in earnings observed at
age 27 remains constant over the lifecycle. We ignore non-monetary returns to education (such as
reduced crime) as well as general equilibrium e§ects. We discount earnings gains at a 3% annual
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rate back to age 6, the point of the intervention.
(1) Class Quality. The random-e§ects estimate reported in column 4 of Table 2.7 implies that
increasing class quality by one standard deviation of the distribution within schools raises earnings
by $1,520 (9.6%) at age 27. Under the preceding assumptions, this translates into a lifetime
earnings gain of approximately $39,100 for the average individual. For a classroom of twenty
students, this implies a present-value beneÖt of $782,000 for improving class quality for a single
year by one (within-school) standard deviation. This large Ögure includes all potential beneÖts
from an improved classroom environment, including better peers, teachers, and random shocks,
and hence is useful primarily for understanding the stakes at play in early childhood education. It
is less helpful from a policy perspective because one cannot implement interventions that directly
improve classroom quality. This motivates the analysis of class size and better teachers, two factors
that contribute to classroom quality.
(2) Class Size. We calculate the beneÖts of reducing class size by 33% in two ways. The Örst
method uses the estimated earnings gain from being assigned to a small class reported in column
5 of Table 2.5. The point estimate of $4 in Table V translates into a lifetime earnings gain from
reducing class size by 33% for one year of $103 in present value per student, or $2,057 for a class that
originally had twenty students. But this estimate is imprecise: the 95% conÖdence interval for the
lifetime earnings gain of reducing class size by 33% for one year ranges from -$17,500 to $17,700 per
child. To obtain more precision, we predict the beneÖts of class size reduction using the estimated
impact of classroom quality on scores and earnings. We estimate that a 1 percentile increase in
class quality raises test scores by 0.66 percentiles and earnings by $50.6, implying an earnings gain
of $76.7 per percentile increase in test scores. Next, we make the strong assumption that the ratio
of earnings gains to test score gains is the same for changes in class size as it is for improvements
in class quality more generally. Under this assumption, a 33% class size reduction in grades K-3
(which raised test scores by 4.8 percentiles) is predicted to raise earnings by 4:8  $76:7 = $368
(2.3%) at age 27. This calculation implies a present value earnings gain from class size reduction
of $9,460 per student and $189,000 for the classroom.79
(3) Teachers. We cannot directly estimate the total impacts of teachers on earnings in this study
79Krueger (1999) projects a gain from small-class attendence of $9; 603 for men and $7; 851 for women. Neither
of our estimates are statistically distinguishable from these predictions.
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because we observe each teacher in only one classroom, making it impossible to separate teacher
e§ects from peer e§ects and classroom-level shocks. However, we can predict the magnitudes of
teacher e§ects as measured by value-added on test scores by drawing upon prior work. Rocko§
(2004), Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005), and Kane and Staiger (2008) use datasets with multiple
classrooms per teacher to estimate that a one standard deviation increase in teacher quality raises
test scores by between 0.1 and 0.2 standard deviations (2.7-5.4 percentiles).80 Under the strong
assumption that the ratio of earnings gains to test score gains is the same for changes in teacher
quality and class quality more broadly, this test score gain implies an earnings gain of $208-$416
(1.3%-2.6%) at age 27 and a present-value earnings gain ranging from $5,350-$10,700 per student.
Hence, we predict that a one standard deviation improvement in teacher quality in a single year
would generate earnings gains between $107,000 and $214,000 for a classroom of twenty students.
These predictions are roughly consistent with the Öndings of Chetty, Friedman, and Rocko§ (2011),
who directly estimate the impacts of teacher value-added on earnings using a dataset that contains
information on multiple classrooms per teacher.
Our results suggest that good teachers could potentially create great social value, perhaps
several times larger than current teacher salaries.81 However, our Öndings do not have direct
implications for optimal teacher salaries or merit pay policies as we do not know whether higher
salaries or merit pay would improve teacher quality.82 Relative to e§orts that seek to improve the
quality of teachers, class size reductions have the important advantage of being more well-deÖned
and straightforward to implement. However, reductions in class size must be implemented carefully
to generate improvements in outcomes. If schools are forced to reduce teacher and class quality
along other dimensions when reducing class size, the net gains from class size reduction may be
diminished (Jepsen and Rivkin 2009, Sims 2009).
Finally, our analysis raises the possibility that di§erences in school quality perpetuate income
inequality. In the U.S., higher income families have access to better public schools on average
80We use estimates of the impacts of teacher quality on scores from other studies to predict earnings gains because
we do not have repeat observations on teachers in our data. In future work, it would be extremely valuable to
link datasets with repeat observations on teachers to administrative data on students in order to measure teachersí
impacts on earnings directly.
81According to calculations from the 2006-2008 American Community Survey, the mean salary for elementary and
middle school teachers in the U.S. was $39,164 (in 2009 dollars).
82An analogy with executive compensation might be helpful in understanding this point. CEOsí decisions have
large impacts on the Örms they run, and hence can create or destroy large amounts of economic value. But this does
not necessarily imply that increasing CEO compensation or pay-for-performance would improve CEO decisions.
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because of property-tax Önance. Using the class quality impacts reported above, Chetty and
Friedman (2011) estimate that the intergenerational correlation of income would fall by roughly
1/3 if all children attended schools of the same quality. Improving early childhood education in
disadvantaged areas ñ e.g. through federal tax credits or tax policy reforms ñ could potentially
reduce inequality in the long run.
154
Appendix A: Algorithm for Matching STAR Records to Tax Data
The tax data were accessed through contract TIRNO-09-R-00007 with the Statistics of Income
(SOI) Division at the US Internal Revenue Service. Requests for research contracts by SOI are
posted online at the Federal Business Opportunities https://www.fbo.gov/. SOI also welcomes
research partnerships between outside academics and internal researchers at SOI.
STAR records were matched to tax data using social security number (SSN), date of birth,
gender, name, and STAR elementary school ZIP code. Note that STAR records do not contain all
the same information. Almost every STAR record contains date of birth, gender, and last name.
Some records contain no SSN while others contain multiple possible SSNs. Some records contain
no Örst name. A missing Öeld yielded a non-match unless otherwise speciÖed.
We Örst discuss the general logic of the match algorithm and then document the routines in
detail. The match algorithm was designed to match as many records as possible using variables
that are not contingent on ex post outcomes. SSN, date of birth, gender, and last name in the tax
data are populated by the Social Security Administration using information that is not contingent
on ex post outcomes. First name and ZIP code in tax data are contingent on observing some ex
post outcome. First name data derive from information returns, which are typically generated after
an adult outcome like employment (W-2 forms), college attendance (1098-T forms), and mortgage
interest payment (1098 forms). The ZIP code on the claiming parentís 1040 return is typically from
1996 and is thus contingent on the ex post outcome of the STAR subject not having moved far
from her elementary school by age 16.
89.8% of STAR records were matched using only ex ante information. The algorithm Örst
matched as many records as possible using only SSN, date of birth, gender, and last name. It then
used Örst name only to exclude candidate matches based on date of birth, gender, and last name,
often leaving only one candidate record remaining. Because that exclusion did not condition on an
information return having been Öled on behalf of that remaining candidate, these matches also did
not condition on ex post outcomes.
The match algorithm proceeded as follows, generating seven match types denoted A through
G. The matches generated purely through ex-ante information are denoted A through E below
and account for 89.8% of STAR records. Matches based on ex-post-information are denoted F and
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G below and constitute an additional 5.4% of STAR records. The paper reports results using the
full 95.0% matched sample, but all the qualitative results hold in the 89.8% sample matched using
only ex ante information.
1. Match STAR records to tax records by SSN. For STAR records with multiple possible SSNs,
match on all of these SSNs to obtain a set of candidate tax record matches for each STAR
record with SSN information. Each candidate tax record contains date of birth, gender, and
Örst four letters of every last name ever assigned to the SSN.
 Match Type A. Keep unique matches after matching on Örst four letters of last name,
date of birth, and gender.
 Match Type B. ReÖne non-unique matches by matching on either Örst four letters of
last name or on ìfuzzyî date of birth. Then keep unique matches. Fuzzy date of birth
requires the absolute value of the di§erence between STAR record and tax record dates
of birth to be in the set {0,1,2,3,4,5,9,10,18,27} in days, in the set {1,2} in months, or
in the set {1} in years. These sets were chosen to reáect common mistakes in recorded
dates of birth, such as being o§ by one day (e.g. 12 vs. 13) or inversion of digits (e.g.
12 vs. 21).
2. Match residual unmatched STAR records to tax records by Örst four letters of last name,
date of birth, and gender.
 Match Type C. Keep unique matches.
 Match Type D. ReÖne non-unique matches by excluding candidates who have a Örst
name issued on information returns (e.g. W-2 forms, 1098-T forms, and various 1099
forms) that does not match the STAR Örst name on Örst four letters when the STAR
Örst name is available. Then keep unique matches.
 Match Type E. ReÖne residual non-unique matches by excluding candidates who have
SSNs that, based on SSN area number, were issued from outside the STAR region
(Tennessee and neighboring environs). Then keep unique matches.
 Match Type F. ReÖne residual non-unique matches by keeping unique matches after each
of the following additional criteria is applied: require a Örst name match when STAR
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Örst name is available, require the candidate tax recordís SSN to have been issued from
the STAR region, and require the Örst three digits of the STAR elementary school ZIP
code to match the Örst three digits of the ZIP code on the earliest 1040 return on which
the candidate tax record was claimed as a dependent.
3. Match residual unmatched STAR records to tax records by Örst four letters of last name and
fuzzy date of birth.
 Match Type G. Keep unique matches after each of several criteria is sequentially applied.
These criteria include matches on Örst name, last name, and middle initial using the
candidate tax recordís information returns; on STAR region using the candidate tax
recordís SSN area number; and between STAR elementary school ZIP code and ZIP
code on the earliest 1040 return on which the candidate tax record was claimed as a
dependent.
The seven match types cumulatively yielded a 95.0% match rate:
Match type Frequency Percent Cumulative percent
A 7036 60.8% 60.8%
B 271 2.3% 63.1%
C 699 6.0% 69.2%
D 1391 12.0% 81.2%
E 992 8.6% 89.8%
F 299 2.6% 92.4%
G 304 2.6% 95.0%
IdentiÖers such as names and SSNís were used solely for the matching procedure. After the
match was completed, the data were de-identiÖed (i.e., individual identiÖers such as names and
SSNs were stripped) and the statistical analysis was conducted using the de-identiÖed dataset.
Appendix B: Derivations for Measurement of Unobserved Class Quality
This appendix derives the estimators discussed in the empirical model in Section V and quan-
tiÖes the degree of attenuation and reáection bias. We Örst use equations (14) and (15) to deÖne
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average of test scores and earnings within each class c and school n:
scn = dn + zcn + acn
ycn = n + zcn + z
Y
cn + acn + cn
sn = dn + zn + an
yn = n + zn + z
Y
n + an + n:
We deÖne variables demeaned within schools as
sicn  sn = zcn  zn + aicn  an
scn  scn  sn = zcn  zn + acn  an;
yicn  yn = (zcn  zn) + (zYicn  zYn ) + (aicn  an) + icn  n
ycn  yn = (zcn  zn) + (zYcn  zYn ) + (acn  an) + cn  n:
Recall that aicn and icn are independent of each other and zcn. Let 2 = var(aicn). We
assume in parts 1 and 2 below that zcn; zYcn ? aicn, ruling out peer e§ects. Note also that, as
zcn ? zYcn, the component of classroom environments that a§ects only test scores drops out entirely
of the covariance analysis below. In what follows, we take the number of students per class I and
the number of classrooms per school C as Öxed and analyze the asymptotic properties of various
estimators as the number of schools N !1.
1. Mean score estimator. The simplest proxy for class quality is the average test score
within a class. Since we include school Öxed e§ects in all speciÖcations, scn is equivalent to scn
as deÖned above. Therefore, consider the following (school) Öxed e§ects OLS regression:
yicn = n + b
Mscn + "icn: (22)
As the number of schools N !1, the coe¢cient estimate b^M converges to
plim N!1 b^M =
cov(yicn  yn; scn  sn)
var(scn  sn) ;
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which we can rewrite as
plim N!1 b^M =
cov

(zcn  zn) + (aicn 
P
k
P
j ajkn
IC ); zcn  zn +
P
j ajcn
I 
P
k
P
j ajkn
IC

var

zcn  zn +
P
j ajcn
I 
P
k
P
j ajkn
IC

=
var(zcn  zn) + 2C1IC
var(zcn  zn) + 2C1IC
:
Even absent class e§ects ( = 0), we obtain plim N!1 b^M > 0 if I is Önite and  > 0. With
Önite class size, bM is upward-biased due to the correlation between wages and own-score, which is
included within the class quality measure.
2. Leave-out mean estimator. We address the upward bias due to the own observation
problem using a leave-out mean estimator. Consider the OLS regression with school Öxed e§ects
yicn = n + b
LMsicn + "icn: (23)
where sicn = sicn  sin is deÖned as in equation (18). The coe¢cient bLM converges to
plim N!1 b^LM =
cov(yicn  yn; sicn  sin )
var(sicn  sin )
;
which we can rewrite as
plim N!1 b^LM =
cov

(zcn  zn) + (aicn  an); ICIC1(zcn  zn) + 1I1
P
j 6=i ajcn  1IC1
P
k
P
j 6=i ajkn

var

IC
IC1(zcn  zn) + 1I1
P
j 6=i ajcn  1IC1
P
k
P
j 6=i ajkn

=  
IC
IC1var(zcn  zn)
(IC)2
(IC1)2 var(zcn  zn) + 
2
I1  
2
IC1
Hence, plim N!1 b^LM = 0 if and only if var(zcn zn) = 0 (no class e§ects) even when I and C
are Önite.83 However, bLM is attenuated relative to  because peer scores are a noisy measure of
class quality.
83The leave-out mean estimator bLM is consistent as the number of schools grows large, but is downward biased in
small samples because own scores sicn and peer scores sicn are mechanically negatively correlated within classrooms.
Monte Carlo simulations suggest that this Önite sample bias is negligible in practice with the number of schools and
classrooms in the STAR data.
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Quantifying the degree of attenuation bias. We can quantify the degree of attenuation bias by
using the within-class variance of test scores as an estimate of 2 = var(aicn). First, note that:
dvar(zcn  zn) = (IC  1)2
(IC)2
dvar sicn  sin   ^2I  1  ^2I  C  1

=
(83:63)2
(84:73)2

81:75

437:4
19:07
 437:4
83:63

= 62:39
where we use the sample harmonic means for IC, IC1, and I1 because the number of students
in each class and school varies across the sample. This implies an estimate of bias of
83:63
84:7362:39
(83:63)2
(84:73)2
62:39 + 437:419:07  437:483:63
= 0:773.
That is, bLM is attenuated relative to  by 22.7%. Note that this bias calculation assumes that all
students in the class were randomly assigned, which is true only in KG. In later grades, the degree
of attenuation in bLM when equation (23) is estimated using new entrants is larger than 22.7%,
because existing students were not necessarily re-randomized at the start of subsequent grades.
3. Peer e§ects and reáection bias. With peer e§ects, the assumption zcn ? aicn does
not hold. We expect zcn and aicn to be positively correlated with peer e§ects as a higher ability
student has a positive impact on the class. This leads to an upward bias in both bLM and bSS
due to the reáection problem. To characterize the magnitude of this bias, consider a standard
linear-in-the-means model of peer e§ects, in which
zcn = tcn +

I
X
j
ajcn
with tcn ? ajcn for all j. Here tcn represents the component of class e§ects independent of peer
e§ects (e.g., a pure teacher e§ect). The parameter  > 0 captures the strength of peer e§ects.
Averaging across classrooms within a school implies that
zn = tn +

IC
X
k
X
j
ajkn:
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In this model, the leave-out mean proxy of class quality is
sicn = s
i
cn  sin =
IC
IC  1(tcn  tn) + 
IC
IC  1(acn  an) +
1
I  1
X
j 6=i
ajcn  1
IC  1
X
k
X
j 6=i
ajkn
and as N grows large b^LM converges to
plim N!1 b^LM =
cov(yicn  yn; sicn  sin )
var(sicn  sin )
=
 
h
IC
IC1var(tcn  tn) + ( + 2)2 C1IC1
i
+ 2 C1IC1
(IC)2
(IC1)2 var(tcn  tn) + (2 + 2)2 IC(C1)(IC1)2 + 
2
I1  
2
IC1
The last term in the numerator is the reáection bias that arises because a high ability student has
both high earnings (through ) and a positive impact on peersí scores (through ). Because of this
term, we can again obtain plim N!1 b^LM > 0 even when  = 0. This bias occurs i§  > 0 (i.e.,
we estimate bLM > 0 only if there are peer e§ects on test scores). This bias is of order 1I since any
given student is only one of I students in a class that a§ects class quality.
Bounding the degree of reáection bias. We use the estimated impact of KG class quality on 8th
grade test scores to bound the degree of reáection bias in our estimate of the impact of class quality
on earnings. Recall that the reáection bias arises because a high ability student has better long-
term outcomes and also has a positive impact on peersí kindergarten test scores. Therefore, the
same reáection bias is present when estimating b^LM using eighth grade test scores as the outcome
instead of earnings.
Denote by b^LMe the estimated coe¢cient on s
i
cn when the outcome y is earnings and b^
LM
s the
same coe¢cient when the outcome y is grade 8 test scores.84 Similarly, denote by e and s the
(within class) correlation between individual kindergarten test score and earnings or eighth grade
test score. Under our parametric assumptions, these two parameters can be estimated by an OLS
regression yicn = cn + sicn + "icn that includes class Öxed e§ects.
To obtain an upper bound on the degree of reáection bias, we make the extreme assumption
that the e§ect of kindergarten class quality on eighth grade test scores (b^LMs ) is due entirely to the
84The latest test score we have in our data is in grade 8. We Önd similar results if we use other grades, such as
fourth grade test scores.
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reáection bias. If there are no pure class e§ects (var(tcn tn) = 0) and peers do not a§ect earnings
( = 0),
plim b^LM =

1
1 1
I
+ 2+
2
1 1
IC
' 
(1 + )2
(24)
Using equation (24) for b^LMs and the estimate of ^s, we obtain an estimate of the reáection bias
parameter 
(1+)2
= b^LMs =^s. Combining this estimate and the estimate ^e, we can then use equation
(24) for b^LMe to obtain an upper bound on the b^
LM
e that could arise solely from reáection bias.
We implement the bound empirically by estimating the relevant parameters conditional on
the vector of parent and student demographics, using regression speciÖcations that parallel those
used in column 3 of Table IV and column 2 of Table VIII. For eighth grade scores, we estimate
b^LMs = 0:057 (SE = 0:036) and s = 0:597 (SE = 0:016), and hence

(1 + )2
=
0:057
0:597
= 0:0955:
For earnings, we estimate e = $90:04 (SE = $8:65) in Table IV. Hence, if the entire e§ect of class
quality on earnings were due to reáection bias, we would obtain
b^LMe =
e
(1 + )2
= $90:04  0955 = $8:60 (SE = $5:49)
where the standard error is computed using the delta method under the assumption that the
estimates of b^LMs , s, and e are uncorrelated. This upper bound of $8:60 due to reáection bias is
only 17% of the estimate of b^LMe = $50:61 (SE = $17:45) in Table VIII. Note that the degree of
reáection bias would be smaller in the presence of class quality e§ects ( > 0); hence, 17% is an
upper bound on the degree of reáection bias in a linear-in-means model of peer e§ects.
Appendix C: Cost-BeneÖt Analysis
We make the following assumptions to calculate the beneÖts of the policies considered in the
conclusion. First, following Krueger (1999), we assume a 3% annual discount rate and discount
all earnings streams back to age 6, the point of the intervention. Second, we use the mean wage
earnings of a random sample of the U.S. population in 2007 as a baseline earnings proÖle over the
lifecycle. Third, because we can observe earnings impacts only up to age 27, we must make an
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assumption about the impacts after that point. We assume that the percentage gain observed
at age 27 remains constant over the lifecycle. This assumption may understate the total beneÖts
because the earnings impacts appear to grow over time, for example as college graduates have
steeper earnings proÖles. Finally, our calculations ignore non-monetary returns to education such
as reduced crime. They also ignore general equilibrium e§ects: increasing the education of the
population at large would increase the supply of skilled labor and may depress wage rates for more
educated individuals, reducing total social beneÖts. Under these assumptions, we calculate the
present-value earnings gains for a classroom of 20 students from three interventions: improvements
in classroom quality, reductions in class size, and improvements in teacher quality.
(1) Class Quality. The random-e§ects estimate reported in column 4 of Table VII implies that
increasing class quality by one standard deviation of the distribution within schools raises earnings
by $1,520 (9.6%) at age 27. Under the preceding assumptions, this translates into a lifetime
earnings gain of approximately $39,100 for the average individual. This implies a present-value
beneÖt of $782,000 for improving class quality by one within-school standard deviation.
(2) Class Size. We calculate the beneÖts of reducing class size by 33% in two ways. The Örst
method uses the estimated earnings gain from being assigned to a small class reported in column
5 of Table V. The point estimate of $4 in Table V translates into a lifetime earnings gain from
reducing class size by 33% for one year of $103 in present value per student, or $2,057 for a class
that originally had twenty students. But this estimate is imprecise: the 95% conÖdence interval
for the lifetime earnings gain of reducing class size by 33% for one year ranges from -$17,500 to
$17,700 per child. Moreover, the results for other measures such as college attendance suggest that
the earnings impact may be larger in the long run.
To obtain more precise estimates, we predict the gains from class size reduction using the
estimated impact of classroom quality on scores and earnings. We estimate that a 1 percentile
increase in class quality raises test scores by 0.66 percentiles and earnings by $50.6. This implies
an earnings gain of $76.67 per percentile (or 13.1% per standard deviation) increase in test scores.
We make the strong assumption that the ratio of earnings gains to test score gains is the same
for changes in class size as it is for improvements in class quality more generally.85 Under this
85This assumption clearly does not hold for all types of interventions. As an extreme example, raising test scores
by cheating would be unlikely to yield an earnings gain of $77 per percentile improvement in test scores. The $77
per percentile measure should be viewed as a prior estimate of the expected gain when evaluating interventions such
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assumption, smaller classes (which raised test scores by 4.8 percentiles) are predicted to raise
earnings by 4:8 $76:7 = $368 (2.3%) at age 27. This calculation implies a present value earnings
gain from class size reduction of $9,460 per student and $189,000 for the classroom.
Calculations analogous to those in Krueger (1999) imply that the average cost per child of
reducing class size by 33% for 2.14 years (the mean treatment duration for STAR students) is
$9,355 in 2009 dollars.86 Our second calculation suggests that the beneÖt of reducing class size
might outweigh the costs. However, we must wait for more time to elapse before we can determine
whether the predicted earnings gains based on the class quality estimates are in fact realized by
those who attended smaller classes.
(3) Teachers. We calculate the beneÖts of improving teacher quality in two ways. The Örst
method uses the estimated earnings gain of $57 from being assigned to a kindergarten teacher with
one year of extra experience, reported in Figure IIIb. The standard deviation of teacher experience
in our sample is 5.8 years. Hence, a one standard deviation increase in teacher experience raises
earnings by $331 (2.1%) at age 27. This translates into a lifetime earnings gain of $8,500 in present
value, or $170,000 for a class of twenty students.
The limitation of the preceding calculation is that it is based upon only one observable aspect of
teacher quality. To incorporate other aspects of teacher quality, we again develop a prediction based
on the impacts of class quality on scores and earnings. Rocko§ (2004), Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain
(2005), and Kane and Staiger (2008) use datasets with repeated teacher observations to estimate
that a one standard deviation increase in teacher quality raises test scores by approximately 0.2
standard deviations (5.4 percentiles). Under the strong assumption that the ratio of earnings gains
to test score gains is the same for changes in teacher quality and class quality more broadly, this
translates into an earnings gain of 5:4$76:7 = $416 (2.6%) at age 27. This implies a present-value
earnings gain of $10,700 per student. A one standard deviation improvement in teacher quality in
a single year generates earnings gains of $214,000 for a class of twenty students.
as class size or teacher quality for which precise estimates of earnings impacts are not yet available.
86This cost is obtained as follows. The annual cost of school for a child is $8,848 per year. Small classes had 15.1
students on average, while large classes had 22.56 students on average. The average small class treatment lasted 2.14
years. Hence, the cost per student of reducing class size is (22.56/15.1-1)*2.14*8848= $9,355.
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III Why Donít People Trust Experts?87
III.A Introduction
Your doctor probably knows more about what medical treatments you need than you do. She also
has a Önancial stake in the decision of which treatment to provide. This is called the "credence
good" problem. Sellers of credence goods are known as "experts."
Credence goods are closely related to the "lemons" analyzed in Akerlof (1970). Whereas Akerlof
analyzed the decision of whether to trade a single good, credence goods generalize this problem
to the selection of one good to trade out of multiple goods on a menu. In the one-good model,
the seller has private information about the buyerís price-conditional surplus for the single good;
in the credence good model, the buyer has private information about the buyerís price-conditional
ranking over all goods on the menu.
This generalization creates a familiar problem. Whereas the market for lemons only su§ers
from foregone trade, the market for credence goods su§ers from (socially) sub-optimal choices of
goods from the expertís menu, due to biased recommendations of the expert. This is known as
mistreatment. Mistreatment of patients by doctors, for example, is thought to be a major source
of large geographic cost variation in Medicare (Skinner 2009).
A recent review article by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006, henceforth DK) clariÖes the diverse
body of existing results on credence goods. They show, surprisingly, that the literature has so far
failed to provide any simple, robust explanation for widespread mistreatment. They conclude that
ì. . . a comparison of common experience with the results of this paper suggests that something is
missing from existing models of credence goods.î
In this paper, I provide a simple rationale for mistreatment: consumers do not perfectly observe
expert cost functions. This point has a long history in the literature on regulation of monopolists
(Baron and Myerson 1982)88 but has not been fully recognized in the credence good literature.
87 I would like to thank Oliver Hart for numerous insightful suggestions, as well as overall guidance and support.
I also thank Philippe Aghion, Raj Chetty, Tyler Cowen, David Cutler, Melissa Eccleston, Drew Fudenberg, Joshua
Gottlieb, Andrei Shleifer, and Danny Yagan for helpful comments. Funding from a National Science Foundation
Graduate Research Fellowship and Harvard University are gratefully acknowledged.
88Baron-Myerson (1982) assume that sellers only possess private information about supply, not demand. This
is realistic when regulating the production of one large product (e.g., a bridge) to a community, but not when
regulating the production of thousands of small products (e.g., medical treatments) tailored to individual consumer
circumstances.
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Under the more traditional and realistic assumption that consumers do not observe seller costs,
mistreatment in both directions becomes a deep problem, robust to endogenous pricing, competi-
tion, and endogenous technology-adoption by experts.
DK rely heavily on the assumption that expert cost functions are common knowledge in their
analysis. They recognize this limitation, but do not explore alternate assumptions, and do not
recognize how radically their common-knowledge assumption departs from the adverse selection
and regulation literatures on asymmetric information. In reality, expert cost functions are far from
common knowledge. An expertís cost function may depend on local prices of capital and labor, the
form of organization, production capacity, and her own skills and preferences. Consumers typically
have at best a rough estimate of expert cost functions. A consumer with heart disease does not
know how much it costs any heart surgeon to provide an echocardiogram, stents, or rotoblationñ
much less the consumerís particular surgeon, at a particular point in time. Even sophisticated
buyers of expert services, such as HMOís, observe only a small fraction of the actual variation in
cost functions across individual suppliers. Moreover, cost functions can vary endogenously. Given a
set of market prices, or a reimbursement rule Öxing prices at some local average cost as in Medicare,
experts may partly specialize in particular treatments to maximize the proÖts from mistreatment.
My analysis ignores what I refer to as three important "non-price constraints" on experts:
professional ethics, reputation, and second-opinions. All of these constraints will tend to reduce
problems of asymmetric information, including the adverse selection that arises in Akerlof (1970),
the information rents that arise in Baron-Myerson (1982), and the mistreatment that arises in
credence good markets. However, continuing the tradition of these earlier authors, I ignore these
constraints because they seem likely to complicate the analysis for gains of minor additional in-
sight89. Below I also discuss many reasons why these non-price constraints are unlikely to solve the
mistreatment problem completely.
Understanding why mistreatment arises in credence good markets is important because a large
and growing share of expenditures involve credence goods. Leading examples of credence good sell-
ers include physicians, money managers, lawyers, mortgage brokers, real estate agents, home and
auto repair experts, and funeral parlors. In addition, many public goods exhibit credence. Credence
89However, see Ely and Valimaki (2003) for an example in which the intuition that reputation alleviates information
problems turns out to be false.
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arises when politicians possess inside information about the social costs or beneÖts of potential pub-
lic expenditures; politicians then act as experts "selling" goods to voter-taxpayers. Similarly, CEOs
of corporations act as experts, and voter-shareholders pay for spending with foregone dividends.
Understanding mistreatment in theory is also important because empirical evidence suggests it
may be an economically large problem. A large literature in health economics tests for overtreat-
ment, referred to as "physician-induced demand" (PID). The literature Önds evidence of mistreat-
ment but su§ers from identiÖcation problems (McGuire 2000). More recent studies of variation in
Medicare spending (Fisher et al 2003a,b, Skinner 2009a,b, Skinner et al 2006, Baicker and Chandra
2004, Sirovich 2008, Gruber and Owings 1996, Gawande 2009) suggest that mistreatment may be
economically signiÖcant relative to medical spending growth90.
The leading explanation for geographic variation in medical spending is geographic variation
in capacity. This explanation points to unobserved variation in expert cost functions91 as the key
source of ine¢ciency. While previous authors have explored the role of idle capacity in credence good
markets (Emons 1997 and 2001, Richardson 1999), no one has analyzed the more general problem
of unobserved cost functions, shown how robustly they push the market toward mistreatment, or
placed this problem in its proper context in the asymmetric information literature.
Akerlof (1970) pointed out that governments can "solve" the lemons problem with product
"pooling," or a mandate that all sellers sell their goods at identical prices. Similarly, governments
can "solve" the credence good problem with input pooling, or a mandate that all sellers buy iden-
tical inputs at identical prices. In theory, this would render all expertsí cost functions common
knowledge. In practice, just as it is costly and di¢cult to force sellers of di§erent goods to adopt
identical sale prices (e.g., to force healthy and sick people to "sell" their risk portfolio to health-
insurers for the same price), it is costly and di¢cult to force sellers to adopt identical input mixes at
identical input prices (e.g., to force better and worse doctors to buy the same "e§ort" input quan-
90Studies have documented overtreatment in other markets, as well. Jessica Mitford (1998) informally documents
overtreatment by funeral good sellers. Studies of auto mechanics by the Department of Transportation (New York
Times 1979, cited in Wolinsky 1993) and of optometrists by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC 1980, cited in
Wolinsky 1993) claim to Önd substantial overtreatment. All of these studies can be interpreted in the framework of
unobserved costs presented here.
91 It is useful to distinguish (1) PID, which is mistreatment as deÖned in this paper, from (2) excessive treatment
due to Öxed prices or monopoly quantity-setting (McGuire 2000). In (1), supply equals demand. In (2), supply does
not equal demand. Presumably, the two cases can be distinguished empirically by observing correlation between
consumer satisfaction and treatment rates. The lack of correlation observed in the existing literature (Fisher et al
2003.b) suggests mistreatment, not expert-imposed quantity-setting against the will of consumers.
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tities at the same implicit prices). Hiring experts on salary and purchasing inputs on their behalf,
as do some hospitals and public health systems, can be viewed as attempts to move toward this
pooling strategy. Input-pooling cannot fully equalize input prices for time, e§ort, and ability, but
might help if non-price constraints function better when experts have less to gain from dishonesty.
This loosely describes some of the more e¢cient healthcare producers in Gawande (2009).
The paper proceeds as follows. I Örst provide an example that captures the main story of
the paper. I then present a model of credence goods with unobserved cost functions. I solve for
separating and pooling equilibria under assumptions of monopoly and exogeneity of cost function
type. I then extend the model to a competitive bidding process. I then endogenize the expertís
choice of cost function, under both monopoly and competition. I then discuss the results and
conclude.
III.B Note on Prior Literature
The results presented here Öt into DKís framework in a very clear way. DK show in their Proposition
1 that under three simple assumptions, endogenous pricing by experts solves the credence good
problem. These assumptions are (i) consumers are all the same (assumption H for "Homogeneity"),
(ii) getting second-opinions is not possible (assumption C for "Commitment"), and (iii) either
consumers can verify what good is provided (assumption V for "VeriÖability") or sellers are liable to
unlimited punishments for selling a good of ine¢ciently low quality (assumption L for "Liability").
Moreover, e¢ciency is maintained without H if there is competition, and e¢ciency is maintained
without C if prices are not restricted. If assumptions V and L are both relaxed then all experts
either "overcharge" consumers, i.e. recommend expensive goods and secretly provide inexpensive
goods, or there is no trade.
Unobserved cost functions escape the e¢ciency result of DKís Proposition 1 through a partial
relaxation of assumption V . Suppose a consumer with a hand problem may need expensive surgery,
or may only need inexpensive cortizone shots. It is implausible in this example, and most other
medical examples, to suppose that the consumer cannot verify which treatment she has actually
received. But if we view the same treatment provided at di§erent costs as di§erent treatments, then
partial relaxation of V becomes realistic. The consumer can observe that she has received surgery,
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but cannot tell how much it cost the expert to provide it. Finally, in keeping with DKís Proposition
1, I must also relax assumption L. A partial relaxation of L is su¢cient for my results, and realistic;
experts who undertreat consumers face only Önite and perhaps small expected punishments for a
number of reasons. However, to simplify the algebra below, I fully relax L.
DK suggest a di§erent explanation for the failure of existing models to explain consumer fears of
mistreatment, i.e., the sense that "something is missing from existing models of credence goods."
They suggest that consumers may be unwilling to pay equal markups on treatments with very
di§erent prices. To use their example, if an auto mechanic has a choice between recommending a
new fuse that costs the expert $20 or a new engine that costs the expert $3000, and the expert
stands to gain $500 in proÖt from installing a new engine because he will use idle capacity that
would otherwise generate zero proÖt, then equal markups require a $500 markup on a $20 fuse. DK
suggest that a $520 fuse would outrage consumers. But this is not obvious. Such consumers would
get cheaper treatments when they actually did need them, in e§ect cross-subsidizing themselves
from good states to bad states over time. In the limit, this would amount to an annual subscription
fee, with payment for all needed services at cost, i.e., a standard maintenance or insurance plan.
Unobserved cost functions appear more likely to be the missing "something" than social norms
against collecting insurance fees for risks that have not eventuated.
For the sake of clarity, I should note that the credence good model here does not fully generalize
the lemons model to a multiple-good setting. In the lemons model, it costs the expert seller more
to provide the version of the single good with higher consumer valuation (the non-lemon). In the
credence good model here, it does not. This is because the "quality" of the good is here deÖned by
the consumerís state, not any inherent characteristic of the good. This assumption would eliminate
adverse selection in the one-good model, because equilibrium prices under pooling give sellers of
high-quality goods no greater incentive to withdraw from the market than sellers of low-quality
goods. The fully-general choose-one-out-of-many lemons problem is more complicated than we
need for credence goods, and would involve both adverse selection and mistreatment. Credence
goods still involve private information about both supply (a sellerís cost function) and demand
(the consumerís valuations of all goods on the menu). But the credence good structure reduces the
amount of information there is to know about supply by holding a given sellerís costs constant for
a particular good, even as di§erent consumer rankings of that good can vary. The credence good
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model therefore eliminates variation that underlies adverse selection in order to focus on the new
problem that arises under multiple goods: mistreatment.
Finally, the approach taken here may appear similar to that taken by Fong (2005). Fong endows
the expert with private information on which consumers are more expensive to treat. This results
in experts overcharging some consumers, i.e., pretending to provide expensive treatments while
only providing inexpensive treatments. While endowing sellers with private information on which
consumers are more expensive to treat is similar to the assumption explored here (that sellers
possess private information on their own cost functions), Fongís argument is less appealing for
several reasons.
First, the ine¢ciency Fong derives is overcharging, not mistreatment. This is not a realistic form
of ine¢ciency in many important cases. For example, virtually all concerns about the health care
market involve mistreatment, not mischarging. Second, descriptions of the consumer heterogeneity
that generate Fongís overcharging result are not as simple and appealing as the more traditional
story of unobserved cost functions. For example, he states, "...a crack on the muer of a car will not
bother much a car owner with bad hearing. However, if he is a Hi-Ö enthusiast and has installed an
expensive car stereo, he will su§er much more." Third, Fong derives ine¢ciencies in mixed strategy
equilibria, which are harder to interpret than the pure-strategy equilibria derived here. Fourth, he
makes several other complicated assumptions. He assumes that experts cannot price discriminate
across heterogeneous consumers despite being able to recognize them well enough to target them
with overcharging; that consumers cannot hide their own types from experts or send other types on
their behalf; that it is not worthwhile for consumers to Öx a small problem with a large treatment;
and that assumptions V , H, and C all simultaneously break down in very speciÖc ways. In contrast,
the DK-based model presented here is simple, easy to explain with realistic examples, and yields
robust predictions of mistreatment (not mischarging) as pure strategies.
III.C An Example
As above, consider a risk-neutral consumer with a hand problem. The consumer is willing to pay
15 for healthy hands. But he doesnít know if he has carpal tunnel syndrom, which requires major
surgery, or minor ináammation, which only requires cheap cortizone injections. She knows each
problem is equally likely.
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There are two types of doctors, S and B. S doctors perform surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome
more easily than B doctors; surgery costs S doctors 8, and B doctors 10. Both doctors can provide
cortizone shots at the cost of 4. The "cost wedge" of a doctor is the di§erence between her costs
of providing the more and less expensive treatments. Thus S stands for "smaller cost wedge" and
B stands for "bigger cost wedge."
If patients know what kind of doctor theyíre dealing with, they can calculate the markups
implied by prices and costs. Thus an S doctor charging 13 for cortizone shots and 17 for surgery
would earn the same proÖt on both treatments. Consumers could recognize this and trust the
doctor to provide the right treatment, since the doctorís proÖt does not depend on her diagnosis.
The same holds for a B doctor charging 12 for cortizone and 18 for surgery. Since patients are
willing to pay more for an honest doctor, and a monopolistic doctor gets to extract the patientís
full WTP, this is the doctorís optimal pricing scheme when consumers observe cost functions.
But now, more realistically, suppose patients donít know what kind of doctor theyíre dealing
with. Patients only know that type S and type B doctors are equally common.
Suppose each type of doctor adopts the same equal-markup strategy as before. The expected
proÖt for S will be 9, and the expected proÖt for B will be 8, reáecting Sís greater skill at performing
surgery. Under this candidate equilibrium, consumers will infer the type of doctor theyíre dealing
with from posted prices: the price vector (13; 17) will induce consumers to believe a doctor is type
S, while a price vector (12; 18) will induce consumers to believe a doctor is type B.
Is this incentive-compatible? To Önd out, we must calculate the proÖt that S doctors can earn
from imitating B doctors, and vice versa. If one type of doctor imitates another, his markups
across treatments will vary, and he will mistreat consumers: S Örms charging honest-B prices will
always perform surgery, and B Örms charging honest-S prices will always provide cortizone shots.
Unfortunately, this yields proÖts of 10 for S and 9 for B. Thus both types of doctors would deviate
from the honest equilibrium by imitating each otherís prices and mistreating consumers. Below, I
show that this is a general feature of the credence good situation when consumers do not observe
cost functions.
What equilibrium will emerge in this example, if not the honest one? Two salient candidates
for equilibria are an overtreatment pooling equilibrium at price (12; 18) in which S doctors always
perform surgery but B doctors are honest, and an undertreatment pooling equilibrium at price
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(13; 17) in which B doctors always provide cortizone shots but S doctors are honest. However, the
consumer now anticipates mistreatment, lowering her WTP for expert services. Therefore, the Örst
step is to reduce these prices while preserving equal markups for the relevant types. As I show
below, the proper reductions depend nonlinearly on the consumerís WTP to solve her problem, the
probability of having the big problem, the probability that the expert has type B cost function,
and the cost wedges. In this example, the prices that emerge when S pools with honest-B to yield
partial overtreatment are (10:5; 16:5) and the prices that emerge when B pools with honest-S to
yield partial undertreatment are (10:25; 14:25).
Consider the pooling overtreatment equilibrium at prices (10:5; 16:5), at which B earns honest
proÖts 6:5 and S earns overtreatment proÖts 8:5. (To preview later results for the case when experts
can choose their cost functions, note that it is not a coincidence that the dishonest doctor earns
higher proÖt than the honest doctor.) To sustain this, each doctor must consider and reject many
alternative price vectors. In calculating proÖts at price vectors o§ the equilibrium path, doctors
must impute beliefs to consumers. For example, in the overtreatment equilibrium, B must not be
tempted to announce the o§-equilibrium price vector (13; 17), the separating-equilibrium honest
price vector for S.
If consumers infer that such an announcement must be made by an S doctor, then B earns
a proÖt of 9 and hence deviates: he gets to undertreat consumers, and consumers have a high
WTP because they think theyíre being treated honestly (by an S doctor at honest-for-S prices).
So clearly consumers cannot react to such a surprise announcement with these beliefs if we are to
sustain the equilibrium.
If consumers infer that the (13; 17) announcement must be made by a B doctor, thereby an-
ticipating undertreatment, they will reject the contract and both S and B will earn zero proÖts.
The more useful deviation to test when consumers believe the deviator is a B doctor, then, is the
maximum price vector B can charge that still induces trade in this family of deviations, where the
family of deviations is deÖned as price vectors for which an S doctor would earn equal markups.
This is just one family of deviations. In the proofs, I partition the price space into distinct families
of deviations, and examine the most proÖtable trade-inducing deviations given consumer beliefs
for each type of doctor in each family of deviations. Here, in the "S prices honestly" region of the
price space, when consumerís perceive deviators as B doctors, that maximum-proÖt price vector
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is (7:5; 11:5), leaving both S and B doctors with a proÖt of 3:5. Therefore this belief supports the
equilibrium with respect to this family of deviations in this example. Further calculations show that
there do exist beliefs at all o§-equilibrium price vectors that support the overtreatment equilibrium
in this example. In the proofs, general patterns emerge that show many of these calculations reduce
to a single restriction on the parameter space with intuitive implications.
The ine¢ciency created by the overtreatment equilibrium is the expected excess expenditure on
the big treatment, which occurs when the doctor has cost type S and the consumer has the small
problem. In this example, the ine¢ciency is :5  :5  (8 4) = 1. This means a government maxi-
mizing total output should be willing to spend up to one unit of resources to eliminate unobserved
cost variation.
Are the beliefs discussed so far consistent with the "Intuitive Criterion" of Cho and Kreps
(1987)? The Intuitive Criterion requires that beliefs at a deviation place no weight on doctors
for whom that deviation is weakly dominated over all beliefs by the equilibrium. Clearly, B does
prefer (13; 17) for the belief that S made the deviation (proÖt of 9, as shown above) so that belief
is consistent with the Intuitive Criterion. At (7:5; 11:5), on the other hand, beliefs do not a§ect
proÖtsñthe consumer is willing to trade at all beliefs, and both doctors earn proÖts below the
equilibrium, so the Intuitive Criterion places no restrictions on beliefs here. It turns out that
the Intuitive Criterion does not a§ect the analysis. An even stricter equilibrium concept called
Neologism Proofness discussed by Farell (1993) renders the coexistence of over- and undertreatment
equilibria impossible, and in some cases leaves no pure-strategy equilibria at all. This is consistent
with Farellís Önding that NP equilibria need not exist.
Can the pooling undertreatment equilibrium also exist in this example? As before, the (13; 17)
prices that work under separation must be adjusted downward to reáect the consumerís lower WTP
under pooling. The adjusted prices are (10:25; 14:25). Similar calculations as above show that in
this example the undertreatment equilibrium cannot be supported. The reason is that S doctors
will deviate from a (10:25; 14:25) price vector where S earns proÖts of 6:25 to, among other prices,
a (0; 15) price vector where S earns proÖts of 7 at all consumer beliefs (at these prices, proÖts do
not depend on beliefs since consumers know that both types will overtreat). So in this example the
only pure strategy equilibrium is the overtreatment equilibrium found above.
In other examples, both overtreatment and undertreatment equilibria can arise without addi-
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tional reÖnements on beliefs such as Neologism-Proofness. While these reÖnements are interesting,
they complicate the model and the comparative statics without adding subsantially to the argu-
ment, and I therefore ignore them in what follows.
III.D A Model of Hidden Cost Functions
III.D.1 Setup
The model extends the framework developed in DK (2006). To ease exposition, continue the above
example and imagine a consumer is willing to pay v for healthy hands, but may require expensive
surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome (the high treatment) at cost cH or cheap cortizone shots (the
low treatment) at cost cL. The consumer needs surgery with probability h.
There are two types of doctors, S and B, deÖned as above by their cost vector ci = (cLi; cHi)
with i 2 fS;Bg and cost wedge ci = cHi  cLi. DeÖne cS and cB as the smaller and larger
cost wedges such that cS  cB. DeÖne cS and cB as the analogous cost vectors and qS , qB as
the analogous price vectors. Thus qHS refers to the price charged for surgery by S doctors92, and
cLB refers to the cost of providing L for a B doctor.
I assume that cost functions vary in a particular way: high and low costs are negatively cor-
related. This means that cLB  cLS and cHS  cHB. This assumption describes a world with
specialization by doctors in one treatment or the other, and rules out the world in which some
doctors are simply better at everything than other doctors. This assumption is often plausible and
is required to make the model interesting.
Denote the consumerís belief at an information set (price vector q) as   Pr (Bjq) (omitting
the q argument for simplicity), the perceived likelihood that a B doctor is o§ering the observed
prices. DeÖne the share of type B doctors in the market as p = Pr (c = cB), or, in words, the
probability that a given Örm, drawn from a two-type cost distribution, has the cost-type with the
bigger cost wedge.
The market has n  1 risk-neutral experts simultaneously choosing prices, and measure 1 of
92 It is important to keep the unobservability of cost functions in mind when interpreting the model. The imagined
experts must be su¢ciently similar in apparent realms of expertise that normal consumers cannot distinguish them.
The distinction here, for example, should not be thought of as that between primary care physicians (PCPs) and
surgeons. Consumers know that a surgeon has a cost advantage in providing surgery relative to a PCP. This is why
the numerical example above di§erentiates cost functions by the more hidden metric of surgeon skill. As discussed
in the text, subtle but substantial cost variation of this sort may arise for many reasons.
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risk-neutral consumers.
I now restate the key deÖnitions and assumptions employed in the analysis of DK (2006), already
discussed above.
DeÖne "overcharging" as supplying the low treatment but charging for the high treatment.
DeÖne "veriÖability" as observability of treatment type by consumers. I assume veriÖability
in the sense that consumers recognize the type of treatment they receive, but not in the sense
that consumers can distinguish identical treatments by their cost to the expert. This assumption
rules out overcharging: our hand doctor canít charge a consumer for surgery but then just inject
cortizone instead.
DeÖne "undertreatment" as providing the low treatment to a consumer with the big problem,
and "overtreatment" as providing the high treatment to a consumer with the small problem. A
doctor who likes to perform surgery tends toward overtreatment, while a doctor who considers
surgery a hassle tends toward undertreatment.
DeÖne "liability" as the restriction that undertreatment guarantees an inÖnite punishment of
the expert. Liability ensures that Örms will not undertreat. Below I assume there is no liabilityñthe
doctor who always injects cortizone, even when patients need surgery, never gets punished. The
results are qualitatively similar under su¢ciently limited liability, though they are not robust to
unlimited liability93.
Next, deÖne "commitment" as the restriction that diagnosis by a Örm entails the implied treat-
ment by that Örm. I assume commitment and hence ignore the constraints implied by second
opinions.
I further assume that it is socially e¢cient for consumers to solve their problems, i.e., v > cH 
cH  cL = c for all cost functions.
The order of play in the expert-consumer game is as follows. Nature chooses expert cost
functions and consumer problem types. Experts learn their cost functions and choose prices q.
93Why does unlimited liability restore e¢ciency? In this case, the only mistreatment we need to consider is overtreat-
ment. The Örm tempted to overtreat has lower costs of providing expensive treatment, and attempts to pool on the
higher-cost Örmís pricing for the expensive treatment. But the higher-cost-for-expensive-treatment Örm can simply
decrease its price on the more expensive treatment and increase its price on the inexpensive treatment one-for-one
until it is no longer proÖtable for the other Örm to pool on pricing and overtreat. Full liability makes this possible
by removing the temptation to undertreat as the markup on the inexpensive good gets arbitrarily large. This is why
partial liability is su¢cient for my resultsñit does not permit the higher-cost-for-expensive-treatment Örm to shift
enough proÖt into the less expensive good to eliminate the temptation of the lower-cost-for-expensive-treatment Örm
to copy the other Örmís price and overtreat.
179
Consumers observe prices and choose whether or not to visit an expert. If the consumer does visit
an expert, the expert diagnoses and treats the consumer. The game tree is depicted in Figure 3.1.
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Much of the analysis that follows refers to the price space (qH ; qL), depicted in Figure 3.2. Prices
yield markups over costs and deÖne the expertís incentive-compatibility (IC) line, qL = qH c.
Any point southeast of the IC line commits the expert to overtreatment. Any point northwest of
this line commits the expert to undertreatment. Note that the price space is partitioned into Öve
regions labeled R1-R5. Both types of experts will undertreat in R1 and overtreat in R5. Type S
will behave honestly in R2 and overtreat in R3 and R4. Type B will behave honestly in R4 and
undertreat in R2 and R3. Let S (R2j = 0) refer to the maximum proÖt function of type S for
prices constrained to lie in R2, given that consumers believe that only type S will price in R2.
Thus S (R2j = p) is the S expertís maximum proÖts in R2 when consumers believe that both
expert types will choose the same price in R2. Experts can separate by pricing in di§erent regions,
or by pricing at di§erent price vectors in the same region.
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Figure 3.2 
III.D.2 Observed Costs: Monopoly Case
I begin with the monopoly case in which the expert o§ers a take-it-or-leave it contract to the
consumer. I call the "Örst best" equilibrium that which emerges when the consumer knows the
expertís cost type. This separating equilibrium replicates the results from DK. The expertís strategy
is a mapping from costs c into chosen prices q.
The Örst-best outcome is a fully separating equilibrium with honest treatment. Under separa-
tion, each Örm solves its problem as if there were a single cost function. Hence we can apply Lemma
1 from DK separately for each type of Örm. By Lemma 1, optimal prices satisfy qL+h (qH  qL) = v
and qH  cH = qL  cL.
Solving for optimal prices as in DK, we get for j 2 fS;Bg:
qLj = v  hcj (25)
qHj = v + (1 h)cj : (26)
ProÖts are:
j = v  hcHj  (1 h) cLj : (27)
Under separation, it is optimal for each type of expert to commit to honest treatment of con-
sumers. Honesty maximizes consumersí willingness to pay (WTP) for expert services, and experts
can set prices to extract full WTP.
III.D.3 Unobserved Costs: Monopoly Case
I refer to equilibria in which the expert has private information about her cost type as "second-
best" equilibria. The following two propositions characterize all pure-strategy PBEs of the expert-
consumer second-best monopoly game. They show that perfect honesty is not possible, but partial
honesty is guaranteed. Note that proÖts for all regions and all relevant beliefs along the consumerís
PC are listed in the appendix.
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Proposition 1 There is no pure strategy honest separating equilibrium in the expert-consumer
second-best monopoly game.
Proof. Suppose S and B both treat honestly. Then S maximizes proÖts in R2 given  = 0 and
B maximizes proÖts in R4 given  = 1. First, suppose that S and B price on the consumerís PC.
Then given these beliefs, B will prefer to pool with S in R2 i§
B (R4j = 1) < B (R2j = 0) (28)
() v  hcHB  (1 h) cLB < v  hcS  cLB (29)
() cS < cB, (30)
which is true by assumption. Similarly, S will prefer to pool with B in R4. Now suppose that
either S or B prices strictly inside the consumerís PC, leaving the consumer with positive surplus.
For S not to pool with B, the di§erence qH  qHB  qHS must decrease. For B not to pool with
S, the di§erence qL  qLS  qLB must decrease. But since we have the relation qH +qL =
cB cS = constant, this is not possible. QED.
Proposition 2 There exist only two pure-strategy PBE in the expert-consumer second-best monopoly
game. Suppose
v > cB

1 +
(1 h) (1 p)
h

. (31)
Then there exists an "overtreatment pooling" PBE at prices qL = v  [1 p (1 h)]cB and
qH = v+p (1 h)cB, and proÖts S = v+p (1 h)cBcHS and B = v(1 h) (1 p)cB
hcHB  (1 h) cLB, in which S treats all consumers for the big problem, and B treats consumers
honestly. Now suppose
v < cS

1 +
1 h
ph

: (32)
Then there exists an "undertreatment pooling" PBE at prices qL = (1 ph) v  h (1 p)cS and
qH = (1 ph) v + [1 h (1 p)]cS, and proÖts S = (1 ph) v + phcS  hcHS  (1 h) cLS
and B = (1 ph) v  h (1 p)cS  cLB in which B treats all consumers for the small problem,
and S treats consumers honestly.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 has some interesting implications. These implications should be viewed as merely
suggestive due to the simplicity of the model.
1. All equilibria involve some honest and some dishonest experts. We never have all crooks or
all saints.
2. The dishonest Örm earns higher proÖts. Therefore proÖts are positively correlated with
mistreatment.
3. Only Örms specializing in the costlier treatment ever overtreat, and only Örms specializing
in the cheaper treatment ever undertreat.
4. Market prices depend on the cost wedge of honest Örms, but not the cost wedge of dishonest
Örms. In particular, a larger cost wedge of honest Örms lowers qL and raises qH for both honest
and dishonest Örms.
5. Overtreatment and undertreatment equilibria can both exist in parts of the parameter space
(multiple equilibria), but only if Örms are not "too di§erent," i.e., only if cScB is close enough to 1,
and only if consumers are not too likely to have the big problem, i.e., only if h is small enough.
6. We get clean comparative statics on the direction of mistreatment with respect to all exoge-
nous parameters. DeÖne indicator variable IO to equal 1 if a market can support an overtreatment
equilibrium and otherwise 0, and IU to equal 1 if a market can support an undertreatment equi-
librium and otherwise 0. DeÖne the parameter space . The Öve exogenous parameters in  are
v; h; p;cS ;cB. As shown, the implications of the model for the likelihood of overtreatment versus
undertreatment at this stage are:
@IO
@v
 0; @IO
@p
 0; @IO
@h
 0; @IO
@cS
= 0;
@IO
@cB
 0 (33)
@IU
@v
 0; @IU
@p
 0; @IO
@h
 0 ; @IU
@cS
 0; @IU
@cB
= 0. (34)
Overtreatment is more likely in a market where experts Öx more important problems (bigger
v), and when big problems more commonly befall consumers (bigger h). If consumers place a high
value on solving their problems, and these problems tend to require major treatment, pricing plans
that induce overtreatment will allow Örms to extract much more surplus and therefore tend to
prevail. Medicine comes to mind as a good candidate for this kind of market, at least in terms of
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large v. The model suggests that overtreatment will be more common for expensive treatments
Öxing more common problems, such as heart disease, than less common problems, such as Lou
Gehrigís Disease. It also suggests that overtreatment of a particular problem will be more common
in populations with higher risks of needing expensive treatment, such as bed bug extermination in
New York City, and Alzheimerís Disease medication among older people.
Overtreatment is also more likely when there is a greater chance that the Örm is better at the
cheap treatment. This is because if all Örms are better at the cheap treatment, the overtreatment
equilibrium converges to an honest equilibrium ñ consumers only get ripped o§ by a few bad apples
who are "too good" at the expensive treatment. This may seem reminiscent of specialty clinics
that o§er big treatments like heart surgery or Lasik eye surgery at discount prices, and allegedly
tend to overtreat consumers. However, this application of the model is incorrect if such Örms are
so di§erent from nonspecialists that consumers perceive this di§erence.
Overtreatment is also more likely when cB is small, but oddly enough does not depend on
cS . Symmetrically, undertreatment is more likely when cS is big, but does not depend on cB.
The idea is that in each equilibrium, the binding temptation is for the honest Örm to deviate to a
pure-mistreatment pricing vector, in the direction in which he specializes. When cB is small, the
B Örm has a smaller cost advantage in the cheaper treatment and so is less tempted to deviate,
making overtreatment easier to sustain. This temptation is not a§ected by cS because cS has
no e§ect on the proÖts that would be gained at this alternative pure-undertreatment price. These
results are harder to map into real phenomena.
Which is worse, undertreatment or overtreatment? The e¢ciency loss from undertreatment by
B Örms is the loss in consumer welfare minus the cost savings from B performing a simpler treat-
ment, times the probability of the undertreatment state, or ph(v cB). The e¢ciency loss from
overtreatment by S Örms is just the extra resources wasted by S Örms times the probability of
the overtreatment state, or (1 p) (1 h)cS . Thus overtreatment is more e¢cient than under-
treatment when ph(1p)(1h) >
cS
vcB . Thus, in e¢ciency terms, society prefers overtreatment more
when p,h, and v are larger, and when cS and cB are smaller. Given the above comparative
statics, this means that a mistreating monopolist is likely to choose the more e¢cient direction of
mistreatment. This is not a coincidence: more e¢cient mistreatment allows higher prices.
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Note that in theory, all of these implications are testable empirically. However, these Örst results
depend on many assumptions, some of which I now relax. The assumptions I relax are that (1) the
expert rather than the consumer o§ers the contract and there is only one expert, which together
can be thought of as an absence of competition, (2) the consumer cannot decline treatment post-
diagnosis, and (3) cost function variation is exogenous. Throughout the discussion I maintain the
assumption of negative correlation in cost functions.
III.D.4 Competition: Consumer O§ers Contract
Suppose the consumer, rather than the expert, can o§er price contracts to experts. There are two
cases, a market with a single expert with uncertain cost type, and a market with at least one expert
of both cost types. The former case is akin to a regulated monopoly problem, the second case more
akin to competition.
First, I should point out the separate roles of multiple treatments and asymmetric information
in creating problems for the credence good market. Consider a world with asymmetric information
about cost types but only one treatment option. This is a standard problem in procurement. Let
costs equal cS or cB for this treatment, where cS < cB. In the monopoly case, the consumer will
set q = cS and risk foregoing trade with probability p if v < cS +
cB
p , and otherwise will set q = cB.
(Note that this is about information rents, not adverse selection.) We will see that adding the
second treatment with the credence good structure will yield similar cases in which the consumer
risks foregoing trade, but also creates the di§erent phenomenon of mistreatment, which either adds
to the e¢ciency costs of foregone trade, or creates ine¢ciency even when trade is guaranteed, and
is always present to some degree. It is possible to decompose the e¢ciency costs into the costs of
foregone trade and the costs of mistreatment.
In the competitive case with only one treatment, the consumer will o§er the price that equals
the cost of the lower-cost provider, trade will always prevail, and higher-cost providers will be
driven out of the market, yielding the e¢cient outcome. Now adding a second treatment with the
credence good structure does relatively more damage: it both raises the possibility of foregone trade,
and guarantees mistreatment. In the competitive case, all of these costs are due to the multiple-
treatment credence good structure; neither mistreatment nor foregone trade would be present in
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the simpler one-good model of competition with asymmetric information about Örm costs.
In the case of multiple treatment options characterized by the credence good structure, does
empowering consumers to o§er contracts yield e¢ciency, i.e., eliminate foregone trade and mis-
treatment? The next proposition shows that it does not, under either monopoly or competition.
Proposition 3 The consumer cannot o§er any contracts that induce honest treatment from both
types of expert.
Proof. Consider any qS 2 R2 that S accepts. Note that B earns proÖt qLS  cLB at qS , and
in R4, Bís proÖts on both goods are equal; hence at qB, Bís proÖt on both goods must at least
equal qLS  cLB if he is to accept qB over qS . Hence B will only prefer qB 2 R4 to qS if qLB > qLS .
But by deÖnition of R4, this implies qHB > qHS . This means S will prefer qB to qS , for the same
reasons that tempted B to prefer qS over qB. To keep S happy, we must raise qHS , which requires
raising qLS , which starts the process again. Thus there is no pair of contracts that both Örms will
accept and that induces honesty from both Örms. QED.
Proposition 3 is pessimistic about credence good markets: giving the consumer full control
over prices does not bring about e¢ciency. Prices are too blunt an instrument for the consumer
to overcome her informational disadvantage regarding both what she needs and who sheís dealing
with. The following two propositions describe equilibria arising when consumers set prices. The Örst
proposition describes the set of contracts the consumer might o§er in the monopoly case. Which
contract arises will depend on market parameters, as described in the proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 The consumer will o§er a single price vector. This price vector will induce one
of the following four outcomes: (1) pooling with honest treatment by B Örms and overtreatment
by S Örms, (2) pooling with honest treatment by S Örms and undertreatment by B Örms, (3) pure
overtreatment provided at cost only by S Örms, or (4) undertreatment provided at cost by B Örms
and overtreatment provided at cost by S Örms. Which numbered outcome prevails depends on which
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of the following corresponding numbered expressions is largest:
(1) (1 ph) v  [1 h (1 p)] cLS  h (1 p) cHS
(2) v  [1 p (1 h)] cHB  p (1 h) cLB
(3) (1 p) (v  cHS)
(4) (1 ph) v  pcLB  (1 p) cHS.
Proof. Follows from calculations of consumer utility, which yield these four contracts as the
set of non-dominated contracts. See Appendix for details.
The next proposition describes the analogous set of contracts that arise when consumers o§er
contracts to a population of experts including at least one expert of each type. The results change
because now consumers can o§er contracts that only lower-cost providers accept without risking
foregone trade.
Proposition 5 The consumer will o§er a single price vector. This price vector will induce one
of the following four outcomes: (1) pooling with honest treatment by B Örms and overtreatment
by S Örms, (2) pooling with honest treatment by S Örms and undertreatment by B Örms, (3) pure
overtreatment provided at cost only by S Örms, or (4) pure undertreatment provided at cost only
by B Örms. Which numbered outcome prevails depends on which of the following corresponding
numbered expressions is largest:
(1) (1 ph) v  [1 h (1 p)] cLS  h (1 p) cHS
(2) v  [1 p (1 h)] cHB  p (1 h) cLB
(3) v  cHS
(4) (1 h) v  cLB.
Proof. Follows from calculations of consumer utility, which yield these four contracts as the
set of non-dominated contracts. See Appendix for details.
Propositions 4 and 5 show that giving the consumer all the power, which is closely related to
competition, can yield a greater variety of outcomes than giving the expert all the power, but have
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no clear e§ect on e¢ciency. More outcomes are possible when the consumer sets prices because
now prices depend on the actual cost levels faced by Örms, not just the consumerís WTP and
the expertís cost wedges. The comparative statics from the Örm-o§ers-contract case more or less
continue to hold, but letting the consumer set prices can have strange e§ects. For example, there
are cases in which the Örm sets prices to yield overtreatment, while consumers set prices to yield
undertreatment94.
One feature of these equilibria is that in some cases experts fully reveal their types to consumers
in the act of accepting contracts. This may seen unrealistic, in that a consumer who learned an
expertís true type in the process of trade would update her beliefs and insist on a contract that set
incentives correctly. There would even be surplus to share motivating both parties to change the
contract. However, this raises the possibility that a Örm might accept a contract it didnít actually
want in order to induce renegotiation. I have not explored this more complicated dynamic game
in the consumer-o§ers-contract case. However, the next section shows that this is also a problem
when the expert o§ers the contract, and that eliminating this feature does not improve e¢ciency
in that case.
III.D.5 Price Ceilings (Weak Commitment)
When the monopolist expert o§ers the contract, the pooling equilibria characterized in Proposition
2 involve qH > v. This implies that the contract as written is time-inconsistent: the consumer
wishes to renege on the contract when he receives the diagnosis H.
A time-consistent mechanism to implement this pricing scheme could simply set the diagnosis
cost d = qL and then reparameterize prices to q0L = 0, q
0
H = qH  qL. Such a contract is time-
consistent from the consumerís perspective and leaves incentives unchanged for the expert. This
contract seems plausible: experts often charge large diagnostic fees.
Nevertheless, we may want to relax the commitment assumption in the current framework
without allowing an endogenous diagnostic price. If the consumer can renege on the contract after
diagnosis, we must add the constraints that qL  v and qH  v. How does this a§ect the analysis?
The obvious thing to do is to charge qH = v, and then raise qL to compensate. But this is not
94The following case does the trick when consumers set prices for a monopolist expert: v = 15, p = 0:5, h = 0:5,
cLB = 4, cHB = 10, cLS = 4, cHS = 5.
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consistent with honesty. Incentive-compatibility requires a proportional reduction in both prices,
lowering proÖts that experts achieve under honesty. Now no expert proÖts from honesty. The best
an expert of either type can do under honest treatment is to charge qH = v, earning the same
markup on all treatments sold. This yields the same proÖt as optimal prices in the overtreatment
region of the price space, and may yield more or less proÖts than prices inducing undertreatment.
Suppose S Örms select honest prices qH = v, qL = v  cS . Then B will pool on this price
since v  cS  cLB > v  cHB () cB > cS . This reduces the prices that S can charge
while maintaining honesty, because consumers anticipate Bís pooling and lower their estimated
surplus. But S will not tolerate lower prices, because S was already indi§erent between honesty
and overtreatment. Therefore S will never price honestly. What about B? If B prices honestly,
then S may or may not poolñit makes no di§erence to S or B. Therefore B might price honestly,
but S will never price honestly.
The key comparison is whether experts prefer overtreatment or undertreatment. For S, this
means v cHS ? (1 h) v cLS () hv ? cS . Similarly for B, it means hv ? cB. Three cases
emerge:
Case 1: hv < cS < cB: S and B both undertreat.
Case 2: cS < hv < cB: S overtreats, B undertreats.
Case 3: cS < cB < hv: S overtreats, B is indi§erent between honesty and overtreatment.
Note that the comparative statics that held in the monopoly case once again carry over.
Therefore the ceiling on prices, which can loosely be interpreted as a relaxation of the commit-
ment assumption, does not eliminate mistreatment, and plausibly increases it. A full relaxation of
the commitment assumption would involve "second-opinions," which are beyond the scope of this
paper.
III.D.6 Endogenous Cost Functions
In reality, experts have some control over their cost functions. For example, they can choose among
available technologies and ownership structures. As an extreme case, suppose experts have perfect
and costless control over their cost function. In the model this corresponds to a choice between S
and B cost functions. This also does not solve the credence good problem, and might make things
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worse.
First consider the monopoly case. To sustain honest treatment by the S expert, we require that
h (qL +cS  cHS)+ (1 h) (qL  cLS) > qL cLB, implying cLS < cLB, which is a contradiction.
To sustain honest treatment by the B expert, we require h (qL +cB  cHB)+(1 h) (qL  cLB) >
qL+cBcHS , implying cHScLB > cB, again a contradiction. Therefore a monopolistic expert
with a choice between S and B cost functions will never provide honest treatment. Instead, he will
overtreat as a B type if v > cHScLBh , and undertreat as an S type otherwise. Again, this preserves
all the comparative statics of the monopoly case with exogenous cost functions.
Now consider the monopolistic and competitive consumer-o§ers-contract cases, in which the
contract most-favored by the consumer must prevail. At any price vector inducing honesty by a
type of expert, that type of expert would earn higher proÖts by acting dishonestly under that price
vector as the other type. Now the consumer makes the same choice that the monopolist makes:
induce overtreatment by type B if v > cHScLBh , and undertreatment from type S otherwise.
III.E Discussion
The above results depend on the assumption that costs for low and high treatments negatively
correlate across experts. This assumption seems weak, as experts who are worse at all treatments
should be driven out of the market.
The model still places very high informational demands on consumers, even after relaxing
observability of costs. In reality, consumers do not have a good sense of h, the distribution of
various problems, or p, the distribution of Örm cost functions, especially once we abandon the
simple two-by-two structure assumed here. Weakening these assumptions seems likely to make
things worse, not better. In fact, it seems possible that consumers would not even attempt to
play the game described here, instead abandoning all hope of monitoring experts with price signals
in favor of pure reliance on non-price constraints. This is analogous to concluding, in Akerlofís
lemons model, that consumers trying to buy a used car do not attempt to do inference about
product quality from product price. Instead, they only buy from friends (ethics), or only buy
from dealerships with good reviews (reputation), or insist on submitting the car to inspection by
a trusted mechanic prior to purchase (second-opinions). This is another reason we must interpret
the modelís comparative statics about mistreatment as suggestive at best.
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Anything that mutes price signals sent to consumers a§ects mistreatment. Insurance is one
example. Suppose consumers pay copayment  of all full prices. They then perceive prices q
instead of q. This is equivalent to increasing v by a factor of 1 . Since higher v tends to increase
overtreatment, so does a smaller copayment rate. This phenomenon is distinct from moral hazard
and interacts with it in unknown ways.
As mentioned earlier, I have ignored professional ethics, reputation, and second opinions. Un-
doubtedly these constraints are at least as important as the traditional price and quantity mecha-
nisms explored in the asymmetric information literature. However, all three of these non-price
constraints face problems that suggest a great deal of room for mistreatment when the price
mechanism breaks down. Mistreatmentñunlike mischargingñdoes not require stark violations of
professional ethics. It merely requires that experts partly defer to unconscious or semi-conscious
biases when making decisions under uncertainty (Gawande 2009). Reputation works poorly when
consumers interact rarely with sellers and have trouble assessing quality, two conditions that pre-
dominate in credence good markets. Second opinions also may work poorly in the credence good
context. Many credence goods solve urgent problems; it is hard to shop around for experts when
you are sick, or your car doesnít work, or termites are eating your house. Experts consulted for
second-opinions are also biased toward disagreement with prior opinions, since this may induce the
consumer to seek treatment from the second expert. Consistent with this worry, experts often ask
if the consumer has already received a diagnosis, what the diagnosis was, and who gave itñnothing
like the i.i.d. draws assumed in the economics literature on second-opinions. And many consumers
may hesitate to question the recommendation of an authority Ögure in the Örst place. Therefore,
there is no strong a priori reason to believe that these other constraints can solve the problems
described here.
If mistreatment is a serious problem, it raises the question of an optimal policy response. While
a formal analysis of optimal policy is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth referencing three
policy initiatives that make more sense given the above results. First, the market might not provide
su¢cient incentives to compress input price variation by adopting salary pay instead of volume-
based pay (e.g., fee-for-service, sales commissions, or proÖt-sharing). Second, the market might not
provide su¢cient private incentives to develop technologies that separate diagnosis from treatment
(Christianson 2008). Third, experts might not have su¢cient private incentives to collect and
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publish data on their own performance in a standardized format in order to reduce informational
asymmetries. This might provide an additional reason to encourage electronic record-keeping in
healthcare markets.
Some predictions of the model could be tested without measuring mistreatment. For example,
one could measure the response of prices and proÖts of some Örms to exogenous changes in cost
functions of other Örms in the market. One example of such a cost shock is regulations that prohibit
doctors from owning their own laboratories. Testing other predictions requires measurement of
mistreatment. This data could be obtained as follows for a particular credence good market. First,
identify suppliers with neutral economic incentives for providing the cheap and expensive treatments
in question. This sounds hard, but may be easy. Some experts are paid on salary and supplied
with inputs by a central administrator. Others have large alternative sources of income such as
rich spouses, or are subject to intense scrutiny by other experts or the public. Second, estimate
models of treatment rates on this population of experts, accounting for observable variation in
consumer attributes across experts. Third, impute "honest" treatment rates to experts with non-
neutral incentives for providing the cheap versus expensive treatments, using data on these expertsí
clientele. Finally, deÖne mistreatment as the di§erence between observed and imputed treatment.
III.F Conclusion
Expenditures on credence goods are a large subset of expenditures on all goods. In particular,
healthcare is both the textbook example of a credence good, and may be the worldís most im-
portant goodñnow or eventually (Hall and Jones 2007). Financial and legal services, including
mortgage sales, are also important industries involving credence. There is widespread perception
of mistreatment in all of these industries, reáected in media reports and academic research. Fears
of mistreatment seem consistent with everyday experience.
Yet there remains no simple, robust explanation for widespread mistreatment. In this paper
I have shown that a realistic and traditional assumptionñthat consumers do not perfectly observe
expert cost functionsñgenerates pervasive mistreatment in credence good markets. When cost
functions are not observed, prices do not signal markups. Thus prices do not alert consumers to
the existence and direction of expert biases. Mistreatment emerges under a variety of reasonable
assumptions, including competition and endogenous technology-adoption. By focusing on prices
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and quantities instead of non-price mechanisms, the analysis puts the credence good problem on
the same footing as the traditional lemons problem, and thereby puts mistreatment on the same
footing as adverse selection. The analysis also generates a host of testable implications.
Some broad implications are that (1) widespread mistreatment in credence good markets would
be easy to explain in theory, (2) non-price mechanisms such as professional ethics, reputation,
and second opinions that constrain expert mistreatment may play a crucial role in credence good
markets, and (3) if these constraints do not eliminate mistreatment, then various government
interventions may improve welfare.
Potential interventions in credence good markets include, among many others, subsidized com-
pression of input-price variation (i.e., subsidies for paying experts on salary and purchasing inputs
on their behalf), mandatory and standardized record-keeping by experts, and development of bet-
ter diagnosis technologies to separate diagnosis from treatment. While this paper establishes that
experts have clear incentives to mistreat, the actual extent of mistreatment and the optimal policy
response both remain open questions.
III.G Appendix
Preliminaries Under pooling, the participation constraint (PC), prices, and proÖts in all Öve
regions (see Figure 3.2) are as follows. Note that I solve for the highest prices that satisfy the
deÖnition of the price region (thereby embodying the incentive properties, i.e. overtreatment or
undertreatment by Örms S and B) and that leave the consumer with at least zero surplus.
These regions are labeled by their number and the letter "P" for pooling.
Region 1P
PC: (1 h) v = qL
qL = (1 h) v
qH < (1 h) v +cS
S = (1 h) v  cLS
B = (1 h) v  cLB
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Region 2P
PC: (1 ph) v = [1 h (1 p)] qL + h (1 p) qH
qL = (1 ph) v  h (1 p)cS
qH = (1 ph) v + [1 h (1 p)]cS
S = (1 ph) v + phcS  hcHS  (1 h) cLS
B = (1 ph) v  h (1 p)cS  cLB
Region 3P
PC: (1 ph) v = pqL + (1 p) qH
Prices and proÖts in this region can vary and I do not list them here.
Region 4P
PC: v = p (1 h) qL + [ph+ 1 p] qH
qL = v  [1 p (1 h)]cB
qH = v + p (1 h)cB
S = v + p (1 h)cB  cHS
B = v  (1 h) (1 p)cB  hcHB  (1 h) cLB
Region 5P
PC: v = qH
qL < v cB
qH = v
S = v  cHS
B = v  cHB.
Under separation, the PC breaks into three regions for each type of Örm: above, on, and below
the incentive-compatible (IC), or equal markup, price line in (qH ; qL) space. I label these three
regions their number and the letter "S" (do not confuse this S with expert type S). If I refer to a
region as just "Rx" instead of "RxP" or "RxS" then I am not specifying whether the price in this
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region is a pooling or separating equilibrium. The prices and proÖts of each Örm in each region
under separation are as follows:
Region 1S qL = (1 h) v
qH < (1 h) v +cS
S = (1 h) v  cLS
B = (1 h) v  cLB
Region 2S qLj = v  hcj
qHj = v + (1 h)cj , j = S;B
S = v  hcHS  (1 h) cLS
B = v  hcHB  (1 h) cLB
Region 3S qL < v cB
qH = v
S = v  cHS
B = v  cHB.
III.G.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds as follows. In each region, I ask if a deviation from the candidate overtreatment
equilibrium in R4P to that region can be rendered unproÖtable by some belief. I then check to
make sure that this belief is consistent with the Intuitive Criterion, i.e., only puts weight on expert
types for whom the deviation is not weakly dominated by the equilibrium. If the deviation is weakly
dominated by the equilibrium for all types then the Intuitive Criterion imposes no restrictions.
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Note that a price vector is a strategy. The only way beliefs a§ect the proÖt earned at that
strategy is by inducing the consumer to accept or reject the o§er. In each price region, for each
belief, there are three subregions: inside the consumerís PC, on the PC, and past the PC. Prices
past the PC are always dominated by the equilibrium because the consumer rejects the contract,
yielding zero contracts. Prices inside the PC turn out not to matter. The key prices to check, as
candidate deviations, in each price region and for each belief are those that lie on the consumerís
PC.
Overtreatment Equilibrium
R1 Deviations S must not deviate to R1. Beliefs donít matter here: for all beliefs the
consumer expects to be mistreated by both expert types.
S (R4P ) > S (R1S) = S (R1P )
() v  cHS + p (1 h)cB > (1 h) v  cLS
()
v >
1
h
[cS  p (1 h)cB] : (35)
B must not deviate to R1.
B (R4P ) > B (R1S) = B (R1P )
() v  hcHB  (1 h) cLB  (1 h) (1 p)cB > (1 h) v  cLB
()
v > cB

1 +
(1 h) (1 p)
h

: (36a)
Note that the B condition implies the S condition, by the assumption that cB > cS .
We do not need to check any other prices in R1 because they are either rejected by consumers,
or they are less tempting than prices on the PC, because they donít a§ect consumer beliefs or
behavior, just extract less surplus. So here deviations to prices inside the PC only exist if there are
deviations to prices on the PC.
R5 Deviations Beliefs donít matter here: for all beliefs the consumer expects to be mistreated
by both expert types.
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B does not deviate to R5 if:
B (R4P ) > B (R5)
() v  hcHB  (1 h) cLB  (1 h) (1 p)cB > v  cHB
() p > 0, which is true by assumption.
S does not deviate to R5 if:
S (R4P ) > S (R5)
() v  cHS + p (1 h)cB > v  cHS
() p (1 h)cB > 0, which is true by assumption.
Therefore all beliefs at all price vectors in R5 support the equilibrium.
R2 Deviations Check if  = 1 in R2 can support the equilibrium at the highest prices this
belief can support. This is the belief least favorable to the deviation in this region, implying
the most dishonesty. It is therefore the best candidate for a belief in this region to support the
equilibrium.
D3. No deviations to R2 with beliefs  = 1.
B does not deviate to R2 with  = 1 if:
Same as condition (36a).
S does not deviate to R2 with  = 1 if:
S (R4P ) > S (R2Sj = 1)
() v  cHS + p (1 h)cB > (1 h) v  cLS
() same as condition (35).
Therefore  = 1 at all q 2 R2 can support the equilibrium under no additional restrictions.
Intuitive Criterion: To use this belief at all prices q 2 R2, it must be the case that there is no
price acceptable to consumers at which S wants to deviate given some belief and B does not want
to deviate given any beliefs. This requires:
B (R4P ) > B (R2) (B does not deviate)
\ S (R4P ) < S (R2) (S deviates)
\ qH = qL +cS (q 2 R2)
\ (1 ) [hqH + (1 h) qL] + qL  v (PC)
\  2 [0; 1].
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B condition:
B (R4P ) > B (R2)
() v  hcHB  (1 h) cLB  (1 h) (1 p)cB > qL  cLB
() qL < v cB [h+ (1 h) (1 p)].
S condition:
S (R4P ) < S (R2)
() v  cHS + p (1 h)cB < qL  cLS
() qL > v cS + p (1 h)cB.
These two conditions imply a contradiction if v  cB [h+ (1 h) (1 p)] < v  cS +
p (1 h)cB () cB > cS , which is true by assumption.
Therefore the belief  = 1 can sustain the equilibrium for all q 2 R2:
R3 Deviations Suppose only one type would deviate to a particular price in R3 for at least
some belief. Then at that price beliefs must put weight on that type only.
Suppose that belief puts all weight on S. Then the consumer expects overtreatment in R3.
Suppose that price is outside the PC for R5. Then the consumer rejects the contract
and proÖt at this price is zero.
Suppose that price is inside the PC for R5. Then the R5 case, which checks the most
proÖtable possible deviation that consumers will accept under under this belief, is su¢cient to cover
this price vector as well, since only qH matters for S in R3.
Suppose that belief puts all weight on B. Then the consumer expects undertreatment in
R3.
Suppose that price is outside the PC for R1. Then the consumer rejects the contract
and proÖt at this price is zero.
Suppose that price is inside the PC for R1. Then the R1 case, which checks the most
proÖtable possible deviation that consumers will accept under under this belief, is su¢cient to cover
this price vector as well, since only qL matters for B in R3.
This establishes that price vectors in R3 that are weakly dominated by the equilibrium for
at least one type require no additional restrictions not already imposed by prices in R1 and R5.
201
Suppose both types would deviate to a particular price in R3 for some beliefs. Then the Intuitive
Criterion does not restrict beliefs.
Consider the conditions that S not deviate and B not deviate at such a price q. The
conditions for this are:
S (R3) < S (R4P ) (S does not deviate)
\ B (R3) < B (R4P ) (B does not deviate)]
\ qL < qH cS (q 2 R3)
\ qL > qH cB (q 2 R3)
\ qL + (1 ) qH  (1 h) v (PC)
\  2 [0; 1] (valid belief).
Get a restriction using the S condition:
S (R3) < S (R4P )
() qH  cHS < v  cHS + p (1 h)cB
() v > qH  p (1 h)cB.
Get a restriction using the B condition:
B (R3) < B (R4P )
() qL  cLB < v  (1 h) (1 p)cB  hcHB  (1 h) cLB
() v > qL + [h+ (1 h) (1 p)]cB.
Check if one is redundant:
qH  p (1 h)cB < qL + [h+ (1 h) (1 p)]cB
() qL > qH cB, which is true in R3, meaning that
if B does not deviate, then S does not deviate
if S deviates, then B deviates.
So Önd a belief that makes B not deviate. B undertreats in R3. By construction, beliefs are not
restricted at the price under consideration, so set  = 1. So the consumer assumes undertreatment.
Then all prices in R3 that are inside the PC for R1 are rejected by the R1 condition, and all prices
in R3 that are outside the PC for R1 are rejected by consumers. We know that this keeps B from
deviating. And we know that if B does not deviate then S does not deviate.
The establishes that  = 1 supports the equilibrium for price vectors at which there exists some
 that makes S deviate and some  that makes B deviate.
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Undertreatment Equilibrium
R1 Deviations D1. S must not deviate to R1. Beliefs donít matter here.
S (R2P ) > S (R1S) = S (R1P )
() (1 ph) v  hcHS  (1 h) cLS + phcS > (1 h) v  cLS
() v > cS , which is true by assumption.
B must not deviate to R1.
B (R2P ) > B (R1S) = B (R1P )
() (1 ph) v  cLB  h (1 p)cS > (1 h) v  cLB
() v > cS , which is true by assumption.
R5 Deviations D2. No deviations to R5 (does not depend on beliefs).
B does not deviate to R5 if:
B (R2P ) > B (R5)
() (1 ph) v  cLB  h (1 p)cS > v  cHB
()
v <
1
ph
[cB  h (1 p)cS ] : (37)
S does not deviate to R5 if:
S (R2P j = p) > S (R5)
() (1 ph) v  hcHS  (1 h) cLS + phcS > v  cHS
()
v <
1 h (1 p)
ph
cS : (38)
Note that the S condition implies the B condition, by the assumption that cB > cS .
R3 Deviations Suppose only one type would deviate to a particular price in R3 for at least
some belief. Then at that price beliefs must put weight on that type only.
Suppose that belief puts all weight on S. Then the consumer expects overtreatment in R3.
Suppose that price is outside the PC for R5. Then the consumer rejects the contract
and proÖt at this price is zero.
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Suppose that price is inside the PC for R5. Then the R5 case, which checks the most
proÖtable possible deviation that consumers will accept under under this belief, is su¢cient to cover
this price vector as well, since only qH matters for S in R3.
Suppose that belief puts all weight on B. Then the consumer expects undertreatment in
R3.
Suppose that price is outside the PC for R1. Then the consumer rejects the contract
and proÖt at this price is zero.
Suppose that price is inside the PC for R1. Then the R1 case, which checks the most
proÖtable possible deviation that consumers will accept under under this belief, is su¢cient to cover
this price vector as well, since only qL matters for B in R3.
This establishes that price vectors in R3 that are weakly dominated by the equilibrium for
at least one type require no additional restrictions not already imposed by prices in R1 and R5.
Suppose both types would deviate to a particular price in R3 for some beliefs. Then the Intuitive
Criterion does not restrict beliefs.
Consider the conditions that S not deviate and B not deviate at such a price q. The
conditions for this are:
S (R3) < S (R2P ) (S does not deviate)
\ B (R3) < B (R2P ) (B does not deviate)]
\ qL < qH cS (q 2 R3)
\ qL > qH cB (q 2 R3)
\ qL + (1 ) qH  (1 h) v (PC)
\  2 [0; 1] (valid belief).
Get a restriction using the S condition:
S (R3) < S (R2P )
() qH  cHS < (1 ph) v  hcHS  (1 h) cLS + phcS
() (1 ph) v > qH  [1 h (1 p)]cS .
Get a restriction using the B condition:
B (R3) < B (R2P )
() qL  cLB < (1 ph) v  cLB  h (1 p)cS
() (1 ph) v > qL + h (1 p)cS .
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Check if one is redundant:
qL + h (1 p)cS < qH  [1 h (1 p)]cS
() qL < qH cS , which is true in R3, meaning that
if S does not deviate, then B does not deviate
if B deviates, then S deviates.
So Önd a belief that makes S not deviate. S overtreats in R3. By construction, beliefs are not
restricted at the price under consideration, so set  = 0. So the consumer assumes overtreatment.
Then all prices in R3 that are inside the PC for R5 are rejected by the R5 condition, and all prices
in R3 that are outside the PC for R5 are rejected by consumers. We know that this keeps S from
deviating. And we know that if S does not deviate then B does not deviate.
This establishes that  = 0 supports the equilibrium for price vectors at which there exists some
 that makes S deviate and some  that makes B deviate.
R4 Deviations Check if  = 0 in R4 can support the equilibrium at the highest prices this
belief can support. This is the belief least favorable to the deviation in this region, implying
the most dishonesty. It is therefore the best candidate for a belief in this region to support the
equilibrium.
B does not deviate to R4 with  = 0 if:
B (R2P ) > B (R4j = 0)
() (1 ph) v  cLB  h (1 p)cS > v  cHB
() same as (37), see condition above.
S does not deviate to R4 with  = 0 if:
S (R2P ) > S (R4j = 0)
() (1 ph) v  hcHS  (1 h) cLS + phcS > v  cHS
() same as (38), see condition above.
Therefore, the belief  = 0 at all q 2 R4 supports the equilibrium under no additional assump-
tions.
Intuitive Criterion: To use this belief at all prices q 2 R4, it must be the case that there is no
price acceptable to consumers at which B wants to deviate given some belief and S does not want
to deviate given any belief. Such a price would require:
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S (R2P ) > S (R4j = 1) (S does not deviate)
\ B (R2P ) < B (R4j = 1) (B deviates)
\ qL = qH cB (q 2 R4)
\  [hqH + (1 h) qL] + (1 ) qH  v (PC)
\  2 [0; 1].
Implies:
(S not deviate) (1 ph) v  hcHS  (1 h) cLS + phcS > qH  cHS
() qH < (1 ph) v + (1 h)cS + phcS .
(B deviates) (1 ph) v  cLB  h (1 p)cS < qH  cHB
() qH > (1 ph) v +cB  h (1 p)cS .
This set is empty if:
(1 ph) v + (1 h)cS + phcS < (1 ph) v +cB  h (1 p)cS
() cS < cB, which is true by assumption.
Therefore the belief  = 0 can sustain the equilibrium for all q 2 R4:
This establishes the proposition.
III.G.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that in this proposition I assume the market contains only a single expert, whose type is
unknown to the consumer.
DeÖne CB as a contract o§ered by the consumer that B accepts (i.e., implies B  0) in
equilibrium, and likewise for CS , and deÖne a pair of contracts C  fCS ; CBg. This is a complete
strategy for the consumer.
Now consider other pairs of contracts, one by one. There are 5*5=25 ordered price region pairs
to consider, and there may be multiple options within some of these ordered price region pairs. I
will show that the consumer only needs to consider contracts in a subset of these pairs.
Proposition 3 shows that there does not exist incentive-compatible C such that CB 2 R4 and
CS 2 R2.
Now consider separating contract pairs (i.e., C such that CS 6= CB) in which only one expert
type acts honestly.
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First, consider any CB 2 R4, CS =2 R4. We have to o§er S a contract that he prefers to CB,
but which B does not prefer to CB.
Suppose CS 2 R1. To keep S happy we must set qLS  cLS  qHB  cHS . Thus the best
the consumer could do would be to set qLS = qHB cS > qHB cB = qLB. But this doesnít
work, because now qLS > qLB, so B prefers CS to CB.
Suppose CS 2 R3. This cannot work. Keeping S happy requires qHS > qHB, but in R3
this implies qLS > qLB, which induces B to prefer CS to CB.
Suppose CS 2 R4, CS 6= CB. If qHS > qHB then B prefers CS . If qHS < qHB, then S
prefers CB. Therefore incentive-compatible contracts pricing both B and S in R4 require pooling.
Suppose CS 2 R5. We can set qHS = qHB, and qLS = 0, and now the contracts are
separating. But this contract is trivial for the consumer, who gets the same surplus he would get
if he just set B = 0 and o§ered CB = CS 2 R4.
Conclusion: of the contracts involving CB 2 R4, we only need to consider pooling contracts
CB = CS 2 R4.
Now letís check this for CS 2 R2, and CB =2 R2. First suppose qB 2 R1. This requires
qLB  qLS . This is possible if qLB = cLS and qB is arbitrarily small. But this yields the consumer
the same surplus as the pooling equilibrium with qB = qS 2 R2. What about qB 2 R3? This also
fails: the only way to make B prefer such a contract over CS 2 R2 is to raise both prices, which
makes S prefer Bís contract. What about qB 2 R5? Same problem as in R3.
Conclusion: of the contracts involving CS 2 R2 or CB 2 R2, we only need to consider
pooling contracts CS = CB 2 R2.
Therefore the consumer cannot o§er qS 2 R2, qB =2 R2, nor can he o§er qB 2 R4; qS =2 R4.
The remaining options are qS = qB 2 R2, qS = qB 2 R4, or any prices exclusively in mistreat-
ment regions.
Consider CS 2 R1.
Suppose CB 2 R1. Both types choose the higher qL. Therefore can pool at higher cL or
only trade with B at lower cL.
Suppose CB 2 R3. Keeping S happy requires qLS  cLS  qHB cHS or qLS  qHBcS ,
and keeping B happy requires qLB  qLS . These conditions imply qLB  qHB  cS , implying
CB 2 fR1; R2g, which is a contradiction.
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Suppose CB 2 R5. Same argument as CB 2 R3.
Conclusion: the only feasible contracts involving CS 2 R1 obey CS = CB 2 R1. There
are two such contracts to consider: one that induces trade from both S and B, and one that only
induces trade from B, the lower-cost provider, and foregoes trade with S.
Consider CS 2 R2:
See above.
Consider CS 2 R3.
Suppose CB 2 R1. Keeping S happy requires qHS  cHS  qLB cLS or qHS  qLBcS ,
and keeping B happy requires qLB  qLS . Together, these conditions imply qHS  qLS  cS ,
meaning CS 2 fR1; R2g, a contradiction.
Suppose CB 2 R3. We need qLB  qLS and qHS  qHB. This requires qB to lie northwest
of qS in (qH ; qL) space. Consider the price vector q = (qL; qH) = (cLB; cHS). This price vector is
weakly incentive-compatible; o§ering B price vectors just to the west and S price vectors just to the
south would be strictly incentive-compatible. In addition, these prices induce B to undertreat at
cost and S to overtreat at cost. This is the best the consumer can do in R3. The question is whether
these price vectors actually exist in R3. They do. To show this, I show that q is strictly inside
R3, meaning there is room to the west and south in which to write strictly incentive-compatible
contracts as proposed. Price q is strictly inside R3 if qL 2 (qH cB; qH cS). This requires
cLB 2 (cHS cB; cHS cS), which is true by the assumption that cS < cB. Therefore,
separating contracts inducing lowest-cost mistreatment from both types of providers with CS 2 R3
and CB 2 R3 are feasible and must be considered. This is a "specialization" equilibrium in which
consumers go to low-cost butchers who always sell them the service theyíre good at, whether or
not thatís the right service to provide.
Note that the R3 nature of this price is not important. This is equivalent to separating
contracts inducing trade from B in R1 and S in R5. The range of prices to consider that are never
actually charged in these specialization equilibria run from the pooling contract in R3 (or barely
separating to induce strict incentive-compatibility) to setting these prices to zero, which puts B in
R1 and S in R5. And we donít have to consider the "ine¢cient specialization" contracts with B
in R5 and S in R1, because they are not incentive-compatible.
Suppose CB 2 R5. Here S requires qHS  qHB and B requires qHB  cHB  qLS  cLB or
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qHB  qLS+cB, together implying qHS  qLS+cB or qLS  qHScB, meaning CS 2 fR4; R5g,
a contradiction.
Conclusion: For CS in R3, the only feasible contract also has CB 2 R3, and the best
feasible contract for the consumer induces overtreatment at cost and undertreatment at cost from
the lowest-cost providers. And also my old comment below about this being the same as four other
possible contracts is correct.
Consider CS 2 R4.
See above.
Consider CS 2 R5.
Suppose CB 2 R1. We donít need to think about this, because itís the same as R3. All
contracts that induce at-cost OT by S and at-cost UT by B o§er the same payo§s.
Suppose CB 2 R3. Same, donít need to consider this.
Suppose CB 2 R5. Fine. Can pool at higher cH or only trade with S at lower cH .
Conclusion: only have to consider two contracts, both in R5, inducing treatment from one
or both types.
Note that I do not have to repeat the above calculations again for CB in R1; R3; R5. They
are already considered, because there is nothing about the above calculations that is "from Sís
perspective."
Now I introduce some notation. Let U (Rx) refer to maximum utility attainable (i.e., value
function) at a pooling contract in region x, let U (Rx;Ry) refer to the maximum utility attainable
at a separating contract with qS in region x and qB in region y. Note that U (Rx; ;) reáects a
contract that pushes B out of the market, and is thus trivially separating.
The above discussion shows that the consumer only needs to consider seven types of contracts.
These contracts are:
(R1)
(;; R1)
(R2)
(R3)
(R4)
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(R5)
(R5; ;).
We can calculate the utility available in the best (for the consumer) available versions of all
these feasible contracts and compare them to Önd the utility-maximizing contract.
I Örst calculate the utility available at pooling contracts in every region.
U (R2) = p [h (0 cLS) + (1 h) (v  cLS)] + (1 p) [v  hcHS  (1 h) cLS ]
= (1 ph) v  cLS  h (1 p)cS .
U (R4) = p [v  hcHB  (1 h) cLB] + (1 p) [v  cHB]
= v  cHB + p (1 h)cB.
U (;; R1) = p [(1 h) v  cLB].
U (R1) = (1 h) v  cLS .
U (R5; ;) = (1 p) (v  cHS).
U (R5) = v  cHB.
U (R3) = p [(1 h) v  cLB] + (1 p) [v  cHS ]
= (1 ph) v  pcLB  (1 p) cHS .
Now we check all pairwise comparisons of feasible contract-pairs. Note that we donít actually
have to check all pairs; itís a knock-out tournament, and knock-outs are transitive.
U (R4) > U (R2) () phv > cHB  cLS  p (1 h)cB  h (1 p)cS .
U (R2) > U (1) () v > cS , true by assumption.
U (R4) > U (5) () p (1 h)cB > 0, true by assumption.
U (R2) > U (;; R1) () (1 p) v > h (1 p)cS + cLS  pcLB.
U (R2) > U (R5; ;) () p (1 h) v > pcHS  [1 h (1 p)]cS .
U (R4) > U (;; R1) () v > (1 p) cHB + ph1p(1h)cLB.
U (R4) > U (R5; ;) () pv > cHB  (1 p) cHS  p (1 h)cB.
U (R2) > U (R3) () [1 h (1 p)]cS > p (cHS  cLB).
U (R4) > U (R3) () phv > (1 p) (cHB  cHS) + phcB.
U (R3) > U (;; R1) () v > cHS , true by assumption.
U (R3) > U (R5; ;) () (1 h) v > cLB.
U (R5; ;) > U (;; R1) () (1 2p+ ph) v > (1 p) cHS  pcLB.
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Survivors:
U (R4) = v  cHB + p (1 h)cB
U (R2) = (1 ph) v  cLS  h (1 p)cS
U (R5; ;) = (1 p) (v  cHS)
U (R3) = (1 ph) v  pcLB  (1 p) cHS
These results establish the proposition.
III.G.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Now we extend Proposition 4 to the case of a market with at least one expert of each type in the
market. The key di§erence here is that the consumer faces no risk of foregone trade when o§ering
prices that exclude some types from trade.
The set of feasible contracts is the same as in Proposition 5; that discussion did not rely on
having only one expert in the market.
In R2, both types of expert Önd the contract proÖtable, so the consumer can randomly choose
one and the chance of getting each type is the same as if there were only one available. Same in
R4.
U (R2) = p [h (0 cLS) + (1 h) (v  cLS)] + (1 p) [v  hcHS  (1 h) cLS ]
= (1 ph) v  cLS  h (1 p)cS .
U (R4) = p [v  hcHB  (1 h) cLB] + (1 p) [v  cHB]
= v  cHB + p (1 h)cB.
In the e¢cient R1, now the consumer will get treated no matter what:
U (;; R1) = (1 h) v  cLB.
There is now no reason to o§er the all-inclusive R1.
U (R1) = (1 h) v  cLS .
In the e¢cient R5, the consumer will again get treated no matter what:
U (R5; ;) = v  cHS .
There is now no reason to o§er the all-inclusive R5.
U (R5) = v  cHB.
Utility does not change in R3.
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U (R3) = p [(1 h) v  cLB] + (1 p) [v  cHS ]
= (1 ph) v  pcLB  (1 p) cHS .
Now redo all the pairwise comparisons, ignoring the all-inclusive over- and under-treatment
equilibria that are now strictly dominated. Note that the inclusive R1 and R5 were already domi-
nated anyway. So the key change is that now U (;; R1) and U (R5; ;) might dominate more things.
U (R4) > U (R2) () phv > cHB  cLS  p (1 h)cB  h (1 p)cS .
U (R2) > U (;; R1) () v > cS + cLScLBh(1p) .
U (R2) > U (R5; ;) () v < 1h(1p)ph cS .
U (R4) > U (;; R1) () v > 1p(1h)h cB. Note these conditions (corrected) now look a lot
like the Prop 2 and 3 conditions.
U (R4) > U (R5; ;) () p (1 h)cB > cHB  cHS .
U (R2) > U (R3) () [1 h (1 p)]cS > p (cHS  cLB).
U (R4) > U (R3) () phv > (1 p) (cHB  cHS) + phcB.
U (R3) > U (;; R1) () v > cHScLBh .
U (R3) > U (R5; ;) () v < cHScLBh . Therefore R3 is either dominated by (;; R1) or (R5; ;).
Why? Because in R3, you get undertreated at cost with probability p or overtreated at cost with
probability 1  p, and you must prefer one of those outcomes to the other, so then you just get
that one all the time. Itís not so simple with only one seller, because you canít get one or the other
all the time. Calculations show that U (R5; ;) > U (;; R1) () v > cHScLBh , conÖrming this
explanation.
New survivors:
U (R4) = v  cHB + p (1 h)cB
U (R2) = (1 ph) v  cLS  h (1 p)cS
U (;; R1) = (1 h) v  cLB
U (R5; ;) = v  cHS
This establishes the proposition.
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